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SUMMARY
The economies of Latin America and the Caribbean contracted by 0.5% in 2002. As a result, per capita GDP for the
year was below the level recorded in 1997, which means that the last five years have been lost to the region in terms
of economic growth. The average growth rate for the region as a whole was influenced by the performance of the
South American economies, and especially those of Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, but there was a loss of
dynamism in almost all of the countries. The regional unemployment rate reached an all-time high of 9.1% of the
labour force, in spite of a significant increase in informal employment. Social conditions deteriorated concomitantly,
and 7 million people across Latin America and the Caribbean joined the ranks of those living in poverty in 2002.
The adverse external environment was a determining factor in the region’s poor economic performance. There
were, in particular, three major elements whose effects varied from country to country. The first was the deterioration
in financing conditions, which, although widespread, had a particularly strong impact on the MERCOSUR economies
in terms of both the cost and volume of external resources. In fact, the net transfer of external resources amounted to
an outflow of US$ 39 billion for the year. The second was the loss of momentum in the United States economy in
2001-2002, which particularly affected Mexico, Central America and parts of the Caribbean. The third was the
worsening terms of trade of the non-oil-exporting economies, which lost ground in this respect for the fifth year
running.
The response capacity of domestic economic policy was very limited. Most of the countries deployed tight
monetary policies in order to shield their currencies from exchange-rate pressures. Fiscal policy was also contractionary
in most instances, as it was directed at maintaining the accumulation of public debt at a sustainable pace. In most
cases, real exchange rates were the sole factor stimulating competitiveness in the real sector of these economies. The
few countries that enjoyed enough economic manoeuvring room —carried over from previous years— to pursue
countercyclical economic policies were the exception to the rule.
Inflation rose to 12% in 2002, which represented a setback with respect to the rate of 6% posted in 2001. The
increase was attributable almost exclusively to currency devaluations, since wage behaviour was generally aligned
with changes in productivity. In most cases, however, the upswing in inflation resulted from one-time surges, and the
pace of price increases is expected to ease in 2003.
Even though average GDP growth for 2002 was weak, it did gather momentum over the course of the year, and
the region posted a positive rate for the final quarter. This trend towards a moderate upswing should continue into
2003, when the region’s economy is expected to grow by 2.1%.
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REGIONAL PANORAMA
1. Introduction
Economic activity in the region was down by 0.5% in 2002. As a result, per capita GDP
growth in Latin America and the Caribbean was negative (-1.9%) for the second year in a
row. The hardest-hit economies have been Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, while per
capita GDP has stagnated in the rest of the region. This result rounds off five years of sluggish
growth (-0.3% average annual per capita GDP growth since 1998) within an adverse
international economic context. Social conditions in the region have deteriorated in line with
these trends.
A considerable portion of the slump in GDP seen during
2002 is accounted for by the economic slowdown
experienced in 2001. The business cycle bottomed out
in the first quarter of 2002 (when the 12-month
variation in GDP totalled -2.9%), and the region then
began to rebound somewhat in the second quarter. GDP
growth for the fourth quarter of 2002 is expected to
show a 1.3% improvement over the last quarter of 2001
(see figure 1). In most countries of the region, a break
in trend was seen in the first half of the year. The
main exceptions are Paraguay; Uruguay; Venezuela;
Bolivia, which had a bad fourth quarter; and the
Dominican Republic, which exhibited a declining trend,
although its growth figures are still in a positive range.
Even the downward slide in Argentina’s economy came
to a halt as of the second quarter of 2002 (over half of
the contraction in GDP for 2002 is accounted for by
the downturn that preceded the discontinuation of the
convertibility regime). These short-term swings in
economic performance have been kept within a range
of low rates, however. Owing to this mild recovery,
the region’s GDP is expected to expand by 2.1% in
2003.
The performance of Latin America and the
Caribbean has been influenced by the adverse
international economic conditions which made their
initial appearance in 1998 when the first repercussions
of the Asian crisis began to be felt and by the imbalances
that built up during the 1990s. The external events that
have had the strongest impact on the region include
the deterioration in international financial conditions,
the slowing pace of economic activity in the United
States and the steady decline in the non-oil-exporting
countries’ terms of trade. The economies of the region
that have witnessed a turnaround are primarily those in
which export investment projects are coming on line and
those which have begun to reap the sectoral benefits of
more competitive real exchange rates.
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1 Net external resource transfers are composed of net capital
inflows (including exceptional financing and errors and
omissions) minus the balance on the income account (net profits
and interest). The region’s net external resource transfers have
been negative since 1999.
2 The sovereign spread is the difference between the yields of
sovereign bonds traded on the international market and
comparable United States Treasury bonds; 100 basis points
(bps) are equal to 1% annual interest.
Table 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN
ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Economic activity and prices
Gross domestic product 3.8 0.3 -0.5
Per capita gross domestic
product 2.2 -1.2 -1.9
Consumer prices 9.0 6.1 11.4 b
Terms of trade 6.0 -2.9 -0.2
Percentages
Urban open unemployment 8.4 8.4 9.1
Fiscal balance/GDP c -2.5 -3.2 -3.3
Billions of dollars
External sector
Exports of goods and
services 407.4 392.0 392.5
Imports of goods and
services 420.5 412.2 381.5
Balance on goods 4.5 -1.2 24.7
Balance on services -17.6 -19.0 -13.7
Balance on income account -53.4 54.7 -52.5
Balance on current account -46.3 -51.3 -15.9
Balance on capital and financial
account 61.0 33.0 -1.4
Overall balance 14.7 -18.4 -17.2






Among the external factors that have had a bearing
on Latin America’s performance, the downturn in the
international financial market has been the most
significant, particularly in the case of the MERCOSUR
economies. Net external resource transfers for Latin
America as a whole have been negative for 2002
(-US$ 39 billion, or -2.4% of GDP at current prices),1
with half of that figure corresponding to Argentina. When
this phenomenon is measured as a percentage of GDP,
the economies where its impact has been the most
striking are Uruguay (-19.8%), Argentina (-18.3%) and
Venezuela (-14.4%).
The deterioration in external financing terms has
also been reflected in widening sovereign spreads,2
which have more than offset the decrease in
international interest rates. In 2001, Argentina
exceeded the 4,000 basis point (bp) threshold, and its
spread soared to nearly 7,000 bps during the worst days
of 2002. Spreads this large are associated with a
perception of insolvency, and the corresponding interest
rates are meaningless for the purposes of portfolio
analysis or cost of funds indices, to say nothing of
resource allocation. Traditional exit mechanisms have
proved ineffective in the Argentine crisis, as they do not
provide institutionalized alternatives for dealing with
situations of sovereign insolvency (see box 1). The
international financial community mistakenly concluded
that the Argentine crisis would not affect other
economies. The financial impact that this crisis has had
on Uruguay and Paraguay and the shocks that have
spread to other economies in the region via various
transmission mechanisms demonstrate the magnitude of
that miscalculation.
Brazil’s financial situation warrants special mention.
After a number of years of adjustment, Brazil posted a
primary fiscal surplus and, more recently, a trade surplus
which -if interest rates were to subside to reasonable
levels- would put it on the road to fiscal and external
solvency. Brazil needs some domestic and external
breathing space in order to resume a steady pace of
balanced growth, despite the persistence of some risks
that the new authorities will have to address. The
presidential elections generated uncertainty in the market
and were preceded by an increase in sovereign spreads,
which climbed to over 2,400 bps at the most critical
juncture. A by-product of the financial market’s
overreaction was a reduction in the degrees of freedom
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3 In Colombia the expansionary effect has been blunted to some
extent, as the main effect of this policy has been concentrated
in short-term interest rates. Long-term rates tended to align
themselves with international rates as the sovereign spread
widened, especially in the third quarter, and it was not until
the fourth quarter that some downward adjustment was seen.
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candidates’ endorsement of the IMF agreement helped
to ease financial tensions, and the spreads narrowed
somewhat, but they are still abnormally high.
The slowdown in the United States economy in
2001-2002 has also had a significant influence on
Latin America’s performance, especially in the cases
of Mexico, the five members of the Central American
Common Market, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and
Panama. All of these economies have also slowed their
pace in 2001-2002, and this year only three of them
(Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador)
have positive -but below their historical average- per
capita GDP growth rates.
The terms of trade for Latin American economies
have deteriorated since 1998, except in the case of
the region’s net oil exporters (Venezuela, Ecuador,
Mexico, Colombia and Argentina) and the Dominican
Republic. Overall, the countries posting the sharpest
cumulative decreases in external relative prices have
been Peru (-21%), Chile (-19%) and Brazil (-16%). The
economies that have been hurt the most by this trend in
2002 are Brazil (-4%), Bolivia and Honduras (around
-3% each), while Peru’s terms of trade have improved
by 5% following four consecutive years of steep declines.
The deterioration in the terms of trade has also had a
strong effect on the performance of most of the Central
American economies and on some regionally important
activities, most notably the coffee sector.
In most countries of the region, procyclical
monetary and fiscal policies have amplified the shocks
generated by unfavourable external conditions. In many
cases, monetary policy has been used to mitigate
exchange rate overshooting and has therefore introduced
an additional contractionary bias. Fiscal policy has
primarily been focused on ensuring that public finances
are on a sustainable course, and this has generated
contractionary pressures as well. The countries’
exchange rates have, in turn, tended to depreciate in real
terms, thereby improving the region’s competitive
position. Overall, the most conspicuous aspect of
economic policy in 2002 has been the authorities’ loss
of degrees of freedom in dealing with economic events
as they unfold. This reduction in the authorities’
autonomy in managing economic policy is partially due
to the presence of more severe external constraints, but
the imbalances that built up during the years of economic
strength have also been a factor.
With very few exceptions, monetary policy in the
region has been tightened in response to the pressure
being exerted on the foreign exchange market. Trends
in the sovereign spreads of other countries in the region
have shown some degree of correlation with Brazil’s,
and in most cases this has pushed up domestic interest
rates. In the economies that have been hurt the most by
developments in the financial market, exchange rate
overshot, and the authorities found that they had less
latitude in managing monetary policy. In fact, Argentina,
Uruguay and Venezuela abandoned their existing
exchange regimes and began to float their currencies.
At the other extreme, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru
have enjoyed sufficient degrees of freedom to pursue an
expansionary monetary policy.3  Even in these countries,
however, the main channel for the transmission of an
expansionary monetary policy –an increase in lending
to the private sector– has not always functioned as it
should because of the cautious stance adopted by banks
and borrowers alike.
Fiscal policy makers have also had less
manoeuvring room in most of the region’s economies,
although in this case conditions have varied more widely
from one country to the next. This is partly because the
Figure 2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
TERMS OF TRADE
(Cumulative variation 1998-2000 and variation for 2002)























available degrees of freedom had already been used to
implement the countercyclical policies of the last three
years. Barbados and Chile are the only economies in
the region that have had explicitly expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies in 2002. These countries’
authorities adopted prudent policy approaches during
the boom years, and as a result they are now better able
to implement countercyclical policies. Costa Rica and
the Dominican Republic have combined loose fiscal
policies with tight monetary policies in 2002, and the
net effect of the resulting policy mix has been
expansionary. The other cases in which an expansionary
fiscal stance (i.e., an increase in the fiscal deficit) has
been adopted are associated with declining public
revenues within the context of a slowdown or actual drop
in economic activity, rather than with an explicit decision
to take an expansionary fiscal approach.
Some of the countries have made an effort to
improve public finances by using structural reforms
to boost fiscal revenues. The Dominican Republic,
Guatemala and Nicaragua have undertaken tax reforms
aimed at raising tax receipts in 2002. Ecuador has been
refining its tax administration system in recent years and
has succeeded in increasing government revenues
substantially. Brazil has also boosted its tax receipts by
introducing structural adjustments in its public revenue
system. Panama, meanwhile, has enacted a fiscal
responsibility law designed to give its authorities greater
control over public finances. Mexico made an
unsuccessful bid to increase its revenues, and in
Colombia a tax reform bill is now being debated that
would focus more on building up revenues than on
curbing expenditure. In all of these cases, the aim has
been to concentrate the fiscal adjustment on the side of
government revenues rather than government spending,
since the latter usually involves a greater structural
adjustment of public finances. Most of the region’s
economic authorities have embarked upon a fiscal
policy course designed to address the issue of public
debt sustainability, thereby generating an additional
contractionary force.
The chief lesson to be learned in this respect is
that the capacity to pursue countercyclical fiscal
policies is built up during economic booms. If, on the
other hand, procyclical policies are implemented during
boom years, then fiscal authorities will have no choice
but to use policy measures that will inevitably magnify
recessionary factors during economic busts.
Uneven trends in real bilateral exchange rates
within the region have been another hallmark of the
year 2002. This trend stands out particularly clearly if
the exchange rates for the third quarters of 2001 and
2002 are compared. With the exception of the recently
dollarized economies (El Salvador and especially
Ecuador), Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago, the
countries’ currencies have all depreciated against the
dollar in real terms. All Latin American and Caribbean
currencies have depreciated against the euro as well.
Trends in real bilateral exchange rates within the region,
on the other hand, have been mixed, and Argentina’s
currency has been the only one to depreciate in real terms
against the currencies of all its major trading partners.
Bolivia is a particularly interesting case because its
currency has depreciated in real terms against the United
States dollar and the euro, but appreciated against the
currencies of the other Latin American countries;
because of the volume of its trade with other countries
in the region, the net effect is an appreciation of 1.7% in
real terms. The country has consequently registered a
marginal reduction in its competitiveness vis-à-vis its
trading partners; this also means that its foreign-currency
financial commitments have increased in value, which
translates into a considerable decline in net worth.
Brazil’s exchange rate has also been affected by opposing
forces. The Brazilian real has depreciated by 16% against
the United States dollar (real bilateral exchange rate)
and by 28% against the euro, but it has appreciated
against some of the other currencies in the region,
especially the Argentine peso. Given the volume of its
bilateral trade with these countries, its currency’s real
depreciation during 2002 amounts to an average of 10%.
The net effect of these trends is that a majority of
the region’s economies will start out the new year with
more competitive exchange rates. In 2002 it has become
clear that, sooner or later, real exchange rates
eventually align themselves with the level of
competitiveness exhibited by a country’s real sector.
Whenever exchange policy has diverged from that
course, either because it has been used to stabilize
inflation (a nominal anchor) or because financial
stimuli have temporarily pointed in the other
direction, the deterioration in the real sector’s
competitive position has eventually made a change
in policy necessary.
Adverse developments in the international
economy and the national policy responses to them
have impacted the economies of South America the
most, and their results have strongly affected the
regional averages. Since 1999 (1998 in Brazil’s case),
activity in the MERCOSUR economies has slowed as
conditions in the international financial market have
deteriorated, and the crises that have overtaken three of
this subregion’s four economies deepened in 2002.
Argentina’s per capita GDP plummeted by 12% in 2002
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and the cumulative decrease over the last four years
amounts to 22.4%, while Uruguay registered a
cumulative decrease in its per capita GDP of 20% for
that four-year period. Brazil was the only country in this
group to post even a marginal expansion of per capita
GDP for the year (0.2%). The growth rates of the Andean
Community economies have also been slipping since
1998 (since 1999 in Bolivia’s case), but within this
unfavourable external environment, financial conditions
and inherently domestic factors in each country have
generated differing trends. Venezuela is a particularly
striking case, with its per capita GDP tumbling by around
9% for the year. Peru and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador
are the only ones that had strong growth figures in 2002,
but their performance over the past five years as a whole
has been poor. Bolivia and Colombia will post positive
economic growth rates, but their populations have grown
faster than their economies. The Chilean economy also
languished in 2002, as the steep downturn in the
country’s terms of trade that began in 1998 continued to
make itself felt.
As noted earlier, Mexico, the economies of the
Central American Common Market, the Dominican
Republic, Haiti and Panama lost momentum in 2001-
2002, primarily because of the effects of the business
cycle in the United States and, in most cases, of a
downtrend in their terms of trade. Cuba’s economy has
grown in 2002, although more slowly than before. The
English-speaking Caribbean has turned in a mixed
performance, but the overall per capita growth rate for
the subregion will be a moderate 1.2% for 2002.
Production capacity has continued to weaken, with
gross fixed capital formation (measured as a percentage
of GDP at 1995 prices) in Latin America falling for the
fourth year running in 2002. This decline has also been
concentrated in South America, and Ecuador will be the
only South American country to post a sizeable upturn
(Bolivia and Colombia will register marginal increases).
Of the various Latin American subregions, this indicator
has been fairly stable in Central America, although the
individual countries’ performances have varied. Lower
levels of investment in fixed capital point towards a
reduction in growth potential over the medium term.
In the more critical cases, short-term growth will have
to be based on the increased use of production
resources that have become underutilized
(unemployment, underemployment and idle
production capacity) as a result of recent recessions.
The lower level of investment in 2002 is not
associated with a drop in national saving, since this year’s
national savings rate will be slightly above the average
for the 1990s. The decline in investment is the natural
counterpart of the adjustment in the balance-of-
payments current account deficit (or external saving),
which will amount to 1.0% of GDP at current prices
in 2002, as compared to the 2.7% average for the
1990s. The deficit was US$ 35 billion smaller in 2002
than in 2001, and 80% of this is accounted for by events
in Argentina and Brazil. Apart from Nicaragua, whose
economic results usually diverge from the regional
averages, Ecuador will have the region’s heftiest current
account deficit for the year (8.5% of GDP in 2002),4
followed by Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala, all of
which are running deficits in the range of 5.5% of GDP.
These decreases in investment and external saving
have been associated with the appearance of an external
constraint which is reflected in the underutilization of
domestic factors of production and a situation in which
balance-of-payments trends are becoming a determinant
of the level of economic activity. For the majority of the
region, this is the first time that such a situation has arisen
since the 1980s. This external constraint is
particularly severe for the four MERCOSUR
economies, whose investment rates have all hit 12-year
lows against a backdrop of substantial adjustments in
these countries’ current accounts and exchange rates.
The bulk of the adjustment in the countries’ current
accounts in 2002 has taken the form of a reduction in
imports, which fell by over US$ 30 billion from their
2001 levels (US$ 25 billion of this sum is accounted for
by the MERCOSUR economies). Part of the downturn
is due to the recession that is affecting a large part of the
region, and this cyclical component of the decline could
readily be reversed by an economic reactivation.
However, real depreciation has also been a significant
factor. As long as competitive exchange rates are
maintained, a more structural (and, hence, less
cyclical) adjustment in imports should be possible,
together with an increased contribution from exports,
which tend to react to changes in relative prices more
slowly. This course of action should enable the
countries to move towards a genuine solution for the
external constraints affecting them.
On the international front, the trade agreements that
Chile has concluded with the European Union and the
United States were significant events for the region as a
whole in 2002. Chile has thus become the second country
in the region (Mexico was the first) to have free trade
agreements with the major Western economies. Other
developments of regionwide importance were the
initiation of FTAA negotiations under the joint
4 Ecuador’s statistics are influenced by the investments being
made in a new oil pipeline.
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chairmanship of Brazil and the United States, which has
now been backed up by the authorizations that the United
States Congress has issued to that country’s government,
and by the renewed political momentum of MERCOSUR
and of the South American integration effort, which is
strongly supported by Brazil. This process will also be
bolstered by the WTO negotiations to be held in Cancún,
Mexico, in 2003.
The unemployment rate climbed from 8.4% of
the labour force in 2001 to a regional record of 9.1%
in 2002. These figures attest to the cyclical nature of
employment, but they also underscore the structural
deterioration of employment trends throughout the
past decade, which has been reflected in
unemployment levels that are even higher than they
were during the crisis of the 1980s. Argentina’s jobless
rate has soared to over 20%, and informal employment
has risen in tandem with unemployment. Real wages
have slipped, on average, by 1.5% from their 2001
levels. This regional average is skewed, however, by the
results for economies where a sharp devaluation in the
currency has triggered an upswing in inflation, since real
wages are moderately higher in most of the region and
are up by about 4% in Colombia, Nicaragua and Peru.
In 2002, changes in real wages have moved in step with
trends in GDP per employed person. No misalignments
in real wages have been observed that would pave the
way for an inflationary spike when the economies that
have been in the deepest recessions begin to rebound.
Be this as it may, conditions in the labour market have
clearly deteriorated, as have social conditions in the
region. ECLAC estimates that during 2002 the number
of poor people in the region has swelled by over 7
million. Moreover, the economies where poverty has
increased the most do not have the fiscal resources they
would need to fund public policies capable of reversing
this downturn in social conditions.
Inflation will rise sharply this year (following
eight years of subsiding rates) to stand at an average
of 12%, versus just 6% in 2001. In each and every
case, the upward trend in inflation is a direct consequence
of the nominal devaluations that have occurred, rather
than the result of wage pressures that outstrip
productivity gains. Although inflation has picked up its
pace in the economies that have experienced the steepest
devaluations (Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, in
particular, and, to a lesser extent, Brazil), this has not
triggered an inflationary spiral. This is a relatively
unusual state of affairs in a region that has begun to
dismantle its automatic indexation mechanisms. Here
again, Argentina is a noteworthy case, since many
analysts had predicted that a hyperinflationary surge
would ensue once the country abandoned its
convertibility regime. In most cases, nominal
devaluations have mainly translated into changes in
the real exchange rate and corrections in relative
prices rather than higher inflation. The steps taken to
do away with indexation mechanisms and the greater
credibility enjoyed by monetary authorities have
contributed to this outcome, but so have the recessionary
conditions affecting many countries. As the overshooting
of exchange rates (especially in the MERCOSUR
economies) is corrected, inflation is likely to abate once
again.
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2. The external sector
In 2002, the net transfer of resources abroad from Latin America and the Caribbean amounted
to US$ 39 billion, equivalent to 2.4 percentage points of GDP in current values. While the
region had not experienced a net resource inflow since 1999, it had not had a negative balance
of this magnitude since the late 1980s. The primary reason for this outflow was the sharp
decline in net capital inflows, since interest payments and profit remittances held steady at
the high levels they had reached in previous years. Furthermore, the region's trade balance
underwent a considerable adjustment, owing mainly to the drop in imports. This balance-of-
payments outcome confirms that external constraints on the region's growth have reappeared.
The global economic downturn that had adversely
affected Latin America and the Caribbean in 2001 carried
over into 2002. This year, both the volume of world trade
and world output continued to move at a plodding pace,
with growth rates estimated at between 1% and 2% for
both variables. Accordingly, the Latin American and
Caribbean countries were once again faced with weak
global demand and low prices for their export
commodities, which worsened the persistent downward
trend in terms of trade experienced by most of the
countries since 1998. This phenomenon, whose
influence was felt in all the countries, though to different
degrees, was compounded by the profound but more
geographically circumscribed impact of financial
disturbances that triggered large capital outflows from
several countries in the region. The ensuing adjustment
of the economies concerned, which took the form of
weakened economic activity and sharp currency
depreciations, led to a widespread and significant slide
in imports. Only a handful of countries, mainly in the
Andean and Central American subregions, deviated from
this general pattern.
The adjustment in imports inverted the region's trade
balance, turning last year's US$ 20.2-billion deficit into
a US$ 11.1-billion surplus this year, the first positive
balance in more than a decade. This change was
primarily the result of the large trade surpluses generated
in Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and, to a lesser extent,
Chile, which more than offset the deficits recorded in
the other countries. Added to this positive balance was
the net inflow of current transfers, consisting mainly of
family remittances, which were a major source of
external financing for a number of countries, as they
have been for the past several years. Current transfers
stayed on their upward trend, exceeding US$ 25 billion
in 2002. The Argentine crisis led to a reduction in the
flow of remittances to Bolivia and Paraguay; transfer
income in Colombia and Peru also shrank while
Ecuador's remained stable. The Dominican Republic and
nearly all the Central American countries, on the other
hand, received sizeable amounts of transfer income.
Brazil, Guatemala and Mexico racked up the biggest
increases in absolute terms.
The trade surplus and transfers from residents
abroad combined were not enough to cover net payments
of profits and interest (US$ 52.5 billion). Overall, the
balance-of-payments current account deficit was
considerably smaller, contracting from more than US$ 51.3
billion in 2001 to US$ 15.9 billion in 2002, which was
equivalent to 1% of regional GDP (see figure 3).
The financial turmoil plaguing the region was
reflected in the erosion of the capital and financial
16 ECLAC
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accounts of the balance of payments. Problems in
obtaining external financing, dwindling inflows of
foreign direct investment and large outflows of short-
term capital resulted in a steep decline in net inflows of
autonomous capital for the second year running,
especially in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela.
In fact, the region as a whole registered zero or slightly
negative net inflows of such capital in 2002, which had
not happened since 1990. To cover the current-account
deficit, the authorities had to use compensatory capital
derived from IMF financing and, in the case of Argentina,
delays in payments of interest and amortizations of
mature debt. The upshot of all these factors was a loss of
international reserves across the region; these losses were
very severe in the four countries mentioned above, with
the exception of Brazil, which was able to replace the
reserves it used with funds from an IMF loan.
Because net capital inflows were limited to resources
from exceptional financing, the net transfer of resources
reached unprecedented negative values. FDI flows were
again positive, but more modest than those received in
2001. The negative net transfer of resources can be traced
to financial flows, which, between interest payments and
net capital outflows, amounted to nearly US$ 65 billion,
which was equivalent to almost four points of regional
GDP (see figure 4).
In 2003, the region's current-account deficit may
not be much bigger than this year's figure, even though
imports can be expected to recover somewhat from the
abnormally low levels they are currently posting in
several countries. Exchange-rate corrections will
probably sustain the improvement seen in exports in the
second half of 2002. In addition, FDI flows are likely to
remain positive, even within the downward trend they
have shown in recent years. Notwithstanding these
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economies are to have enough funds to meet their
obligations in terms of debt servicing and profit
remittances, it is vitally important that they regain
access to external financing at normal interest rates.
Otherwise, more of the region's countries will have
to turn to mechanisms for restructuring external debt
(see box).
Capital inflows reach their lowest ebb since
1989
Against the backdrop of a downturn in the international
financial market, in 2002 capital flows to Latin America
and the Caribbean declined to the lowest levels since
the 1980s. Investors' risk aversion mounted between June
and September, partly due to the climate in the run-up
to the elections in Brazil. As a result, the region's external
borrowing conditions took a turn for the worse and
sovereign spreads rose, which more than offset the
decrease in international interest rates. In the wake of
Brazil's agreement with IMF, which was backed by all
the presidential candidates, from October on the financial
turmoil began to settle, although spreads remained
abnormally high.
Capital inflows amounted to almost US$ 14 billion
in 2002, which stands in sharp contrast to the average of
US$ 58 billion received by the region between 1991 and
2001. The positive net inflow of capital is the result of
inflows of compensatory capital (IMF credits and
exceptional financing), since the contribution of
autonomous capital was virtually nil. The region had
not recorded capital inflows this low since 1989.
All components of autonomous capital contracted,
though some of them were still positive. FDI came in at
US$ 39 billion, which was far below the average of US$ 67
billion recorded between 1997 and 2001 (though still
higher than the levels received between 1992 and 1996).
This fall was due in part to short-term factors, which,
depending on the country concerned, ranged from
recession to greater political instability or the uncertainty
generated by changes in the "rules of the game", such as
occurred in Argentina. Also influencing this outcome,
however, were longer-term factors such as the
completion of privatization processes in many of the
countries. Moreover, the strategy of expansion pursued
by some transnational groups, which had led them to
acquire Latin American banks and firms of different
types (including many privately-owned ones), seems to
have petered out. This mirrors the fact that, at the world
level, an exceptionally active phase of mergers and
acquisitions has drawn to a close.
The FDI slump was especially acute in Brazil,
Mexico and Chile, as purchases of existing assets fell
off sharply. Some countries, however, have managed to
keep FDI flows relatively stable in recent years thanks
to new investments, mainly in the primary sector. In
particular, less volatile flows were observed in the
Andean Community countries. Direct investment abroad,
nearly all of which came from residents of Brazil, Chile,
Colombia and Venezuela, was about US$ 5 billion, by
contrast to 2001, when it was almost zero.
Flows of debt and other private capital were
negative, following the pattern begun in 1999. Outflows
of such capital were massive, especially in the cases of
Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, which replaced their
fixed exchange rates or exchange bands with currency
floats. Once the devaluations took place, capital outflows
tended to become more moderate, meaning that most of
them were observed in the first half of the year. Brazil
also experienced capital flight in the months preceding
its October elections, but this eased significantly once
the electoral process was over. Thus, the negative balance
on the capital account can be blamed in part on
speculative movements which should not persist (at least
to the same degree) once the forces propelling them have
disappeared.
There are also, however, more long-term factors that
make the recovery of easy access to external financing
unlikely for a number of countries, including, in
particular, the high degree of indebtedness they built up
over the 1990s, which has already caused external debt-
servicing problems. Another factor is the persistence of
a "flight to safety" that has dampened the flow of new
capital to emerging markets, particularly since the
Russian crisis of 1998.
After a period between 1992 and 1997 when capital
flows had returned to the region and had even become
quite abundant, net financial flows to the region from
international banks have declined. The region's debt to
international banks decreased by almost 20% between
late 1997 and June 2002, according to figures from the
Bank for International Settlements. Another major
financial flow in this period consisted of borrowing
through international bond issues, a mechanism favoured
by the region's governments and leading firms. Public-
sector resources from these operations, however, have
gone mainly to refinance existing liabilities and have
not brought in new financing for the larger economies.
Equity flows continued to be volatile, and the first
half of the year saw a net outflow of capital. This was
associated with the sharp downturn in stock prices,
especially in the main financial centres in the region. In
November 2002, the dollar-denominated regional index
was down by 20% with respect to the end of 2001. A
drop this steep had not been seen since 1998, when the
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region had been hit by the effects of the Russian
moratorium.
Bond issues on the international markets amounted
to US$ 16.2 billion in 2002, or half the figure recorded
in 2001 (see figure 5). The bulk of these operations
consisted of sovereign bond issues, launched mainly by
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay, and
the proceeds went almost entirely to amortizations of
mature debt or to debt swaps. Bonds were also issued
by the governments of Chile, El Salvador, Jamaica and,
for the first time since 1928, Peru. Most of the issues
were made between January and April, followed by a
few between September and November.  Few regional
firms issued bonds in 2002, with Chile's CODELCO,
Mexico's PEMEX and Brazil's PETROBRAS the only
significant players involved.
Between June and September, when investor's risk
aversion was at its height, sovereign spreads increased
across the region and the regional average rose above
1,000 basis points. The largest increases were recorded
in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, where spreads reached
levels that reflected an effective exclusion from the
voluntary market. Spreads were also sharply up, though
not to such extreme levels, in Colombia and Peru. Chile
and Mexico, whose sovereign bonds enjoy investment-
grade rating, posted the lowest rises between June and
September (see figure 7). Spreads began to come down
from October on, but remained abnormally high for most
governments; in mid-December the average spread on the
region's sovereign bonds was around 870 basis points.
IMF financing became crucial, given the limited
access to voluntary financing and balance-of-payments
crises in a number of countries. Brazil and Uruguay,
battered by the Argentine crisis and with virtually no
Figure 5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES
(Billions of dollars)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from IMF and Merrill Lynch.
The cost and maturity of bond issues continued to
reflect the generally negative trend that has prevailed
since the Asian crisis (see figure 6). Maturities remained
unchanged at around seven years. There was a relative
improvement in the second half of the year, but this
corresponded to small issues made by a small number
of governments. In the first quarter, the average cost of
new issues varied around an annual rate of 11%. From
May onward, when very few issues were being made,
this cost rose to reach 14% in September, then dropped
slightly, although this average masks a variety of very
dissimilar cases. The increase was entirely attributable
to the larger spreads paid by the region's countries, since
the yield on 10-year United States Treasury bonds held
steady at around 4% per year.
Figure 6
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COST AND
MATURITIES OF INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from J.P. Morgan, Emerging
Markets Bond Index Monitor, and Merrill Lynch, Emerging
Markets Daily.
a Sum of the average spread for bond issues and the yield on long-term
United States Treasury bonds. Spreads correspond to estimates given
in the Latin Eurobond Index (LEI).
b LEI recalculated using fixed weightings corresponding to November
2001.
c October and November.
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access to voluntary credit, were able to secure sizeable
loans from IMF. Brazil had an existing arrangement with
the Fund, and in August signed another which provides
access to disbursements for a total of US$ 30 billion up
to the end of 2003. By September Brazil had drawn on
US$ 8.5 billion of this amount, which helped it maintain
the level of its reserves. In Uruguay, IMF disbursements
were used to shore up the private banking system, which
had to deal with a run on deposits. In June and August,
the government received disbursements of US$ 1.6 billion,
or the equivalent of 12% of GDP, of which over half went
to restore international reserves that had been used to
support stricken banks. The banks whose operations had
been suspended at the time of the bank holiday declared
in July were still unable to open their doors at the end of
November, which led to the postponement of two
instalments of the loan arranged with IMF.
Other countries failed to reach agreement with IMF
regarding the conditions attached to new loans and were
thus unable to secure resources from the Fund. A number
of countries even made net payments on their IMF debts,
including Argentina, which made net payments of
US$ 630 million on this item. Including also the
payments made to the World Bank and IDB, in 2002
Argentina made loan repayments totalling US$ 2.8
billion. Early in the year Ecuador received a
disbursement of US$ 90 million, but the government
later rejected the conditions attached to the loan by IMF.
In August the Fund granted Paraguay a US$ 200-million
loan, but these resources were not disbursed because the
government was unable to secure congressional approval
for the fiscal and banking reforms stipulated in the loan
agreement. As these examples show, IMF conditionality
is becoming increasingly vested in requirements that
need to be approved by congress, which is being
questioned by some of the region's governments and
legislatures.
Foreign trade continues to face a sluggish
global economic environment
The world economy's slow growth showed little change
in 2002. The performance of the developed regions was
uneven, but the slowdown that began in 2001 affected
all of them (see figure 8). This situation affected the
countries of the region mainly in the form of lower prices
for commodities, their main export. As a result, most of
the countries saw a new decline in their terms of trade,
which intensified the downward trend that has been in
evidence since 1998.
Over the first 11 months of the year, the commodity
price index for non-oil commodities exported by Latin
America and the Caribbean dropped by almost 1.5% with
respect to the average for 2001, resulting in a cumulative
decline of over 6% in two years. Given the close
relationship between raw material consumption and the
level  of  economic  activity,  these  commodities
(especially minerals) were the products most seriously
affected by the erosion in prices. Important food products
from tropical and subtropical zones, in particular sugar
and shrimp, also suffered from the downturn. Coffee was
again the most dramatic casualty, however, with a price
Figure 7a
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SOVEREIGN
BOND SPREADS (EMBI)
(Over yields of United States Treasury
 bonds)
Figure 7b
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from J.P. Morgan.
Notes: EMBI: Emerging Markets Bond Index. Argentina: ELI PARL index;
Brazil: ELI PBRL index; Mexico: ELI PMXL index; Peru: ELI PPRL
index; Venezuela: ELI PVNL index. Uruguay: Yld YTM Bid of
standard global sovereign bond maturing in 2008. Chile: Yld YTM
Ask of sovereign bond maturing in 2009. Colombia : YTW of global
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slide of more than 10%, which continued the downward
trend observed since 1998. The average price in 2002
stood somewhere between 30% and 40% (depending on
the variety of coffee) of the price obtained in the mid-
1990s. Among agricultural raw materials, cotton and pulp
were particularly affected by price slumps.
On the other hand, some products fetched higher
prices, notably grains, fish meal, wool and gold, which
was used as a store of value in response to the threat of
an international armed conflict. Crude oil prices,
meanwhile, rose by almost 10% recovering in part from
the preceding year's decline (see figure 9).
following the Asian crisis. Since that time, the non-oil-
exporting countries in particular have sustained
substantial terms of trade losses. In Brazil, Chile,
Paraguay, Uruguay and most of the Central American
countries (especially El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras
and Nicaragua), the cumulative decline over the past five
years has ranged from 15% to 20% approximately. In
2002 alone, Brazil's terms of trade declined by 4% and
Bolivia's and Honduras' by around 3%.
Another channel through which the global economic
situation affected the region's trade was export volumes.
As in 2001, this had the greatest impact  in the countries
with the closest ties to the United States market. United
States purchases from Mexico remained flat between
January and September, while those from Central
America showed moderate growth of 4%. Thus, this
market was no longer the engine of growth it had been
up until 2000. The CARICOM countries saw a decline
of 6% in exports to the United States, with the sole
exceptions of Bahamas, Montserrat and Saint Kitts and
Nevis.
A number of factors apart from the global economic
environment also affected export volumes. A principal
constraint was the performance of intraregional trade as
indicated below. Others reflected domestic factors and
were particular to individual countries. This was true of
Brazil, whose shipments expanded appreciably in the
second semester thanks to the greater competitiveness
achieved through currency devaluation, entry into new
markets and an upturn in agriculture. Conversely, other
countries were plagued by adverse developments:
Colombia, by a drop in its oil extraction, and Paraguay,
by losses of export crops owing to drought. Export
volumes showed a moderate increase of 2% for the region
as a whole, but declined in about half of the countries.
In several countries, currency depreciation resulted
not in an expansion of exports, but rather a contraction
in imports. This was due to the predominance of
commodities in the external sales of most countries in
the region, since the supply of these products is not elastic
in the short term. The stabilization of exchange-rate
adjustments, however, will facilitate the emergence of a
relative price structure that is conducive to investment
in tradable goods sectors, including the production of
both primary and manufactured goods for export.
… aggravated by a contraction in the regional
market
The slowdown in economic activity in most of the
region's countries resulted in a contraction in imports,





PRICES OF LATIN AMERICAN EXPORT COMMODITIES
(Indices, January 1999=100)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
Import prices also diminished in almost all the
countries, which enabled some of them to avert a decline
in their terms of trade. Most, however, experienced a
worsening in the downward trend that had begun in 1998
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not have a significant effect on sales within this market,
and intraregional trade shrank by 16% (see figure 10).
Most of this decline occurred in the MERCOSUR
countries, and was due primarily to the slump in
Argentina's imports, whose intraregional purchases
dropped by about 40%. The automotive sector was
the hardest hit, as trade among MERCOSUR countries
fell off by some 60%, while capital goods trade
declined by 20%. For the MERCOSUR countries as a
group, the share of intraregional exports in total
exports declined to 11% (compared to 25% in 1998).
The Andean Community saw intraregional exports
decrease by 8% in the first three quarter of the year,
which brought them down to 10% of the bloc's total
exports.
By contrast, trade within the Central American
Common Market expanded by some 4%. Exports within
this market came to account for more than a quarter of
the group's total exports.
As a result, exports weaken and imports slide
in most of the countries
All in all, more than half the countries in the region
suffered losses in their merchandise export earnings (see
figure 11), while an even larger number experienced a
decline in imports in tandem with the economic
slowdown and the currency depreciations that took place
in several of them. The mixed results in this area reflect
differences between groups of countries with respect to
the influences described above.
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
Figure 11
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PERCENTAGE VARIATION IN EXPORTS
BY UNIT VALUE AND VOLUME, 2002
Figure 10
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTRAREGIONAL TRADE
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The Central American countries had to contend with
lower prices for their main agricultural exports, including
coffee, sugar and bananas, and with the downswing in
the United States market. The results of the Central
American Common Market countries varied according
to their export mix, especially in relation to commodities
and to manufactured goods produced under the maquila
system and in free zones. In Costa Rica and El Salvador,
where such manufactures represent a high percentage
of total exports, sales rallied after a succession of slumps,
although the recovery was very limited in the case of
Costa Rica. In all the other countries, export figures were
dragged down by the poor performance of commodities.
In the case of Mexico, whose main trading partner is the
United States, exports dropped the first quarter and
remained virtually flat for the year as a whole, which
prevented any recovery of the ground lost in 2001.
With just a few exceptions, imports to Mexico and
Central America followed a pattern similar to their
exports. This trend reveals, first, the influence of exports
on economic activity in these countries and, hence, on
their demand for imports; and second, the importance
of the maquila sector, whose exports have a high
imported content.
In the Caribbean Basin countries, tourism, another
important source of foreign currency earnings, showed
only feeble signs of recovery from the negative impact
of the slowdown in the United States economy and the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Figures for the
early months of the year revealed flat growth or further
reductions both in tourist arrivals and in earnings from
this activity. Only a few positive signs brightened this
panorama. In Belize, the agreements signed with cruise
ship operators resulted in an increase in cruise ship
arrivals. Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines had more stopover tourist
arrivals in the first quarter and Saint Lucia, in the third
quarter. El Salvador was another exception in this
area, as its tourism revenues jumped by almost a
quarter.
Trade performance in South America reveals,
moreover, the influence of the subregion's two largest
economies, Argentina and Brazil, on each other and on
their neighbours. The financial problems besetting these
two countries, which took the form of steep falls in the
value of their currencies and in domestic demand, led to
a double-digit slide in their imports. This was especially
severe in the case of Argentina, where the decrease
approached 60%.
The contraction of these large markets had an impact
on the value of exports from many countries of the
region. This variable was down in all the MERCOSUR
members except Brazil, with Uruguay suffering a
double-digit loss. These declines occurred even though
these countries' sales to the rest of the world rose as
their currencies depreciated against the United States
dollar. This was in keeping with the uneven trends in
bilateral exchange rates within the region.
As for the rest of the subcontinent, various Andean
countries posted positive export results. The best
performance was that of Peru, which, like Bolivia, saw
an increase in shipments by its extractive industry, while
Ecuador and Venezuela benefited from the upswing in
crude petroleum prices. Lower export earnings in
Bolivia, Colombia and Chile were due to sagging prices.
The level of imports to these countries reflected
variations in their economic activity. At both ends of the
spectrum were oil exporters: Venezuela, with a 25% drop
attributable to the economic recession and the
devaluation of the bolívar, and Ecuador, with a
substantial increase. In the latter case, the increase may
be ascribed to imports of capital goods for building the
heavy crude oil pipeline and to persistent currency
appreciation. The trade balances of these two countries
trended in opposite directions, as Venezuela's surplus
increased and Ecuador's deficit widened. With a negative
current-account balance equivalent to 8.4% of GDP,
Ecuador had the second biggest deficit in the region,
after Nicaragua.
External debt again shows no increase in
2002
Latin America's gross external debt showed a nominal
decline of 0.4% in 2002, which brought it down to
US$ 725 billion. In a year in which the region's countries
found external financing hard to obtain, most of them
registered either small increases or even nominal
decreases in their external liabilities. Only a few
countries engaged in additional borrowing. Among those
with the biggest increases were Ecuador (10%), owing
to the expansion of private debt, and Uruguay (19%),
which undertook new commitments with multilateral
institutions.
More than half of the Latin American and Caribbean
countries, generally those with economies more open
than the regional average, kept the two traditional debt
burden indicators in the moderate range (see figure 12).
In contrast, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, which were among
the most heavily indebted, had an external debt-to-GDP
ratio of close to 50% and a debt-to-exports ratio of nearly
300%. Even so, it is encouraging to note that this
indicator has systematically improved in Brazil and Peru
since 1999. In Ecuador and Uruguay, however, both
indicators have deteriorated.
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT INDICATORS, 2002a



























Argentina whittled down its external debt, despite
the accumulation of interest arrears of approximately
US$ 4.3 billion on its public debt, by making net
payments to multilateral institutions, while some private-
sector debts were paid off, although a payment of loan
principal to the World Bank went unpaid in November.
The debt burden, however, increased in local currency
after the devaluation, which could pose serious problems,
particularly for the public accounts. Argentina needs to
restructure the principal and interest arrears on its
external public debt, under conditions that provide for
significant discounts, longer maturities and interest rates
that will make its external debt servicing sustainable over




















































































THE DEBATE CONCERNING PROPOSALS FOR RESTRUCTURING
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' EXTERNAL DEBTS; AN UPDATE1
The financial crises that have been
overtaking developing countries with
such frequency since the mid-1990s
have revived the debate as to which
crisis-resolution mechanisms are the
most effective and, in particular, on
how to go about restructuring what are
considered to be "unsustainable"
external debts.
One category of debtor countries
is made up of the lowest-income, least
developed nations.  Both the Paris
Club and the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) Initiative have set up
debt-reduction mechanisms with
official bilateral and multilateral
lenders that cover almost the entirety
of these countries' external
obligations. Within Latin America and
the Caribbean, the countries eligible
for these mechanisms are Bolivia,
Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua;
Bolivia and Nicaragua have already
reached the "completion point" where
they can now formalize their official
debt reductions.2
Another category is mainly
composed of what are known as
"emerging markets", whose debts are
largely owed to private creditors.  The
financial crises experienced by a
number of these countries have been
triggered, moreover, by sudden, large-
scale turnarounds in the capital
account rather than the current
account. In order to help such
countries overcome these crises,
large financial packages have been
put together as part of "bailouts"
which are generally led by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Ever since the first such rescue
operation (Mexico, 1995), this
approach has come in for strong
criticism, however.  Nonetheless, there
are circles in which it is argued that
these operations are still the best
solution, although some aspects might
need to be modified.  The proponents
of this approach compare these
sovereign debt crises with bank runs;
they claim (although this point is
disputed by some) that in both cases
a lender of last resort is called for (i.e.,
an institution that is willing to lend
-and to commit itself to lending-
however much is needed to avert or
halt such a run).3  This option raises
the question, however, of how to go
about identifying that lender, which
thus far has usually been the Fund
itself. In order to perform this function
effectively, the Fund would need to
have greater resources at its
command, but in many countries,
–especially the United States– there is
a deep reluctance to allocate more
government resources for official
development assistance, let alone for
this purpose.  In the opinion of some
authors, this difficulty could be
overcome through the use of special
drawing rights, but this idea has not
gained the necessary support from
some of the most influential members
of the Fund.
As many authors have pointed
out, however, these crises may be
explained in large measure by the
instability of the international financial
market and the impact of large
industrialized countries' policies.  If this
is the case, then the best way to
resolve these sorts of situations would
be to provide generous financing, since
such crises would have been the result
of temporary liquidity crunches rather
than of unsustainable debts, and
debtor countries would thus bear no
responsibility for causing them. The
most important course of preventive
action, meanwhile, would be to improve
the international financial order in order
to avert crises generated by its
instability.
In the past few years, however,
the debate has turned against the use
of bailouts because of the prevailing
reluctance to use public funds and
concern about the moral hazard they
entail.  There is a sizeable school of
thought which contends that the
expectation of a bailout may lead to the
build-up of an excessive level of debt,
since both lenders and borrowers will
count on being rescued by official
creditors if they run into trouble.
Another element in this controversy is
the belief that, in some cases, these
crises may actually be caused by an
unsustainable debt rather than merely
a short-lived liquidity squeeze.  In such
cases, it becomes necessary to admit
that it has become impossible to
service the debt and that simply
deferring payments on principal and
interest will therefore not resolve the
situation; under such circumstances,
an actual debt reduction becomes
necessary.
These considerations have given
rise to two proposals that are, in the
final analysis, deemed to be
complementary.  The first proposal is
to include collective action clauses in
contracts governing sovereign bond
issues; the second is to set up a
sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism (SDRM).4  The SDRM
would be analogous to the bankruptcy
proceedings that exist in the private
law systems of most countries, where
a debtor and all its creditors engage in
systematic debt reduction negotiations
under the authority of a third party
designated by law.
The idea of including collective
action clauses in bond contracts was
first raised in the "Rey Report," which
was prepared at the request of the
Group of Ten in the wake of the 1994-
1995 Mexican crisis.5
Three types of collective action
clauses have been discussed in this
connection: (i) majority action clauses,
which allow payment terms to be
modified without the unanimous
approval of bondholders; (ii) collective
representation/engagement clauses,
which permit an agent or agents to
negotiate on behalf of the bondholders
as a group; and (iii) sharing clauses,
under which bondholders who receive
payments must share them out
equitably with all the others.  The
general purpose of these clauses is to
facilitate renegotiations in situations
such as those created when a large
proportion of the debt is made up of
bond issues. This type of debt is
usually more widely dispersed than
the bank loans that were typical of the
early 1980s, and the holders of such
debts are not linked to one another by
sharing clauses. In such a situation
creditors are more likely to take an
individualist approach that can lead to
legal disputes and paralyse
negotiations, since the modification of
payment terms usually requires
unanimous approval. In addition,
unlike banks, many of these creditors
have no relationship with the debtor
country other than the fact that they
hold some of its bonds, which means
that they have little stake in its future
prosperity. Collective action clauses
help to avoid this type of difficulty
because they permit decisions to be
taken by majority vote, allow
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representatives to be designated and
require that any payments made on
the debt be apportioned among all
the bondholders.  At the same time,
however, they place the negotiations
in the hands of the market rather than
in those of the government or any
other decision-making body.
The main objection that has
been raised to these clauses is that
the process of incorporating them
into sovereign bond contracts can
take a very long time.  It has also
been claimed that their inclusion may
discourage potential creditors from
lending to countries that they suspect
might find it necessary to renegotiate
their obligations later on.
Whereas it was once thought
that the financial market was entirely
capable of handling these kinds of
situations without resorting to any
new sort of institutional mechanism,
the use of collective action clauses in
sovereign bond contracts is now
beginning to gain acceptance.6
As to the second proposal, the
idea of solving the problems
associated with sovereign debt
renegotiations by using procedures
similar to the bankruptcy proceedings
employed in private law has a long
history.  In fact, it dates all the way
back to the very father of modern
economic thought, Adam Smith.7
Over the past few years this idea has
been raised again by, among others,
UNCTAD.  It was also brought up in
November 2001 by Anne Krueger, a
few months after she was named
Deputy Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund.8
The basic idea is to create an
institutional framework for
restructuring unsustainable sovereign
debts and to prevent a debtor and its
creditors from indefinitely postponing
the recognition of the debts'
unsustainability, since such delays
provide time for problems to
accumulate and thus make the
eventual rescue operation more
difficult to carry out. In this case, the
legal acceptance of debt standstills
and of a temporary suspension of any
claims by individual creditors or
groups of creditors is a key element
in creating an appropriate negotiating
framework. One of the principal
difficulties involved in applying this
type of scheme is precisely the lack of
a universally valid legal instrument for
backing up such a suspension within
the courts of all the relevant countries.
Another key element, which is a
feature of national bankruptcy
proceedings and could be present in
a similar form in collective action
clauses is that a sufficiently broad
majority of creditors could grant full
legal validity to a debt restructuring or
write-down agreement in the territory
of all the countries involved.
The International Financial and
Monetary Committee of the Board of
Governors of the International
Monetary Fund has given its support
to the idea of refining both the
proposal for the introduction of
collective action clauses and the
proposal for setting up an SDRM. The
private sector, on the other hand, has
forcefully rejected the latter
proposition in various instances.
Additionally, many developing
countries, especially those in a more
vulnerable position, have also firmly
opposed the introduction of such a
mechanism. They argue that the
possibility of bankruptcy-type
proceedings being invoked could
discourage lenders, thereby
effectively closing the international
financial market's doors to countries
that are unable to guarantee that will
be absolutely free of any marked
fluctuations in the future.9
As to the details of this proposal,
there are a broad range of options
with regard to the following
components: (i) which party would
declare the debt standstill and under
what terms (the country directly
concerned with IMF authorization, the
Fund or the creditors) and what
criteria would be used in determining
whether or not a debt is
unsustainable; (ii) how to ensure the
suspension of creditor litigation (there
are those who contend that the IMF
Articles of Agreement would be
sufficient for this purpose, but there is
a general consensus as to the need
to modify the Articles or supplement
them with another international legal
instrument to this end); (iii) how to
determine which arbiter or court
would be responsible for approving
an agreement between a debtor and
its creditors (given the strong
opposition to the idea of having the
International Monetary Fund play this
role, as it is considered an interested
party); (iv) which debts would be
included in the restructuring process
(sovereign debts only, or also those of
private debtors) and whether or not
the claims of international financial
institutions would be covered; and
(v) what specific criteria and
procedures would be applied to
sovereign debts (Kunibert Raffer and
the Jubilee organization suggest that
the procedures to be used should be
those applied in the United States to
municipalities with unpaid debts).
ECLAC has taken part in the
debate on these issues on a number
of occasions over the past few years.
Its views have been expressed in a
report of the United Nations Executive
Committee on Economic and Social
Affairs in 1999, whose preparation it
coordinated,10  and in ECLAC
documents11  and other contributions
to international debates on the
subject.12  The Secretariat of the
Commission has recommended,
among other points, that: (i) emer-
gency IMF financing and mechanisms
for resolving problems associated with
the accumulation of excessive debt
should be viewed as complementary
to each other rather than as
substitutes, since the former is
intended to deal with liquidity
problems and the latter with solvency
problems; (ii) emergency IMF
financing should be expanded through
the greater use of special drawing
rights, particularly temporary issues
during periods of international
illiquidity; (iii) collective action clauses
and sovereign debt restructuring
mechanisms should be seen as
alternative means of dealing with
solvency problems; (iv) the application
of collective action clauses should be
universal in nature in order to avoid
creating a new factor of discrimination
against developing countries;
(v) within the restructuring process,
seniority should be granted to private
financing extended under crisis
conditions, and in some cases this
should be made a requirement for
such a process; and (vi) credit
supplied by multilateral lending
agencies during the renegotiations
and the period immediately following
their conclusion should be considered
a key element. In this last case, the
focus should be on expediting the
countries' re-entry into private capital
markets; to this end, consideration
should be given to the possibility of
setting up a multilateral system of
guarantees which would be backed up
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3. Macroeconomic policy
Fiscal policy
Fiscal policy played a more modest role in
macroeconomic management in 2002 than in previous
years. In general, fiscal expenditure was not used to buoy
economic activity, in some cases because it had already
been used for this purpose and to continue to do so would
be risky, and in other cases because the capacity for fiscal
manoeuvring had not been strengthen  during the high-
growth years and had become even weaker as the region
sank deeper into recession and the public debt burden
grew heavier.
In Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela,
economic activity plummeted and fiscal expenditure
contracted. In contrast, spending cuts in the Central
American countries and Panama took place under
medium-term stabilization programmes and in a context
of moderate economic growth. In other countries,
expenditure held steady or even rose; the clearest
examples of this are Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Jamaica. In line
with recent practice, capital expenditure was the variable
adjusted in many countries. In Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago, the
adjustment process affected essentially public
investment. By contrast, investment was stepped up
considerably in Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Haiti
and Paraguay in an effort to make up for the sluggishness
of private-sector activity
Income fell in all the countries that experienced a
recession. The worst cases were Argentina and Uruguay,
where fiscal revenues shrank by about 20% in real terms.
The decline was less severe in Paraguay, similarly to
Venezuela, which benefited from high international
prices for petroleum and oil products. Other petroleum-
exporting countries also received large amounts of oil
revenue, with the exception of Colombia, whose oil
output is in outright decline.
Income expanded in half the countries of the region,
most of them in Central America and the Caribbean. In
Guatemala and the Dominican Republic this was due to
the preceding year's tax reforms, and in Nicaragua, to
the reform conducted in 2002. In South America two
exceptional cases were Ecuador and Brazil, whose
income swelled by over 10% in real terms, owing in
both cases to an increase in tax receipts, combined, in
Brazil, with the emergence of new sources of revenue.
In other countries the authorities also took steps to
increase tax collection or raise tax rates, as a way of
halting the deterioration in their fiscal affairs. The
Argentine government imposed new taxes (including a
tax on exports) and the Uruguayan authorities passed a
law increasing contributions to finance social security.
In Venezuela, VAT and the tax on bank withdrawals were
raised, a number of VAT exemptions were eliminated
and the least expensive grade of petrol started to be
phased out. In Colombia, the government enacted a one-
off tax on net worth in the framework of what its
constitution calls a "state of internal disturbance", and
is processing a broad-based fiscal reform which is
expected to improve the fiscal balance by two GDP
percentage points per year. Guatemala, Nicaragua and
the Dominican Republic have begun to implement
reforms intended to increase the tax-take; by contrast,
efforts to win passage for fiscal reforms through the
legislatures of Mexico and Paraguay have not
prospered.
These revenue and spending patterns combined to
keep the public-sector balance relatively unchanged,
with a deficit of 3.3%. This average masks large
differences among countries, however, since the fiscal
deficit narrowed in half of them and widened in the rest
(see figure 13).
The non-financial public sector (NFPS) balance  in
the region's three largest economies varied markedly. In
Argentina the NFPS balance improved from -3.1% of
GDP in 2001 to -1.4% in 2002; in Brazil the operational
balance worsened slightly, as the deficit rose from -1.7%
to -2.1% of GDP; and in Mexico the fiscal deficit
remained unchanged at 0.7% of GDP.
Only Chile and Mexico enjoyed access to sources
of external finance throughout the year, while a number
of Central American and Caribbean countries, as well
as Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, Peru and Uruguay,
resorted to sovereign bond issues early or late in the
year. The domestic market and, to a lesser extent,
international financial institutions were the main sources
of finance for the South American countries, although
Argentina and Brazil, among others, had difficulties in
raising revenue from domestic sources. Brazil faced
problems with the refinancing of its domestic debt in
the pre-electoral climate and its risk premium rose to
prohibitive levels in the third quarter.
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1 This effect is not reflected in the operating balance of the
public sector, which is mentioned earlier in this chapter.
Source: See Statistical Appendix.
a Central government. b Operational balance. c Simple average.
Figure 13
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PUBLIC SECTOR BALANCE
(Percentages of GDP)
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As a result of these trends, fiscal policy tended to be
passive in 2002. First, in the last five years the economic
authorities have found themselves with constantly
decreasing room for manoeuvre in respect of fiscal affairs,
as the fiscal deficit already represented an average of 3.2%
of GDP in 2001. Second, faced with tougher external
financing conditions, the governments have been obliged
to protect the credibility of their policies by adopting a
more austere policy stance. Only Barbados, Chile, Costa
Rica and the Dominican Republic enjoyed enough leeway
to implement a compensatory fiscal policy.
The worsening of economic conditions brought the
issue of public debt sustainability to the forefront once
again. Certainly, a fiscal deficit which has been
expanding ever since the beginning of the Asian crisis
and sluggish economic growth have raised public debt
in relation to GDP, but investor behaviour has also been
responsible for triggering and propagating panic and
contagion, thus giving rise to a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The fact that two countries with a high public debt/GDP
ratio (Ecuador and Brazil) have a large primary surplus
testifies to a major effort to improve this indicator which
has been disregarded by investors.
The problem of public debt has also been
exacerbated by developments in the area of monetary
and exchange-rate policy. Monetary policy was fairly
expansionary early in the year, but then tightened in
response to exchange rate instability and to rising
inflation in a number of countries. This was reflected in
an increase in interest rates, which added to the burden
of domestic debt servicing and worsened public debt
sustainability indicators. In Brazil, currency devaluation
caused a fiscal downturn equivalent to 5.4% of GDP in
nominal terms.1  In combination, these factors brought
about an increase in Brazil's country-risk indicators,
which further complicated an already difficult fiscal
situation. However, positive final-quarter signals
observed in the markets of most of the region's countries,
led by Brazil, together with expectations for moderate
growth in 2003 augur a less thorny fiscal situation in the
coming year. Argentina was forced to suspend payments
on its external public debt, first to private creditors, but
at the end of the year to multilateral creditors too. It is
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2 El Salvador embarked upon the formal dollarization of its
economy on 1 January 2001 with the entry into force of the
Monetary Integration Act.  Under this Act, the rate of exchange
of the colón against the dollar of the United States of America
was set at a fixed and unalterable rate and the dollar became
full legal tender for the payment of monetary obligations in
the country. The process of dollarization and the replacement
of colones by dollars proceeded in 2002, and it is estimated
that by September 2002, 85% of all transactions were being
made in dollars.
for this reason that the local currency devaluation did
not generate a large increase in the government's
financial expenses as it did in Brazil.
Exchange rates and monetary policy
The year 2002 saw a further loss of degrees of freedom
in foreign-exchange and monetary policy management
in most of the economies of the region, especially the
Mercosur countries. In particular, the crisis in Argentina
and the financial turmoil in Brazil had far-reaching
effects on foreign-exchange markets in the countries of
the region and, in particular, on the neighbouring
countries having the closest trade and financial ties with
these economies (Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia). The
hardest-hit countries (Argentina, Uruguay and
Venezuela) abandoned the foreign-exchange regimes
that had been in place up to 2001 and floated their
currencies, which went on to register sharp real
depreciations. Other countries also experienced
significant rises in their exchange rates, which forced
authorities to implement contractionary monetary
policies to defend their currencies and prevent their
depreciation from boosting inflation. Only a few
countries in the region –among them, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico and Peru– were in a position to adopt more
independent and more countercyclical monetary policies.
Their effectiveness was somewhat impaired, however,
by the fact that financing terms for the private sector did
not improve in some cases.
Foreign-exchange markets
Events in the Mercosur countries and in Venezuela had
a strong impact on the region's foreign-exchange
markets. The crises in these countries forced Argentina,
Uruguay and Venezuela to float their currencies and led
to steep real depreciations in all of them. The rest of
Latin America and the Caribbean generally experienced
moderate real exchange-rate depreciations, both in
bilateral rates against the dollar and in their "effective"
exchange rates, that is, their rates against the currencies
of their main trading partners.
Many Latin American countries have recently opted
for floating exchange-rate regimes. The major exceptions
have been Ecuador and El Salvador,2  which have moved
in the opposite direction (see table 2). However, the
adoption of currency floats has not always been a matter
of free choice and, in fact, was due to force of
circumstance in the most recent cases. The particular
mix of economic policies (fiscal and, where appropriate,
monetary policy) must be functional to the exchange
rate regime so that the real exchange rate trend will
reflect changes in the production sector's international
competitiveness. In a number of cases, the collapse of
an exchange regime has been preceded by serious
relative price distortions or by significant fiscal and
external disequilibria.
The countries that switched over to a currency float
in 2002 also registered nominal and real (excluding the
effect of inflation) depreciations of their currencies in
relation to the dollar, the euro and the currencies of other
countries outside the region. However, the sharp
depreciation of some Latin American currencies suggests
that other countries in the region may have seen a real
appreciation in their exchange rates with respect to Latin
America and the Caribbean as a whole while at the same
time registering a real depreciation with respect to the
rest of the world. This effect is illustrated in table 3,
which compares variations in exchange rates from the
third quarter of 2001 to the third quarter of 2002.  These
figures clearly point up the differences between
movements in real bilateral exchange rates with respect
to extra-regional currencies (the dollar and the euro,
among others) and in relation to the currencies of other
countries in the region.
The Mercosur countries experienced the largest real
depreciations. The four full members of this trade bloc
were among the five countries in the region (the other
country being Venezuela) whose currencies depreciated
the most in real terms between the third quarter of 2001
and the third quarter of 2002.
The change made in Argentina's foreign-exchange
regime in January 2002 triggered a steep real
depreciation of the Argentine peso during the first half
of the year, both against the dollar and against the
currencies of all of its main trading partners. By the
fourth quarter of 2002, however, the Argentine peso had
stabilized thanks to the country's large trade surplus, the
regulations introduced regarding the sale of foreign
exchange by exporters and the decline in outflows of
private capital.  These conditions enabled the Central
Bank to intervene when the exchange rate reached 3.5
pesos to the dollar.
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Table 3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN REAL EXCHANGE RATE
(Third quarter 2001 - third quarter 2002) a b
Bilateral exchange Bilateral exchange Effective exchange Effective exchange rate
rate against the US$ rate against the euro rate against whole world against Latin America andthe Caribbean only
Latin America
Argentina 168.9 198.3 163.3 135.0
Bolivia 10.2 22.3 -1.6 -15.0
Brazil 15.9 28.5 10.5 -27.0
Chile 5.0 16.4 -1.6 -22.5
Colombia 9.5 21.5 6.1 -7.2
Costa Ricac 2.4 13.6 2.5 -3.7
Ecuador -9.6 0.3 -12.0 -20.9
El Salvador c -0.3 10.6 0.3 -0.6
Guatemala c -6.6 3.6 -7.6 -11.0
Haiti 7.9 19.7 n/d N/d
Honduras c 0.6 11.6 1.1 -0.4
Mexico 3.6 14.9 4.1 -10.4
Nicaragua c 5.3 16.8 4.1 1.4
Panama 0.4 11.4 0.1 -4.4
Paraguay 29.9 44.1 8.1 -10.0
Peru 3.6 15.0 1.7 -11.2
Dominican Republic d 3.7 15.1 2.2 -9.7
Uruguay 64.5 82.5 39.5 8.6
Venezuela 54.2 71.0 53.5 43.9
The Caribbean     
Barbados 3.4 14.7 5.1 3.7
Jamaica e 1.7 12.9 3.0 -1.9
Trinidad and Tobago -2.9 7.8 -4.7 -12.7
 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official and IMF data.
 a This period was used because it provides the clearest illustration of the differences between real bilateral exchange rates for currencies outside the
zone (dollar, euro, etc.) and for currencies of other countries in the region.
b January 1999 is used as the base period for bilateral exchange rates against the euro and the dollar; January 2000 is the base for the average effective
exchange rate for imports and exports.
c
 The data supplied by the Foreign Trade Data Bank for Latin America and the Caribbean (BADECEL) for calculating the effective exchange rates of the
Central American countries do not include the maquila industry.
d
 The effective exchange rate was calculated using IMF figures for 2000.
e
 The effective exchange rate was calculated using BADECEL figures for 2000.
Table 2
LATIN AMERICA: FOREIGN-EXCHANGE REGIMES, 1996-2002
System 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002
Dollarization Panama Panama Panama Panama Panama
Ecuador Ecuador Ecuador
El Salvador
Currency board Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina
Other fixed-parity
regimes El Salvador El Salvador El Salvador El Salvador
Crawling band Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia
Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica
Nicaragua Nicaragua Nicaragua Nicaragua Nicaragua
Moving band Brazil Colombia Honduras Honduras Honduras
Colombia Chile Uruguay Uruguay





Flotation Guatemala Brazil Brazil Brazil Argentina
Haiti Ecuador Chile Chile Brazil
Mexico Guatemala Colombia Colombia Chile
Paraguay Haiti Guatemala Guatemala Colombia
Peru Mexico Haiti Haiti Guatemala
Dominican Republic Paraguay Mexico Mexico Haiti
Peru Paraguay Paraguay Mexico
Dominican Republic Peru Peru Paraguay




Source:  For 1999-2001, adapted from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. For 1996 and 2002, authors’ compilations.
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3 In Uruguay, following a run on deposits in the local financial
system, the government was obliged to float the Uruguayan
peso on 20 June 2002.
4 Venezuela abandoned its system of exchange-rate bands and
allowed the bolívar to float in February 2002.
5 The depreciation took place mainly between the end of the
first quarter and the third quarter 2002.
6 With the exception of Haiti, whose currency depreciated by
just under 8% against the dollar.
7 The specific reasons for the exchange-rate movements in each
of these countries are set out in the country section of the
Preliminary Overview.
The Brazilian real started to lose value in real terms
in the second quarter of 2002, despite the intervention
of the Central Bank; this was due in part to the climate
that prevailed as the country readied itself for elections.
The real devaluation against the dollar amounted to
15.9% in the third quarter in comparison with the same
quarter of the previous year. However, the real effective
exchange rate for Brazil's currency depreciated much
less than this during the same period as a result of the
devaluation of its trading partners' currencies
(particularly Argentina's). In October, November and the
first half of December, the price of the dollar remained
volatile at levels above 3.5 reales, partly as a result of
market uncertainty regarding the economic situation in
Brazil in the short term.
The depreciation of the Argentine peso and,
subsequently, the smaller depreciation of the Brazilian
real had a strong impact on the effective rates of
exchange of these countries' trading partners within
Mercosur. In fact, although the Paraguayan guaraní and
the Uruguayan peso3  sustained significant losses against
the dollar and the euro in the period under review, the
real effective exchange rates of these two currencies
depreciated much less (see table 3). In October and
November, the Uruguayan peso appreciated in nominal
terms in relation to the low point it had reached in
September and has since remained stable, whereas the
guaraní has continued to depreciate.
Bolivia continued to pursue a line of policy aimed
at maintaining a stable real effective exchange rate. This
policy translated into a depreciation of its currency
against the dollar (10% in real terms) to compensate for
the sharp depreciations in the currencies of the other
Mercosur member countries, but even so, its real
effective rate of exchange appreciated slightly (1.6%)
during the period under review. In Chile, the peso
depreciated by 5% in real terms against the dollar, but
because of the importance of MERCOSUR as a trading
partner, its average real effective exchange rate showed
a small appreciation.
Outside MERCOSUR, Venezuela was the country
whose currency depreciated the most during the period.
Monetary authorities were unable to staunch the
country's heavy capital outflows, despite a considerable
increase in interest rates. Thus, between the third quarter
of 2001 and the third quarter of 2002, the bolívar
depreciated by 55% in real terms against the dollar.4
Then, however, a gradual appreciation of the nominal
exchange rate, which began in early October and
continued throughout the fourth quarter of 2002, brought
the rate back to the levels of June/July 2002.
The Colombian peso depreciated by a little less than
10% in real terms against the dollar during the same
reference period,5  with the Central Bank's expansionary
monetary policy being one of the factors that facilitated
this trend. Colombia's real exchange rate depreciated
even more with respect to that of Ecuador, but because
of the sharp real depreciation of the Venezuelan bolívar
(and the smaller depreciation of the Brazilian real), the
Colombian peso appreciated in relation to the currencies
of the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole,
and the depreciation of the real effective exchange rate
(the rate vis-à-vis Colombia's major trading partners as
a group) amounted to only 6%.
During the period under review, most of the other
countries in the region saw their currencies decline in
value by 5% or less in real terms against the dollar and
against their trading partners' currencies.6  This group
includes Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico,
Barbados, Costa Rica, Jamaica and Honduras, all of
which, generally speaking, have less close trade ties with
Mercosur.7
Guatemala and Trinidad and Tobago were the only
non-dollarized economies to experience nominal and
real appreciations of their currencies during the period,
in both cases thanks to strong capital inflows. However,
the Trinidad and Tobago dollar depreciated in nominal
terms in October and November 2002, thus dropping
back to the levels observed in June 2001.  The quetzal,
on the other hand, has continued to appreciate in nominal
terms. Two of the region's three dollarized economies
–El Salvador and Panama– have remained on a low
inflation path, which accounts for the stability of both
their effective exchange rate and their bilateral rates of
exchange against the dollar. The third -Ecuador-has been
reining in inflation, but the rate is still above international
standards; this has been reflected in a loss of exchange-
rate competitiveness that amounts to a little less than
10% against the dollar and 12% overall against its trading
partners. The most significant real appreciation in the
case of Ecuador has been in relation to the currencies of
the other Latin American countries.
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Monetary policy
In most countries of the region, monetary policy took a
back seat to exchange-rate variations, which in 2002
implied a predominantly contractionary policy stance.
Only a few economies had enough leeway to apply a
countercyclical monetary policy, which did not have
much influence on the cost and availability of credit to
the private sector.
With production activity sluggish in most
countries, few had the capacity to use monetary policy
as a countercyclical instrument. In this context, four
typical situations could be discerned. First, the group
of countries that had come under strong exchange-
rate pressure used interest-rate hikes to shore up their
currencies. A second group of countries tried to
implement a countercyclical monetary policy, but they
were thwarted by the increase in interest rate spreads
in international markets. A third group of countries
was successful in reducing interest rates on lower
deposits, but this did not always result in lower lending
rates, owing to the limited effectiveness of monetary
policies in the circumstances prevailing in 2002.
Lastly, the dollarized economies do not have an
explicit monetary policy and, as expected, their
monetary conditions were automatically determined
by international market trends and changes in the
perception of country risk in international markets.
The MERCOSUR economies belong to the first
group, as Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay pursued
explicitly contractionary policies in response either to
difficulties in financing their external liabilities or to
exchange-rate pressures. National monetary authorities
intervened in order to mitigate any overshooting that
could fuel inflationary pressures or create greater
instability in their national financial systems. Brazil was
unable to maintain its policy of progressive reductions
in the interbank interest rate (Special Settlement and
Custody System, or SELIC, rate), under which the rate
had declined from 19% a year in December 2001 to 18%
in July 2002. This policy had been adopted in an effort
to foster economic recovery in a period of weak growth
and low inflation. The sharp currency depreciation in
the second quarter of 2002 triggered an inflationary spike
in August and September that prompted the Central Bank
to raise the interbank rate to 21% a year in October. This
reversal directly affected the cost of credit, insofar as
spreads are high and are sensitive to variations in base
rates. This also had a negative effect on the cost of very
short-term public debt.
In Paraguay, despite the contraction in productive
activity, monetary policy was also restrictive and
deposit rates rose in the course of 2002. This situation,
together with the effects of the currency devaluation,
had an impact on the financial system; in the middle of
the year the authorities took over one of the largest
local banks. Uruguay also faced serious problems with
its banking system, which experienced capital outflows
and a massive run on deposits by both residents and
non-residents (especially Argentines). At the same time,
the loss of deposits destabilized the local banking
system and resulted in exchange-rate volatility. The
authorities responded by raising domestic interest rates
significantly, but this did not prevent a sharp
devaluation and a domestic banking crisis. In June the
government was forced to abandon the exchange-band
system and allow the Uruguayan peso to float; only in
October did bank deposits pick up again, for the first
time in 2002. At the end of November, however, those
banks whose operations had been suspended during
the bank holiday declared in July were still not in a
position to reopen for business, and credit remained
tightly restricted.
Argentina faced a peculiar combination of strong
monetary expansion and high interest rates, especially
in the first half of 2002, in the context of measures that
impinged on ownership rights in respect of savings and
deposits in foreign currency. Both trends were a
response to the banking and foreign-exchange crisis
besetting the country: money creation by the Central
Bank mainly reflected loans  granted to banks, through
the discount window  to help them cope with substantial
withdrawals of deposits not subject to the "corralito".
Since this liquidity tended to find its way into the
foreign-exchange market, further eroding the value of
the peso, the monetary authorities and the banks
themselves maintained a policy of high interest rates.
These rates did not subside until the second half of the
year, when both the outflow of deposits and the
depreciation of the currency were brought under
control. Credit was flat, as the commercial banking
system is still not fully operational. In any event, despite
the dire predictions of economic analysts, Argentina
was able to avoid hyperinflation, and the domestic
demand for pesos rallied in the second half of the year.
The situation of the Venezuelan economy seemed
similar to that of the MERCOSUR countries in that it
also reflected enormous difficulty in implementing a
countercyclical monetary policy. As mentioned earlier,
the maintenance of an exchange-rate band was no longer
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feasible because of persistently large outflows of capital.
The domestic political situation and market unease about
the fiscal accounts put further pressure on the bolívar.
The Central Bank raised interest rates, but, in this case
as well, the move failed to prevent a sharp currency
depreciation.
The second group is made up of most of the
Central American countries, whose monetary policies
were contractionary. In Guatemala, for example, this
was because inflation was expected to exceed the
target set in the government programme. In Honduras,
the authorities' main concern was to shore up the
exchange rate in a context of copious external
borrowing on the government's part. Nicaragua tried
to keep interest rates on a downward trend, but
reversed that policy starting in mid-2002 in view of
the gradual decline in the level of international
reserves. Costa Rica applied a contractionary
monetary policy and an expansionary fiscal one; the
net effect of this mix was expansionary.
In the group of countries with dollarized economies
(Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama), domestic interest
rates dropped significantly, mirroring the steep fall in
interest rates in international markets. Ecuador's financial
system, which is still being restructured, continued to
improve, and commercial banks saw a decline in their
non-performing loan portfolios and a nominal increase
in loans and deposits. However, monetization levels
and credit balances expressed as a percentage of GDP
remained low. Liquidity in the financial system was
high, in part because lenders showed extreme caution
in supplying credit, and interest rates on deposits and,
to a lesser extent, on loans continued to trend
downward.
Lastly, the fourth group of economies, which were
in a better position to implement countercyclical
monetary policies, includes Chile, Colombia, Peru
(until the third quarter) and Mexico. In Chile, which
keeps a tight rein on inflation and enjoys a sounder
external financial position, the Central Bank lowered
the money-market intervention rate six times, bringing
it to a historically low nominal rate of 3% a year,
notwithstanding the volatility of the exchange rate.
In Colombia, high market liquidity and favourable
inflation trends enabled the Central Bank to reduce
interest rates throughout the first half of the year, but
this policy was interrupted by events in the third
quarter. Peru, where a period of slight deflation was
succeeded by one of very low inflation, also managed
to maintain an expansionary monetary policy,
although increased exchange-rate instability in the
third quarter prompted the authorities to adopt a more
cautious monetary stance. Lastly, Mexico, which
suffered only minor contagion from Argentina and
Brazil, continued the slightly expansionary monetary
policy applied in 2001, with the result that interest
rates fell from an average of 11.3% in 2001 to around
8.5% in 2002.
The net supply of credit, meanwhile, remains low
in a significant number of countries, owing to the
greater caution exercised by local banks. Interest rate
spreads are still high and have even increased in some
countries.
In a pattern reminiscent of the trends observed in
2001, several countries recorded gross credit expansion
that was below total interest rates on loans in 2002,
something that could imply an effective contraction in
lending. One indicator of domestic borrowing
conditions is the bank interest rate spread, which
increased in many economies (such as those of
Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guyana,
Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay) in
the initial quarters of 2002. This indicates that the
decline in deposit rates was not matched by a
proportional fall in lending rates, which suggests that
Figure 14
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION
IN MONEY SUPPLY
(Real 12-month rates of variation)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
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Figure 15
INTERBANK INTEREST RATES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
(Annualized quarterly averages)
Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by national authorities and Bloomberg.
the commercial banking system is following a fairly
conservative policy in view of sluggish productive
activity (in many countries), domestic political
uncertainty (in a smaller group of countries) and
problems in obtaining external financing (as described
above). Thus, the cost of credit is still very high,
restricting the availability of financing for production.
This situation is particularly acute in the case of small
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GDP AND PER CAPITA GDP, 1989-2002
(Index 1995=100, on the basis of constant 1995 dollars)
Figure 17
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(Annual growth rates, on the basis of constant 1995 prices)





The economy of Latin America and the Caribbean
shrank in 2002, which was reflected in a decline of 0.5%
in GDP. This rounded off five years of economic
stagnation in the region, with per capita GDP below the
figure recorded in 1997 (see figure 16).
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
GDP Per c pita
GDP
Per capita GDP slipped for the second year running.
This was partly attributable to the sharp downturn in
economic activity in Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela,
but in fact almost all of the countries posted low growth























This situation was in part the result of a number of
domestic factors that were specific to each country or
group of countries, although the adverse conditions in
the international economy were an overriding common
factor. In some of the countries, economic performance
depended primarily on trade volumes while, in others,
it reflected the prices of their export products, and a
third group was impacted mainly by capital-account
movements. These factors naturally combined with the
domestic situation in each country, which held down
growth rates in most cases. The main domestic dampers
on growth were tight monetary policies, the stagnation
of domestic credit, fiscal problems, high levels of public
and private debt, speculative pressures which affected
interest rates, high rates of unemployment and
underemployment and, in a number of countries, social
and political disturbances. Some countries were also
troubled by adverse weather conditions. In a few cases,
there were positive domestic factors related to resource-
based industries, a slight upturn in domestic demand and
the resolution of specific problems, such as electricity
rationing in Brazil.
On this basis, it is possible to distinguish several
groups of countries. The first such group is composed
of those countries that were the hardest hit by the
persistent weakness of demand for imports in the
United States. This group includes the Dominican
Republic, Haiti Mexico, Panama and the Central
American Common Market countries. Second, those
countr ies whose performance suffered from
downturns in their terms of trade (which have declined
over the past five years in all the economies of the
region that are not net exporters of petroleum). This
group includes Chile and Peru, although Peru’s terms
of trade picked up again in 2002 after four years of
steep decline. The third group of countries were
encumbered with high levels of domestic and external
debt,  which left  them very vulnerable to the
imposition of tougher conditions for international
loans and to speculative attacks. This category
included the four MERCOSUR countries. Lastly, there
was a fourth category of countries in which the level
of activity was not as strongly influenced by external
trade or financial conditions as in previous years, but
instead responded to domestic factors. This group
included Ecuador, Venezuela and, albeit to a lesser
degree, Colombia. Naturally, most of the countries
mentioned experienced the effects of these domestic
and external factors combined.
Slack growth in United States demand deprived
the first group of countries of an engine of growth
that had been crucial in the 1990s. Mexico’s exports
and imports both declined sharply in 2001 and
stagnated in 2002 after expanding at an average annual
rate of around 15% between 1990 and 2000. This
performance accounts for the stagnation of production
and employment in industry, especially in the maquila
sector, which exacerbated the lag in job creation.
Public spending could not be used as a prop for the
level of activity either, as the government afforded
priority to meeting its fiscal targets despite a downturn
in non-petroleum fiscal revenues. On the other hand,
the good oil price avoided the need to make larger
adjustments. The Mexican economy expanded by
1.2% in 2002, which translated into a new decline in
per capita GDP. Against this backdrop, and in
combination with the continued contraction of credit
from the financial system to the non-financial private
sector, investment slipped again in 2002, by a little
over 1%.
The Central American countries also saw their
external trade flag. Their exports to the United States
became steadily stronger as the year progressed,
although the cumulative value for the first nine months
was a mere 4% higher than the figure for 2001, which
accounts for the meagre growth for the year overall
in the maquila industry. These countries also suffered
the effects of the Mexican market’s loss of momentum,
while the low prices paid for some of their traditional
goods hurt the output of the agriculture and fisheries
sectors. Although the price of coffee rose slightly in
the second semester, the subregion has been severely
affected by the crisis in the coffee sector, which has
had serious repercussions for agricultural production
and employment. Despite the stagnation in the level of
activity, a number of countries (Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua and Panama) implemented fiscal
adjustments, consisting essentially of cuts in public
investment, which further weakened total demand.
Together, these factors led to a small downturn in per
capita output in the Central American countries, with
the exception of El Salvador and Costa Rica, where it
rose by half a percentage point. In Costa Rica the
moderate upswing with respect to 2001 was a reflection
of domestic demand, including public spending, and
the expansion of activity in the free zones. In El
Salvador, public investment in reconstruction work in
the wake of the earthquakes of 2001 continued to be a
significant engine of activity, but total consumption
stagnated.
In general, the Caribbean countries turned in low
rates of growth, due to the fact that tourism did not
fully make up the downswing of 2001 (with the sole
exception of Belize) and to the effect of slack external
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1 ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean,
2001-2002, Santiago, Chile, August 2002.
2 This is because of the statistical carry-over effect: GDP
decreased so sharply in the final quarters of 2001 that if the
non-seasonally adjusted level of activity of the last quarter of
2001 had been maintained throughout 2002, total GDP in 2002
would have been lower than the 2001 figure by 7%.
demand on the free zones. Foreign direct investment
also ebbed. Moreover, a number of countries
experienced supply problems, especially in the
agricultural sector, because of climatic phenomena,
with floods in Jamaica and poor weather conditions in
Barbados and Cuba. Output declined in 2002 in
Barbados, Haiti and the Eastern Caribbean States, but
rose by between 1.5% and 2% in Cuba and Jamaica.
The only exceptions to this pattern were Trinidad and
Tobago, whose economy grew by 2.7% on the back of
a good performance from the agricultural and
petroleum sectors, and Belize and the Dominican
Republic, which posted gains of close to 4% in 2002.
The Dominican Republic had to discontinue its
expansionary economic policy early in the year,
however, when external demand failed to rebound as
expected and pressures began to build in the foreign
exchange market.
Chile is possibly the country that has been the worst
affected by an unrelenting downward trend in its terms
of trade. The deterioration has persisted ever since the
Asian crisis and today reflects a cumulative decline of
20% in five years. Export prices declined again in 2002
owing to a downturn in the prices of copper and pulp,
while a decrease in the prices of some imported goods
has been partially offset by the price of petroleum,
which began to climb in the second quarter. In recent
years poor export prices and conservative consumer
and investment spending by the private sector have
consistently conspired to prevent the economy from
recovering the growth rates seen before the Russian
and Asian crises. The rate of investment has held steady
at around 23% of GDP, which is higher than the
regional average, but much lower than the figure of
27% recorded in the period 1996-1998. Consequently,
despite the lower interest rates and the government’s
countercyclical fiscal policy, the economy will have
grown by only 1.8% in 2002, and gross fixed investment
will stagnate. The second part of the year brought an
upturn, which augurs well for a better performance in
2003.
The MERCOSUR countries, which bear heavy
burdens of domestic and external debt, have been the
worst affected by capital movements. To compound
matters, the local currency was very overvalued in two
of them at the beginning of 2002. It is therefore
unsurprising that the members of the bloc have found
themselves very vulnerable to the toughening of
external borrowing conditions, financial speculation
and capital flight. All this has translated into sharp
devaluations, runs on deposits and a breakdown in
credit mechanisms in Argentina, Uruguay and, to an
extent, in Paraguay. In Argentina and Uruguay
unemployment rose to record levels, while domestic
demand, which was already very slack, continued to
flag.
In Argentina, the steep decline in output which
began in mid-2001 continued into the first quarter of
2002.1 At the end of the first quarter, bank withdrawals
combined dangerously with a rising dollar exchange
rate and a high rate of money creation by the central
bank through  its discount window. Faced with the
possibility of further devaluations, exporters postponed
the sale of their foreign currency holdings, while capital
flight and payments to multilateral agencies continued
to eat into international reserves. In such a situation,
the stabilization of the dollar was a crucial accomplish-
ment. To this end, the government took steps to
strengthen exchange controls, limit the withdrawal of
bank deposits more effectively and ensure stricter
enforcement of exporters’ obligation to sell hard
currency. In addition, the central bank continued to
intervene actively in the foreign exchange market.
Together, these measures helped to bring down the rate
of interest, begin the re-establishment of payment
mechanisms, rebuild reserves, resume voluntary
deposit-taking in the banking system and phase out
restrictions on the availability of deposits in general.
Inflation also subsided markedly. The slide in activity
levels came to a halt in the second quarter of 2002,
thanks to the high profitability of the export sectors,
import substitution and the payment of unemployment
benefit. Nevertheless, in 2002 Argentina’s GDP will
have contracted by 11%, of which seven percentage
points are attributable to the decline in output in the
second semester of 2001.2 Gross fixed investment was
down by 35%, with a drastic decline in capital goods
imports and a downturn of almost 30% in construction.
The Argentine crisis spread to Uruguay and
Paraguay, in particular, by a number of means.
Argentine imports in those countries decreased by over
50%, transfers from Paraguayan workers residing in
Argentina were sharply down and Argentine tourist
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arrivals in Uruguay declined drastically. In addition,
the banking crisis in Argentina triggered a massive
withdrawal of deposits from Uruguayan banks and an
outflow of capital, which led to the discontinuation of
the exchange rate band, sharp currency devaluation and
the partial freezing of bank deposits. The financial crisis
proved extremely costly for Uruguay, which saw its
GDP shrink by 10.5% and gross fixed investment
decrease by 30% in 2002. Paraguayan GDP also lost
ground in 2002, slipping by 3%. Like the other
countries mentioned, Paraguay is in the grips of a
banking crisis while agriculture, one of its most
vigorous sectors in recent years, has been stricken by
drought.
Brazil was vulnerable to financial disturbances
because of its burdensome public debt (which was
largely the result of State-supported bank restructuring
in previous years) which, to make matters worse, was
partially indexed to the dollar and mostly short-term.
Attacks against the Brazilian currency in the exchange
markets intensified as the October presidential
elections approached and as the opposition candidate
gained ground in the polls. Although the pressure on
the real eased after the elections, those episodes forced
the government to raise interest rates, which was not
enough to avert a considerable devaluation of the
currency, however. As a result of this situation, the
public sector faced a much heavier burden of interest
payments which, despite a larger primary surplus,
even came to threaten its solvency. At the same time,
the spread on Brazilian bonds increased sharply,
which effectively cut off access to private external
financing and increased the magnitude of the
adjustment in the trade balance, with a large reduction
in imports and a considerable increase in exports in
the last months of the year. Meanwhile, investment
failed to bounce back and output expanded by only
1.5% in 2002.
This group of countries also includes Bolivia, which
was the Andean country worst affected by the crisis in
the MERCOSUR bloc, mainly because of the decline
in remittances from emigrant workers. Domestic
demand remained slack, reflecting high unemployment
and the loss of income from the coca sector, while
investment shrank for the fourth year in a row. Gas
exports were one of the few components driving
economic activity, which expanded at an annual rate
of less than 2%.
The fourth group includes most of the Andean
countries, in which domestic factors pushed external
issues into a secondary role as determinants of
economic performance. Ecuador continued to recover
from the severe crisis of 1999, although per capita
output remained below 1998 levels. Growth was
driven by investment, which went mainly to the
construction of a new oil pipeline, and by household
consumption. One factor that has acted as a brake on
economic growth is Ecuador’s loss of
competitiveness, caused by the persistent upward
trend of domestic prices which, in a dollarized
economy, cannot be offset by means of exchange-rate
adjustment. This situation affects both non-traditional
exports and those activities that compete with imports.
Emigration has played a significant role in containing
unemployment and has also given rise to a large
volume of remittances. These have not been sufficient
to avoid an expansion of Ecuador’s persistent current-
account deficit, however, which will pose a serious
challenge to the newly-elected government if it
remains at its current levels.
Venezuela’s GDP slipped by around 7% in 2002,
despite relatively favourable external conditions,
especially petroleum prices, which were on average
comparatively high. This performance was chiefly a
reflection of domestic factors in both the economic and
political arenas. In the first four months of the year, a
number of developments and economic policy
measures combined to plunge the economy into a
recession. The tenacious defence of the exchange-rate
band was abandoned in February 2002 amid massive
capital flight, but not before it had generated sharp rises
in interest rates. The devaluation of the bolívar
rekindled inflation. In addition to these factors, the
government implemented fiscal adjustment measures
when petroleum prices were trending downwards,
although this trend was later reverted. With the
economy already in recession, and amid mounting
social and political conflict, in April a number of fresh
developments threatened the institutional order and
made it clear that any expansion of private sector
investment was  highly unlikely. In consequence, gross
fixed investment will have shrunk by more than 20%
in 2002. In addition, in December the domestic political
conflict took another turn for the worse, with a
prolonged strike which may reduce annual output even
further.
Colombia was also unable to take full advantage
of higher petroleum prices, because production of crude
has declined in tandem with levels of investment. The
new government has taken a firm stance with respect
to fiscal problems, growing public debt and the need
to find more resources for security spending. High
levels of unemployment and underemployment have
dampened domestic demand, while a lacklustre
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performance in the country’s main export markets
(among which Venezuela figures prominently) account
for the downturn in exports. Investment remained low
in relation to GDP, at 15.6%. These factors have
prevented GDP growth from rising above 1.6% this
year, in spite of the fact that the government deployed
an expansionary monetary policy during most of the
year (except for the third quarter).
Peru’s economy, which was the fastest-growing in
the region in 2002, is another one that is, as a rule, very
sensitive to international conditions, which affect it
through the prices of its export products, mainly metals.
This was not the case in 2002, however, because the
decline in the price of certain products (copper and zinc)
was offset by the rise in the prices of fishmeal and gold.
The Peruvian economy has been experiencing an
upswing and will have grown by 4.5% in 2002. This
performance was attributable mainly to an increase in
public and private consumption, and to the production
and export of minerals as the Antamina mine came on
stream. The rate of investment remained low, however,
although new mining and gas extraction projects could
spark a reactivation.
In summary, the region’s economic performance
was poor in 2002, very similar in most aspects to the
year before. Be this as it may, activity began to pick up
again in most of the countries by contrast with the
downslide experienced throughout 2001. In fact, the
main factors underlying the feeble performance in 2001
–the slowdown in the United States economy, electricity
rationing in Brazil and the depression that engulfed
Argentina in the final phase of the convertibility regime–
affected the region mainly in the second half of the year.
This partly explains the fact that year-on-year growth
rates were negative in the first quarters of 2002 because
they were compared with the relatively high levels of
output recorded in early 2001, whereas just the opposite
was true in the latter part of 2002.
Output contracted sharply in a number of countries
in 2002. This was mainly a reflection of domestic factors
(over-indebtedness, capital flight, banking crises and
slack domestic demand), but external financing
conditions also had a hand in the downswing.
International trade continued to be sluggish, which meant
that export volumes did not recover and the prices of
many raw materials, with the exception of petroleum,
failed to return to the levels seen before the Asian crisis
of 1997.
Gross investment contracted again (see figure 18),
which placed the regional investment rate at 18 GDP
percentage points (at 1995 prices), even lower than
the rates recorded in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The steepest downturns were experienced in the South
American countries. As tends to occur in a recession,
fixed investment was the component of global demand
to contract the most. During this particular recession,
limited export prospects combined with the higher
prices of imported capital goods (inflated by the effect
of devaluation), while scarce or expensive financing
discouraged construction activity. In addition,
political instability or conflict seriously retarded
capital formation. Ecuador was the only country in
the subregion to record significant growth in this
respect, thanks to the construction of a new oil
pipeline.
Figure 18
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS FIXED
CAPITAL FORMATION
(Percentages of GDP, on the basis of constant
1995 prices)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary estimates.




































In Central America and Mexico investment ratios
remained relatively unchanged from the levels of
2002. The development that affected these countries
the most was the cessation of the high rates of
investment growth that the majority of them enjoyed
between 1997 and 1999 (in Costa Rica the boom lasted
until 1998 and in Mexico and the Dominican Republic
until 2000).
A preliminary calculation of saving trends at
current values shows, most significantly, little variation
in the gross saving rate (which dropped from 19.7% to
19.2%). The downturn in external saving was matched
by an increase in national saving, as percentages of
GDP. The lower rate of external saving corresponded
to a narrowing of the balance-of-payments current
account deficit (another way of referring to external
saving), from 2.7% of GDP in 2001 to just under 1%
in 2002. In times when external saving has been more
abundant, the countries have tended to post lower rates
of national saving, which means that investment has
not increased at the same rate as available financing.
At the present juncture, as external saving has
narrowed, national saving has expanded as a percentage
of output, and public and private domestic consumption
has therefore contracted (see figure 19). This greater
domestic effort has not been enough to avoid a
downturn in investment in physical terms, however,
which amounted to 6% in the region as a whole.
Figure 19
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SAVING AND
INVESTMENT RATIOS
(Percentages of GDP, in current dollars)
The lower rate of investment in fixed capital
affected the countries’ medium-term growth potential.
In some cases, short-term growth could be achieved
by tapping into resources that have been underused
(unemployed and underemployed workers and idle
capacity) due to recession. A low rate of investment is
apparently not the only obstacle to the resumption of
sustained growth, however. The deteriorated social and
political conditions across most of the region represent
a major challenge for the governments. Moreover, the
downturn in external conditions may reflect, at least in
part, long-term factors: the existence of debt overhang
problems in some countries will make it difficult to
secure the return of generous net inflows of financing,
while foreign direct investment will be lower than in
previous years, because many processes of privatization
and take-overs of banks and private firms by
transnational corporations have run their course. This
multifaceted situation means that 2002 may not simply
be defined as the low point of an economic cycle, which
would naturally give way to an upswing. Instead, it
must be viewed as the continuation of the economic
stagnation which has bedevilled the region for the last
five years. The outlook for 2003 is for a modest regional
growth rate of 2.1% which, however, will not be enough
to significantly raise per capita GDP.
Regional inflation rises, but stays moderate
Inflation for the region as a whole in 2002, measured by
the consumer price index, moved up after eight years of
steady decline, reaching an annual rate of about 12%;
this is twice the rate recorded in 2001 (see figure 20).
Wholesale prices rose even more sharply (as was to be
expected in a context of widespread devaluations),
posting an annual rate of about 29% for the region,
compared to only 6% in 2001.
The upsurge in inflation essentially reflected the
fact that several countries of the region experienced
currency devaluations, some of which were quite
severe. Devaluations are to blame for the inflation rates
of 41%, 32% and 26% recorded in Argentina,
Venezuela and Uruguay, respectively.  In Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Haiti, Mexico and Paraguay,
inflation did not reach these orders of magnitude, but
the devaluations were nonetheless significant,
especially in the second half of 2002, and this was
reflected in the higher inflation rates posted towards
the end of the year. Indeed, inflation climbed steadily
over the course of the year in most of the region’s
countries. A notable exception to this was Argentina
where, after a steep rise in the early months of 2002,
inflation subsided markedly later in the year.
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
 CONSUMER PRICES
(Twelve-month variation)a
The countries with the sharpest price hikes are the
ones that also witnessed the biggest exchange-rate
increases, namely Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela.
These devaluations immediately followed the countries’
abolition of their fixed-rate (convertibility or exchange
band) regimes, which had considerably distorted
relative prices and ultimately proved to be
unsustainable. The drastic change in Argentina’s
exchange-rate regime caused the currency to plummet,
losing nearly three fourths of its value. Wholesale
prices, in which imports weigh heavily, bore the brunt
of this loss, soaring by more than 118%, which was
much higher than the rise in consumer prices. As a
result of the deep recession and high unemployment,
nominal wages were not significantly adjusted to offset
the sharp increase in prices. The exchange rate’s
stability in the second half of the year helped to slow
inflation to about 10%, in contrast to the 30% posted
in the first half of the year. The inflationary effect of
the devaluation was countered by smaller increases in
rates and charges for public goods and services; the
effect of these negotiated increases should be apparent
in the inflation rates recorded in the initial months of
2003. It should be underscored, in this regard, that
predictions that ending convertibility would unleash a
sustained process of high inflation or even
hyperinflation were not borne out. The inflationary
effects of devaluation have proved to be fairly weak
and short-lived (see figure 21).
Figure 21
ARGENTINA: DEVALUATION AND INFLATION
 IN 2002
Source: See Statistical Appendix.
a
 Latest available period.
Despite these developments, the increase in
regionwide inflation does not seem to signal the start of
a long-term trend; rather, it represents the region’s
response to a shock that is being gradually absorbed
without giving rise to sustained inflationary processes.
It is worth noting, for example, that none of the
devaluations triggered an inflationary spiral; this
suggests that indexation, which was very common in
past decades, has not resurfaced. Moreover, in almost
every case price hikes have been much more modest
than the devaluations that caused them –which impacted
more significantly on real exchange rates– evincing the
moderating effect that low growth or recession have on
inflation. Another factor that hints at a coming slowdown
in inflation is the overshooting of the exchange rate in a
number of countries and the rate’s nominal decline










































In Venezuela, inflation shot up after having
declined steadily for five years. Here again, the
turnaround was sparked by the abandonment of the
exchange system (exchange band), which led to a
sharp devaluation in the first part of the year. In the
second half of 2002, however, the recovery of crude
oil prices mitigated the exchange rate’s instability and
even pushed up the bolívar’s value, but this has not
yet been reflected in domestic prices, which are still
on the rise. The persistence of this trend may be due
in part to the raising and extension of the VAT and to
cutbacks in the subsidies provided in respect of certain
products. In Uruguay, the rise in inflation was due to
the steep devaluation of the currency, especially after
the sliding-band system was discarded and replaced
with a floating rate. Consumer prices went up by an
estimated 26% (25% between November 2001 and
November 2002), compared to less than 4% in 2001,
while wholesale prices surged by more than 60%. The
country’s severe recession, combined with the
problems caused by the financial crisis, the credit
squeeze and the freezing of deposits in some
institutions, have softened the impact of the sharp
devaluation. On the other hand, the economy’s
widespread dollarization has limited the capacity to
cushion the impact of the exchange-rate hike, although
many prices had to be adjusted in response to the new
circumstances. Wages have not been further increased,
despite the quickening pace of inflation. In Paraguay,
consumer prices rose by 15% and wholesale prices
by 24% in 2002, wholly as a result of devaluation,
which has intensified since the third quarter. As in
the above-mentioned cases, the mix of recession and
high unemployment limited the extent to which cost
increases deriving from the devaluation were passed
on to domestic prices.
Brazil’s 2002 inflation rate came in at about 12%,
compared to 7.7% the year before. The upsurge
occurred near the end of the year as a result of the
devaluation recorded between May and October.
Wholesale prices came under stronger inflationary
pressure, since the wholesale price index jumped by
31%, or 19 percentage points more than in 2001. The
price hike can be traced not only to the devaluation,
but also to increases in fuel prices and public rates
and charges. Accordingly, inflation far overshot the
Central Bank’s target, to an even greater extent than
in 2001. It was nonetheless kept from speeding up
even further by persistently sluggish economic
growth, combined with the tight monetary policy that
the authorities continued to apply to cope with
inflationary pressures and, in particular, the instability
of the foreign-exchange market. Interest rates remained
very high throughout 2002 and rose even further in the
final months of the year, reaching an annual rate of
some 22%.
Unlike the countries mentioned above, Ecuador
and El Salvador maintained a regime of full
dollarization. Ecuador once again posted a significant
drop in inflation, from 22% to 9%, but this result  could
not prevent the rise in prices from eroding the country’s
competitiveness. Prices in El Salvador showed a very
slight increase similar to the 2001 rate; unlike Ecuador,
El Salvador has had single-digit inflation since before
it switched exchange-rate regimes.
In Guatemala and Jamaica, inflation went down
by about three percentage points thanks to less severe
currency devaluations. Honduras, meanwhile, turned
in a favourable performance, with clear signs that
the stabilization process had taken hold after several
years of double-digit annual inflation. In Colombia
inflat ion also subsided,  consol idat ing the
stabilization process launched in recent years, even
though the currency depreciated significantly
between May and October. Costa Rica’s inflation
stayed at around 10%, where it has more or less held
steady in recent years, while Panama’s rate remained
at its usual low level. Trinidad and Tobago saw a
slight increase in consumer prices, despite the
revaluation of its currency. Bolivia, Chile, Nicaragua
and Peru again posted very low inflation, which
showed that their stabilization processes were firmly
entrenched, even though their exchange rates came
under some pressure. In Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, on the other hand, inflation sped up as their
currency devaluations sharpened in the final quarter.
Inflation in the Dominican Republic could be as high
as 10%, compared to 4.4% in 2001.
The inflation outlook for 2003 is favourable for
most of the countries. In some of the ones that had
previously exhibited an exchange-rate misalignment,
the dramatic relative price changes associated with
devaluation have already taken place, without setting
off indexation processes or massive pass-throughs of
higher costs to domestic prices. Inflation will probably
become more moderate in 2003 in countries that
suffered excessive devaluations, mirroring the extent
to which the exchange-rate overadjustment is gradually
absorbed. In the remaining countries, the conditions
that made it possible to gradually reduce regional
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inflation in the 1990s are still in evidence, and
economic policy continues to give high priority to
maintaining that achievement. Generally speaking,
economic policies no longer involve measures that
seriously alter relative prices and that may have lasting
effects on competitiveness.
Employment and wages
The labour market turned in a weak performance in the
context of a shrinking regional economy. The main
labour trends were a steep decline in the rate of
employment, a sharp rise in unemployment, the
expansion of informality and sluggish job creation in
small and medium-sized firms. As a result, many Latin
Americans saw their living conditions take a turn for
the worse in 2002. At the same time, real wages reflected
patterns in rates of inflation and did not greatly diverge
from labour productivity trends.
After dropping sharply in 2001, in 2002 the rate
of employment declined heavily again, from 52.7% to
52.2%, due to the first negative rate of economic growth
recorded in the region since 1983. Given that the rate
of labour force participation remained unchanged,
regional unemployment climbed from 8.4% to 9.1%,
which was the highest figure since comparable
measurements became available. This deterioration in
employment and unemployment rates was seen in nearly
all the countries of the region (see figures 22 and 23).
Figure 22
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
EMPLOYMENT RATE
(Employed as a percentage of the
working-age population)

















LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN
UNEMPLOYMENT
(Annual average rate)
The heavy downturn in the employment rate testified
to the existence of a close link between economic growth
and job creation, which has been a feature of the labour
markets in recent years (see figure 24).
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
b Weighted average.
As the figure shows, this trend suggested that
employment would perform even more poorly in 2002
than it actually did. In many countries, corporate demand
for labour, reflected in the generation of waged
employment, was even weaker than the employment rate
indicates. This slack demand was partly offset by an
expansion of informal employment, mainly self-
employment, as households responded to the need to
generate income. Waged employment as a proportion
of total employment thus declined from 73.9% to 72.9%
in Argentina, from 73.7% to 72.7% in Mexico and from
58.1% to 56.7% in Peru. In Venezuela, an expansion of
informal employment pushed up the rate of employment,
despite a heavy decline in GDP.
Owing to the custom of setting nominal wages on
the basis of past inflation, real wages in the formal sector
were determined to a great extent by the annual variation
in inflation. This meant substantial declines in countries
that experienced surges of inflation and small rises in
countries that posted decreasing rates of inflation (see
figure 25). Variations in real wages in the formal sector
ranged from -15% in Argentina to over 4% in Colombia,
Nicaragua and Peru (see table A-6 in annex). At the
regional level, information from 12 countries shows an
increase of 1% in real wages as a median, and a decline
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LATIN AMERICA: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
EMPLOYMENT
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
Figure 25
REAL WAGES AND INFLATION
Figure 26
WAGES AND APPARENT LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
OF WAGE-EARNERS
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
Countries’ international competitiveness is also a
function of trends in their real exchange rates, however.
With widespread depreciation in real effective exchange
rates, many countries posted gains in wage
competitiveness in 2002. Currency depreciation also
tends to stimulate the hiring of labour, because it has
the effect of making it cheaper in comparison with capital
goods, which are largely imported. As discussed in
chapter 3, in 2002 relatively few countries experienced
a downturn in currency competitiveness (notable
exceptions to this were Ecuador and Guatemala).
Although the rate of job creation was low across
the region, the phenomenon varied in magnitude and
detail from one country to another. Two groups of
countries can be distinguished in this respect. First, those
countries that were overtaken by a profound economic
crisis and, second, the majority of the countries in the
region whose GDP expanded only modestly and whose
per capita GDP stood still, together with the few
countries (Ecuador, Peru and Dominican Republic) that
recorded higher economic growth rates of around 4%.
The first group of countries (Argentina, Uruguay
and Venezuela) saw demand for labour drop sharply even
though real wages sagged owing to inflationary surges.
The worst affected sectors were those that rely on
domestic demand. In Greater Buenos Aires formal
employment contracted by almost 10% in the first three
quarters of 2002 with respect to the same period of 2001.
Although formal employment declined in all the
segments of activity, the hardest hit were construction
(down 38%, following a decline of 19% in 2001) and
commerce (down 11%). As a result, in May
unemployment in the construction sector climbed to




















R te of employm nt (right axis)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
In 2002 an inverse relationship was clearly visible
between the inter-annual changes in inflation and
economic growth. In keeping with these two trends, real
wages grew faster in countries with higher rates of
economic growth. Given that in many countries the bulk
of the increase in employment took place in low
productivity sectors (for reasons of household
subsistence), a calculation of growth in average labour
productivity based on the variation in the number of
wage-earners alone gives a positive correlation between
labour productivity and the variation in the real wage.
In fact, real wages rose in countries that recorded an
increase in the apparent productivity of wage-earners
and declined in the other countries (see figure 26). Thus,
although real wages were strongly affected by the rate
of inflation, they did not diverge much from productivity



































Variation in apparent productivity of wage earners (percentages)
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medium-sized enterprises, in which around 12% of
formal jobs were lost. The rise in unemployment also
affected heads of household, among whom the rate rose
from 12.8% to 17.7%. At the same time,
underemployment increased and real wages declined
sharply. Together, these trends translated into a
substantial worsening of poverty indicators. The situation
would have been even worse but for emergency
employment programmes, which enabled the transfer
of resources to approximately one million people.
The majority of the other countries in the region
posted low rates of economic growth, which also
affected labour trends. The rate of employment trended
down in most of countries in the second group that had
information available (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
Ecuador and Mexico), although much less drastically
than in the first group. The exceptions were Colombia,
where a strong expansion of informal employment
compensated for the weakness of labour demand, and
Peru and the Dominican Republic, where stronger
economic growth helped to maintain the level of
employment, even amid weak generation of waged
employment. Given the sluggish rate of job creation,
unemployment increased in most of the countries.   In
some of them, however, open unemployment decreased
because households reacted to the situation in a way
that translated into a contraction of the labour supply.
In Ecuador, persistent emigration also contributed to a
decline in labour supply.
In most of the countries in this group, real wages
increased slightly in the context of a decreasing
inflation rate. The main exception to this pattern was
Brazil, where real wages in the formal sector
continued the downward trend that has persisted ever
since 1999.
Similarly to Argentina, although in a different
context, in the two countries in this group –Chile and
Peru– in which information was available on formal
employment by size of firm, the larger firms performed
better than small and medium-sized enterprises. This
suggests that, first, it cannot be stated that large firms
invariably react to sluggish economic activity by cutting
back on hiring and, second, that small and medium-
sized firms often bear the brunt of slack domestic
demand and of such economic difficulties as credit
shortages.
In many countries,  slow domestic demand
continued to undermine employment in construction,
which depends more heavily on it than any other sector.
In Brazil, for example, employment in construction
contracted by almost 9% in the period from January to
September 2002, in comparison with the year-earlier
period. Employment in manufacturing was affected
to a greater or lesser extent across the region by weak
external, regional and local markets. As a result,
employment in manufacturing declined as a
percentage of total employment, particularly in the
largest economies of the second group –Brazil,
Colombia and Mexico– and in the countries of the
first group.
Since the 1990s, if not before, economic growth and
hence employment trends in the countries of the north
of the region (Mexico, Central America and the
Caribbean) have closely shadowed economic
performance in North America, because of growing trade
integration in goods production (especially maquila) and
in services provision (tourism). During most of the
1990s, the dynamic North American economy fuelled
growth in those countries, but the downturn that began
in late 2000 had an adverse impact on their labour
markets.
In the particular case of the Mexican maquila
industry, almost 300,000 jobs were lost between October
2000, when employment was at a record high, and March
2002. From April onwards, the number of jobs in this
sector began to increase again as the North American
economy swung back, to reach 29,000 new posts by
September. Even so, growth in maquila employment was
negative between 2001 and 2002 and, as competition
from the Asian maquila sector steps up, there can be no
assurances that Mexican and Central American maquila
will be able to return to the rates of employment growth
recorded in the 1990s.
Outlook for 2003
Latin America and the Caribbean is expected to grow
by 2.1% in 2003, which will translate into a slightly
positive variation in per capita growth.
Current growth trends show that most of the
countries began to experience an upturn in the second
quarter of 2002, which will generate a carry-over
effect of 1.1% in 2003. The world economy is also
expected to see a slight upswing in 2003. In the United
States the rate of expansion will be similar to that of
2002, at around 2%, while economic growth in both
Europe and Japan will exceed the 2002 rates of under
1% and -0.5%, respectively. Thanks to strong
economic expansion in China and India, the growth
rate for the developing countries as a group will
increase.
There is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the
prices of agricultural and mining commodities, but they
should continue to climb slowly upwards from the low
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levels recorded in 2001. This trend began in 2002, fuelled
by demand from the United States and South-East Asia.
Petroleum will not vary significantly in price in 2003,
although the geopolitical situation in the Middle East is
generating some apprehension in this respect.
The growth rate of 2.1% projected for Latin America
and the Caribbean reflects a mixed performance across
countries and groups of countries within the region, with
respect to 2002 (see table 4).
Table 4
LATIN AMERICA: GDP TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS,
2001-2003
(Annual growth rates)
States. Argentina should grow by 2%, reflecting a
modest recovery from the crisis that began in late 1998
and appears to have reached its blackest point in early
2002. Although the demise of the convertibility regime
has opened up possibilities with regard to exports and
import substitution, the country still faces difficulties
in tapping into those opportunities effectively. The high
rate of unemployment, the sharp downturn in real
income and the shortage of credit –which represents
an obstacle to the expansion of exports– have conspired
to stifle the domestic market. Argentina’s GDP has risen
only slowly since the upturn in the second quarter of
2002 and the projections indicate that this trend will
continue into 2003. In Uruguay the adverse effects
carried over from 2002 will make expansion unlikely,
although exports may increase. A downturn is projected
in Paraguay, as the contraction begun in the second
half of 2002 continues, exacerbated by the
reappearance of foot-and-mouth disease and external
debt servicing problems.
The Andean Community is expected to expand at
a rate of 1.6%, which represents an upturn by
comparison with the stagnation experienced in 2002.
The complex situation in Venezuela has triggered a
sharp economic downswing and a decline in petroleum
production, which could harm exports and rule out a
positive growth rate in 2003. Colombia’s projected
growth rate of 2% reflects a continuation of the modest
recovery that began in the second quarter of 2002.
Ecuador is forecast to expand at a rate of 1%, because
of a recent downturn in the external accounts which
has created an element of uncertainty with regard to
its economic performance in 2003. Peru recorded the
region’s highest growth rate in 2002 and will probably
retain its lead position –jointly with Chile– in 2003.
Its economy should expand by 3.5% thanks, in
particular, to the incipient recovery of construction
investment and an increase in domestic and external
demand in construction and other sectors.
The Brazilian economy will expand by 1.8%,
provided that the current domestic and external
macroeconomic conditions –a favourable exchange rate
and high rates of interest– hold steady. This expansion
will be the result of a revitalization in construction, which
was beleaguered until recently by the electricity crisis,
and of exports, which should post a significant increase
again in 2003. Expectations of buoyant external sales
are based on the devaluation of the real and favourable
conditions for the production of a number of
commodities and semi-manufactures. Inflation showed
signs of rekindling at the end of 2002, however, which
could hinder a return to better investment figures.
Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division.
2001 2002 2003a
Latin America and
the Caribbean 0.3 -0.5 2.1
Argentina -4.4 -11.0 2.0
Bolivia 1.3 2.0 2.0
Brazil 1.5 1.5 1.8
Chile 2.8 1.8 3.5
Colombia 1.4 1.6 2.0
Costa Rica 1.0 2.8 3.0
Ecuador 6.0 3.4 1.0
El Salvador 1.9 2.3 2.5
Guatemala 2.4 1.9 2.5
Honduras 2.7 2.0 2.5
Mexico -0.4 1.2 3.0
Nicaragua 3.0 0.5 1.5
Panama 0.4 0.4 2.0
Paraguay 2.4 -3.0 -2.0
Peru 0.2 4.5 3.5
Dominican Republic 2.7 4.0 3.0
Uruguay -3.4 -10.5 -2.5
Venezuela 2.9 -7.0 -0.5
a Projections.
The Southern Cone will experience a major shift
in economic trends. First, the sharp contraction in
Argentina and Uruguay will not be repeated in 2003,
while Chile will turn in a slightly better performance
than in 2002, chiefly thanks to an upturn in the external
situation following the signature of free trade
agreements with the European Union and the United
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Mexico’s economy is projected to grow at a rate of
3%. The extrapolation of late 2002 figures does not paint
a very optimistic picture, since the year ended with a
drop in investment and the stagnation of non-petroleum
exports. The projected growth rate reflects a modest
expansion of exports with respect to 2002, a slight upturn
in investment and a level of consumption comparable to
2002.  Economic growth in the United States, Mexico’s
main export market, will not significantly exceed the
previous year’s rate, which will weaken growth in the
Mexican economy.
The Central American countries and the Dominican
Republic should post a growth rate of 2.6%, which
represents little variation with respect to 2002. The
Dominican Republic could turn in the strongest
performance among the group, but this may be contingent
upon the mitigation of certain domestic and external
disequilibria which sharpened in 2002. Costa Rica is in a
similar situation. Nicaragua will post the subregion’s
lowest growth rate of 1.5%, as the political crisis takes its
toll on investment. The other Central American economies
will expand at rates of between 2% and 3%.
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SOUTH AMERICA
Argentina
The demise of the convertibility regime, after a long and traumatic downslide, marked a
turning point in the Argentine economy and substantially altered the way it operated. The
disruption in the system of contracts caused by the devaluation of the peso sharpened the
financial crisis and helped to prolong the steep downtrend in activity that had accelerated in
mid-2001. Economic activity bottomed out in the first quarter of 2002, however, and from the
second quarter on production showed signs of a slight upturn, driven by sectors linked to
exports and import substitution.
GDP shrank by 11% in 2002, which translated into a
cumulative decline of 20% in a period of four years and
represented a level of activity below the figure posted in
1993. At the same time, in May the urban unemployment
rate rose to 21.5%, which exceeded all existing records.
The currency depreciated sharply in the first half of 2002,
then stabilized later in the year. This heavy devaluation
generated a steep rise in prices, but did not ignite an
inflationary spiral. Nominal wages varied only slightly.
The downturn in employment and in real wages
worsened the country’s levels of poverty and indigence.
Aggregate spending slumped heavily. In particular,
investment plunged by 35%. The decline in imports
contributed to a trade surplus of US$ 15.6 billion, which
was equivalent to over 50% of exports. The current
account yielded a surplus of 8.6 GDP points. The public
sector did not service its bond debt, and there were
widespread instances of arrears or renegotiations of
private external debts. Nevertheless, international
reserves declined, which was a reflection of heavy capital
outflows in the private sector, especially in the early part
of the year, and of the pressure of net capital and interest
payments to multilateral agencies, which represented
close to 4% of GDP. Laborious negotiations went on
throughout the year with IMF, but no agreement was
reached. Consequently, in November the government
deferred a capital amortization payment to the World
Bank, in order to preserve international reserves. Such
a default on obligations to a multilateral agency was
unprecedented.
The government’s primary spending posted no
significant nominal variation and declined as a
percentage of GDP. The tax burden also shrank, although
to a lesser extent. The lower tax receipts generated sharp
fiscal tensions at the beginning of the year, when the
government had already announced the suspension of
debt payments. In the first quarter, the national non-
financial public sector recorded a primary deficit of 1.7%
of quarterly GDP. Later, as the effects of price rises and
export taxes began to kick in, the government’s nominal
revenues rebounded, thus easing the payment difficulties
of the public sector. One of the outcomes of the critical
state of public finances early in the year was that the
national administration and several local governments
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issued small-denomination bonds to meet their current
obligations. These quasi currencies circulated –with
varying degrees of acceptance– as “emergency monies”.
The crisis in Argentina was marked by severe
disarray in the financial markets. Towards the end of
2001, in response to the draining of deposits and the run
on the currency, the authorities restricted cash
withdrawals from the banks and transfers of funds
abroad. Restrictions on the withdrawal of funds
constrained transactions and further fuelled the existing
social and political tensions. President De la Rua
resigned in December. Congress appointed a successor
who remained in the post for only a week, during which
the government announced the suspension of public debt
servicing payments. In early 2002, a new government
formally terminated the convertibility regime and
announced the establishment of a dual currency system.
This was replaced a few weeks later by a unified floating
exchange rate subject to intervention by the central bank.
In addition, restrictions continued to apply to the use of
the foreign-currency proceeds of export activity and to
the purchase of dollars. However, the exchange rate in
the informal market did not differ appreciably from the
rate used for authorized transactions.
As was to be expected, the effects of devaluation
on net worth were extremely costly, since they called
the whole contract system into question. Currency
depreciation cast a spotlight on the treatment of payments
denominated in foreign currency. Creditors (particularly
the holders of dollar-denominated bank deposits) insisted
upon their right to recoup dollars at the rate agreed.
Debtors, on the other hand, resisted making repayments
in a currency whose price had risen dramatically. The
authorities imposed a system of “asymmetric
pesification” of assets and liabilities within the financial
system. The bulk of all loans were converted at a rate of
one peso to the dollar, and deposits at a rate of 1.4 pesos
to the dollar, while banks were to receive government
bonds to cover the difference.
These measures, which generated large
distributional effects, were highly controversial. In
response to widespread protests on the part of borrowers,
the authorities postponed the application of a mechanism
indexing debt to domestic prices, which had been
established together with the conversion into local
currency. Savers reacted with public demonstrations and
a plethora of legal submissions. The authorities also
reprogrammed fixed-term deposits, and maintained
restrictions on cash withdrawals. These measures were
not sufficient to ease the pressure on bank liquidity, due
to outflows of deposits authorized under the existing
legislation and, in particular, to the impact of numerous
court orders (“amparos”) giving individual savers the
right to withdraw their funds. As a result, in the early
months of the year bank activity was irregular and
rediscounts, which were extended in large volumes,
became a source of considerable monetary expansion.
Between January and March the central bank’s peso-
denominated liabilities grew by 70%.
The money creation entailed in the return of deposits
helped to step up pressure on the currency markets, while
the virtual breakdown of credit mechanisms visibly
affected the circulation of funds and the conduct of
transactions. In the first quarter, GDP contracted sharply
(about 6% in seasonally adjusted terms, with respect to
the preceding quarter). In the same period the nominal
exchange rate rose by around 200%, in a climate of
extreme apprehension and despite interventions on the
part of the central bank, whose reserves declined by some
US$ 2 billion. In marked contract to past experiences,
however, prices responded in a fairly subdued manner.
The peso retained its function as a price denominator
and a means of exchange for day-to-day transactions.
Tradable goods (and goods with a large proportion of
tradable inputs) rose considerably in price, but other
articles did not follow suit and no wage adjustments were
made. The government announced the pesification of
utility rates  that had been contractually fixed in dollars,
and refused to authorize rate hikes. In the first quarter
the wholesale price index rose by almost 35%, but
consumer price inflation remained below 10%. In the
months that followed, assistance to banks continued to
drive domestic credit creation, which was partly offset
by issues of central bank bills. Initially, these bills were
auctioned in small amounts, with very short maturities
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(14 days) and at high rates of interest. Pressures in the
exchange market persisted, however, and at the end of
June the dollar exchange rate came close to four pesos,
while reserves continued to decline in the second quarter.
The instability of the currency market helped to speed
the transmission to prices, with a rise of 10% in the CPI
in April and a cumulative increase of 30% in the first
semester.
Despite the gravity of the financial crisis, payment
mechanisms gradually shifted back towards normality.
Also, the changes in relative prices enabled a number of
firms to recover their margins, which allowed them to
generate cash flows to substitute for the almost non-
existent supply of credit. In the second quarter, GDP
posted a slight upturn (seasonally adjusted) although it
was still 13.5% down on the year-earlier figure. Price
increases and the maintenance of real activity boosted
VAT receipts, which in May and June exceeded the
nominal levels recorded in the same months of 2001. In
addition, revenues from export duties were also
significant; in June taxes on external trade represented
over 15% of the federal tax agency’s receipts.
The treatment of reprogrammed bank deposits
continued to be hotly debated in the courts and in the
arena of economic policy. The authorities announced a
voluntary swap operation, which would allow savers to
swap their deposits for public bonds denominated in
dollars. The take-up of this option encompassed about a
quarter of all deposits.
Towards mid-year, the withdrawal of deposits
through court-ordered releases slowed, which meant that
assistance to the financial system could be greatly scaled
down. This helped to reduce the issue of base money
through domestic lending operations. Regulations on the
sale of export-generated foreign currency were
tightened, however. Outflows of private capital eased
and the large trade surplus made itself felt on the
exchange market. Between July and November, the price
of the dollar held steady (the peso even appreciated
somewhat) while market interventions resulted in net
purchases of US$ 2 billion. The calm in the currency
market was clearly reflected in price trends. The variation
of the CPI became steadily more moderate, and in
October a rate of just 0.2% was posted. As well, there
was an incipient return of flows towards to the banks
and interest rates came down: around mid-November
peso-denominated bills issued by the central bank with
maturities of 90 days were yielding an annual rate of
under 20%. The level of activity did not make a decisive
recovery, but it did post a slight upturn in the third quarter
and looked set to maintain this trend into the following
months. A number of surveys reported a slight
improvement in the demand for labour.
Although there were signs of an upswing in export
activity during the year, the value of exports shrank by
5% in 2002 overall. A number of factors were to blame
for this result. Unit values were down (possibly partly
because of declarations engineered to sidestep tax
payments and requirements to sell foreign currency). The
acute shortage of credit and higher input prices affected
the supply of goods, including exportables. At the same
time, some of these goods acted as reserves of value:
for example, amid mistrust of financial instruments, part
of the grain harvest is believed to have been stored and
its export delayed. Another factor was the downturn in
sales to Brazil. Even so, the trade surplus was
extraordinarily high, at about 15% of GDP, because of a
heavy slump of about 60% in goods imports. Capital
movements reflected the serious disruption of the
economy, mainly in the first semester. The public sector
ran up arrears of some US$ 4.3 billion. Direct investment
was down, and the other operations of the non-financial
private sector together generated a net outflow of about
US$ 13 billion.
At the end of 2002, the state of the economy
remained fragile, although there were signs of a return
ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product -0.8 -4.4 -11.0
Consumer prices -0.7 -1.5 40.6 b
Real wages c 1.5 -1.2 -15.4 d
Money (M1) -2.7 -23.8 106.9 b
Real effective exchange rate e 1.6 -3.9 136.4 f
Terms of trade 10.5 -0.6 1.5
Average annual percentages
Urban unemploymen rate 15.1 16.4 21.5 g
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -2.2 -3.9 -2.5
Real deposit rate 10.0 15.3 -6.1 h
Real lending rate 12.7 28.2 ...
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 31,092 30,846 29,322
Imports of goods
and services 32,822 27,360 13,742
Current account -8,864 -4,429 9,282
Capital and financial account 7,647 -17,030 -17,282





 Variation between November 2001 and November 2002.
c
 Refers to manufacturing.
d
 Estimate based on average January-September.
e






 Average January-September, annualized.
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to normality. The asset effects of the exit from
convertibility had yet to be resolved; in particular,
litigation continued over the forced conversion of
deposits into pesos. Rate setting for privatized public
utilities remained a pressing issue. Public debt
restructuring was still to be addressed and private
external debt renegotiations were still ongoing. The
government and IMF were yet to arrive at an agreement
on the refinancing of obligations to multilateral agencies.
The authorities therefore decided to cease the drawdown
of reserves to service loans from those agencies, which
led to a default on a capital payment on a World Bank
loan. On the other hand, restrictions were lifted on all
current and savings accounts, without this leading to a
loss of bank deposits or increased tensions in the
currency market. On the contrary, the central bank  built
up reserves in the last few months.
In summary, to put the economy’s performance in
2002 into perspective, it may be observed that exports
have stagnated since the late 1990s, as the dollar
appreciated and the real exchange rate rose in Brazil,
while external credit was shrinking. These factors
translated into a currency misalignment and a loss of
competitiveness. They also exerted downward pressure
on aggregate spending, which was forced down in dollar
terms. A disturbance of this nature could not be absorbed
by the rigidity of the currency regime and a system in
which financial contracts were widely dollarized. In
addition, weaknesses began to show clearly in the tax
structure, exacerbated by a prolonged recession. As
agents began to perceive that no there was no clearly
defined exit scenario but that, on the contrary, the
financial system and the currency regime were becoming
ever more fragile, their decisions regarding demand for
goods and asset holdings tended to steepen the slide in
activity and accentuate the drain on deposits and
reserves, while fiscal problems deepened due to a large
downturn in revenues. This led to the collapse of the
currency regime and rendered the public sector insolvent.
Convertibility carried high exit costs, given the extent
of dollarization of public and private debts. These costs
were manifested in a breakdown of the financial contract
system, generating grave conflicts –many of which
remain unresolved– over the apportionment of major
areas of ownership rights. The credit supply was
therefore interrupted and, with a massive outflow of
capital when spending was already depressed, the level
of activity continued to slip backwards in the months
immediately after devaluation. The peso retained its
function as a transaction currency, however, and the
impact on prices was relatively moderate. After a
troubled first quarter, activity showed some signs of a
return to normalcy and the volume of production ceased
to decline. Although the crisis may have bottomed out,
however, the story is far from over: highly complex
questions remain to be answered, especially in relation
to the asset effects of the crisis (in respect of the
domestic financial system, public debt and private
external debt) and to the form the fiscal regime will
take henceforth.
The Argentine crisis also revealed serious analytical
failings on the part of the international community
which underestimated the risks run by the Argentine
economy and failed to help define measures to cope
with the emergency, beyond general calls for
sustainable policies. The effects of contagion on other
economies were also underestimated. At a broader
level, it became clear that the global financial
institutions were unprepared to deal with financial
crises in large emerging economies.
Preliminary overview of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 53
Bolivia
For the fourth consecutive year, the Bolivian economy recorded low growth with GDP
expanding by barely 2% in 2002. This result was based mainly on natural gas production.
Domestic demand remained depressed, given the uncertain external environment both
internationally and regionally, coupled with a domestic situation marked by the elections and
the change in Government at the beginning of the second half-year. These two factors triggered
an outflow of capital, which, together with a negative export performance, led to a deterioration
in the current-account and balance-of-payments deficits and a sharper depreciation of the
Bolivian currency. There was an upsurge in inflation with the inter-annual rate rising to 2.3%
in November.
Natural gas production was once again the driving force
of the economy, recording almost 30% growth in the
first three quarters. Although this sector is export-
oriented, its increased product was not sufficient to boost
overall external sales. On the other hand, inventories
expanded considerably and so did gross investment,
albeit to a lesser extent; however, these increases had
little impact on GDP since they carry limited weight in
this indicator.
Weak demand kept inflation low, although the
monthly rate moved up from the negative value
recorded in March. This trend meant that rises in
nominal wages translated into parallel increases in
purchasing power. In the first half-year, when inflation
was lower, real private-sector wages had gone up by
3.5% in comparison with the same period of 2001. At
the beginning of the year, the Government raised the
national minimum wage to 430 bolivianos, up from
400 bolivianos in 2001.
The increase in investment was led by the public
sector, which sought to compensate for the sluggishness
of private investment in the face of the prevailing
uncertainty at home and abroad. Scheduled public
investment was almost 10% higher than in 2001,
reflecting the bias of a fiscal policy whose margin for
manoeuvre was determined by external contributions in
a context of weak, flat tax collection.
In this context, public spending increased, while
total income also grew as a result of grants from abroad.
The fiscal deficit, already close to 6% of GDP in the
first three quarters, remained at a similar level to that of
the previous year. Growth in expenditure was due mainly
to higher investment spending geared especially to job
creation. The cost of the transition from a social security
system to a private system continued to be a burden on
the public purse. By the middle of the year, the number
of workers affiliated to pension fund management
companies (AFP) had grown by 7% compared with the
figure one year earlier. The social security deficit was in
itself equivalent to the total fiscal deficit.
Given the concessionary nature of external
financing,  most of which was provided under the highly
indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative, domestic
borrowing in 2002 accounted for far more than a quarter
of total public debt.
In the absence of inflationary pressures, authorities
had more leeway in setting monetary policy and foreign
exchange policy. The latter was directed towards
avoiding excessive variations in the real external value
of the boliviano in relation to the currencies of the
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GDP
BOLIVIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 2.3 1.3 2.0
Consumer prices 3.4 0.9 2.3 b
Real wages c 0.9 4.0 2.1 d
Money (M1) 6.4 13.7 10.7 e
Real effective exchange rate f 1.2 0.9 -0.8 g
Terms of trade 2.0 -1.3 -3.1
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 7.5 8.5 ...
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -4.4 -7.2 -7.5
Real deposit rate 7.7 9.1 6.8 h
Real lending rate 30.5 19.2 17.9 h
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 1,470 1,521 1,463
Imports of goods
and  services 2,078 1,996 2,051
Current account -447 -292 -415
Capital and financial account 408 255 296





 Percentage change November 2001-November 2002.
c




 Percentage change September 2001-September 2002.
f
  A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
g
 Average for January to October.
h
 Average for January to September, annualized.
country’s main trading partners. Thus, at the beginning
of the year, monetary authorities announced a more
active foreign exchange policy, which resulted in an
acceleration in the nominal depreciation to accompany
the sharp devaluations in the Argentine and Brazilian
currencies, which fuelled a higher demand for foreign
currency in Bolivia. In mid-December, the nominal
depreciation accumulated over the year with respect to
the dollar exceeded 9%, compared with 6.6% over the
preceding year, but, in real terms, the boliviano
appreciated against the other currencies.
Capital outflows, prompted by the uncertainty
prevailing both internationally and domestically,
combined with a run on deposits to put pressure on
domestic liquidity. The Central Bank of Bolivia
responded by providing liquidity through open market
operations. Disbursements from the Central Bank’s net
reserves amounted to approximately US$ 190 million
in the first eleven months as a result of which, by
November, the level of reserves had fallen to US$ 890
million. The Central Bank’s policy served to counter-
balance the contractionary effect of this reduction on
the monetary base, which in November showed an inter-
annual growth of 20%, in contrast with a 7% reduction
in liquidity. The pressure on the latter interrupted the
decline in interest rates observed in 2001. In October,
nominal deposit and lending rates reached monthly
averages of 10.6% and 25% respectively, compared with
8% and 19% at the beginning of the year, although they
returned to these levels in November.
The balance-of-payments deficit widened as a result
of the lower export earnings and private capital outflows.
The value of exports declined slightly owing especially
to the results in the mining sector, including the natural
gas industry which saw an almost 10% contraction in
sales in the first three quarters. This was due to a fall in
prices, since the volumes exported were almost 8%
higher. Since these sales account for such a high
proportion of exports, their decline could not be offset
by the buoyant performance of agricultural exports.
Imports, on the other hand, expanded at a rate somewhat
higher than domestic economic activity owing to the high
level of purchases of intermediary goods, since imports
of consumer and capital goods declined significantly.
This increase is attributable largely to the expansion of
imports from the MERCOSUR countries.
Consequently, the trade balance deteriorated; the
same occurred with the current-account balance, which
also reflected a decline in transfers. In the first three
quarters, the current deficit was equivalent to 5% of GDP.
Private capital outflows offset the bulk of the increase
in inflows in the form of net public-sector borrowing
and, above all, foreign direct investment, which remained
high. The overall balance-of-payments deficit in the first
nine months was close to US$ 200 million, double that
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Brazil
In 2002 the Brazilian economy posted a moderate rate of growth (1.5%) for the second year
running, although there were some signs of an upswing during the year. This performance
was attributable to adverse conditions in the world and regional economies, a downturn in
terms of trade, a serious shortage of external credit and  the collapse of trade with Argentina.
All this forced the government to maintain a cautious stance on monetary policy, amid steep
rises in the exchange rate. Currency speculation intensified in the run-up to the elections,
while spreads on Brazil’s sovereign bonds rose to over 2,000 basis points, which was more
than double the figure recorded in December 2001. This situation obliged the government to
negotiate a new agreement with IMF, which will secure an additional US$ 24 billion in funding.
This amount should easily cover the current-account deficit projected for 2003, but in itself is
not enough to meet amortization payments.
In 2002 the rate of inflation was over 11%, which
exceeded the target ceiling of 5.5%, while wholesale
prices rose by a steep 31.29%. Currency devaluation hurt
the fiscal balance, especially public debt, which
expanded by more than 10 percentage points to 64% of
GDP. The current-account deficit declined to 1.8% of
GDP, by comparison with a figure of 4.5% in 2001. There
was also a downturn in foreign direct investment and in
sales of Brazilian debt portfolios, while international
banks scaled down their credit exposure, which translated
into a 60% decrease in capital inflows during the year.
Thanks to more favourable trends in the exchange
rate, in the latter months of 2002 balance-of-payments
current transactions yielded excellent results, which
narrowed the current-account deficit from US$ 23.217
billion in 2001 to US$ 8.601 billion in 2002. The goods
surplus multiplied fivefold, from US$ 2.642 billion in
2001 to US$ 12.5 billion in 2002. The services deficit
narrowed by 34.55% and the deficit on the income
account by 7%. By contrast, the capital account posted
negative results. Net direct investment was down by 46%,
while portfolio investments moved from a net inflow of
US$ 3.4 billion to a net outflow of US$ 2.8 billion.
Exports performed well from mid-year onwards.
In the second semester the value of exports increased
by 24% with respect to the same period of 2001, which
was more than enough to compensate for the downturn
of 13% posted in the first semester. The expansion for
the year overall was 3.6%, despite a decline in export
prices, a large decrease in sales to Argentina (almost
two thirds), which hurt manufactures, and the
protectionist measures imposed on Brazilian goods by
the United States. The trade surplus was not –as it had
been until recently– solely the fruit of limited demand
for imports, but also the result of a good export
performance. The largest increase in export volumes was
recorded in commodities and semi-manufactures (11%).
This was partly offset, however, by a downturn of over
5% in prices (which have slipped by 22% in five years).
The volume of manufactured exports decreased, chiefly
because of the crisis in Argentina, but began to post an
upturn in July, thanks to sales in new markets such as
the United States, Canada, Mexico, China, India and
Russia.
Import volumes were down again, this time by 13%,
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import substitution scheme. Industry accounted for 95%
of the downturn, since the sector’s external trade deficit
narrowed from US$ 7 billion in 2001 to US$ 700 million
in 2002. Three quarters of this adjustment, however, was
attributable to four areas alone: metallurgy, mechanics,
chemicals and electrical and telecommunications
materials. It was argued that a substitution process would
require increasing rates of investment, which have not
been in evidence in recent years. On the other hand, since
2002 a gap has opened up between physical production
and the import of inputs, which appears to indicate that
any such process could not be considered to be
temporary.
In September 2002 international reserves stood at
US$ 38.4 billion, which was equivalent to 10 months of
imports, compared with US$ 35.9 billion in December
2001. In July estimated total external debt was US$ 216
billion, of which US$ 187 billion corresponded to
medium- and long-term holdings and US$ 29 billion to
short term liabilities.
In 2002 Brazil met the IMF-agreed fiscal targets
for the four year running, with a primary fiscal surplus
of around 4% of GDP. This was not enough to offset the
impact of the heavy devaluation on the stock of public
debt, however, which was equivalent to 5.4% of GDP.
Meanwhile, the states and municipalities yielded a
primary surplus of 0.8% of GDP,  which was a tribute to
the effectiveness of the refinancing agreements signed
three years ago and the Fiscal Responsibility Act that
came into force in 2000. The central government’s larger
primary surplus reflected the expansion of extraordinary
revenues and new sources of funding. Federal tax
receipts, not including social security, expanded by more
than 10% in real terms in 2002. New mechanisms of
arrears collection and tax on income from pension funds,
together with a new levy on fuels, account for most of
the real increase. In contrast, the economic slowdown
and financial uncertainty translated into lower receipts
from taxes on imports, automobiles and capital gains
and interest. Higher growth in revenues provided scope
for a looser stance on federal government spending than
had originally been envisaged. Primary expenditures
(excluding interest) expanded by 17% in nominal terms,
which was less than the nominal growth in revenues
(25%). On the other hand, the social security deficit
continued to widen, to reach 1.2% of GDP.
The administration’s management of monetary
policy was affected in 2002 by the downturn in external
borrowing conditions, inflationary pressures generated
by currency devaluation and uncertainty over the path
economic policy, particularly fiscal policy, would take
in view of the approaching change in government. The
central bank sought to draw a distinction between
speculative movements and structural situations, in order
to avert unnecessary damage to the level of activity.
Meanwhile, although it maintained the system of
inflation targets, the central bank refrained from using
it too intensively. The annual base rate of interest was
therefore cut from 19% in December 2001 to 18.5% in
March and 18% in July. Only when inflation surged in
August and September did the central bank raise interest
rates, to 21% in October and 22% in November. As well,
in 2002 the method of valuation of investment fund
portfolio assets was changed, requiring them to be
marked to market, and alterations were made to the
system of payments among financial institutions, which
lowered the central bank’s systemic risk in day-to-day
market operations. These factors helped to accentuate a
preference for liquid assets, which expanded the means
of payment.
As the conditions for refinancing public debt
became tougher, the treasury and the central bank opted
to redeem liabilities rather than renew them.
Consequently, the monetary base expanded rapidly (by
41% over the 12 months to October). To control the
expansion of liquidity –which also affected demand for
dollars– the central bank raised the banking reserve
requirement. Difficulties also arose with securities
indexed to the exchange rate, because the market
demanded a much higher rate of interest to renew such
instruments, amid fears that they could be subject to
some type of restriction in the future. Only from
November on was it possible to fully roll over maturing
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  BRAZIL: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 4.0 1.5 1.5
Consumer prices 6.0 7.7 10.9 b
Real wages c -1.0 -5.0 -2.3 d
Money (M1) 18.5 11.2 31.9 e
Real effective exchange rate f -6.8 20.0 5.9 g
Terms of trade -3.0 -0.2 -4.1
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 7.1 6.2 7.3 h
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -3.2 -3.9 -6.0
Real deposit rate 10.7 9.5 8.8 i
Real lending rate 48.1 46.4 48.1 i
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 64,469 67,545 69,567
Imports of goods
and services 72,774 72,652 62,138
Current account -24,669 -23,217 -8,601
Capital and financial account 32,731 19,766 -76





 Variation between November 2001 and November 2002.
c
 Workers covered by existing social and labour legislation.
d
 Estimate based on average January-September.
e
 Variation between October 2001 and October 2002.
f




 Estimate based on average January-October.
i 
 Average January-September annualized.
The sharp devaluation recorded in 2002 was
attributable to market factors and external pressures. The
fact that 2002 was an election year, coupled with the
relative concentration of domestic and external public
debt commitments and with the shortage of liquidity in
international markets, exerted pressure on the currency
market. The nominal exchange rate rose by more than
50% in 2002, with real gains in relation to the currencies
of the country’s main trading partners. The real depreciated
by 36% with respect to the euro, but appreciated by 14%
in relation to the Latin American currencies due, in
particular, to the devaluation of the Argentine peso.
As well as its effects on the public accounts,
currency depreciation had an adverse impact on private-
sector borrowing. A number of firms –in the segments
of air transport, communications and basic inputs–
approached their creditors with requests for restructuring
of loans. In some cases, BNDES, the official
development bank, provided assistance in the form of
local-currency credit lines to enable the restructuring of
foreign currency-denominated liabilities.
The level of activity was modest again, although it
trended upwards throughout 2002 following the
downslide recorded from the second quarter of 2001. In
the first quarter of 2002 activity was down by 0.6% by
comparison with the year-earlier period, but by the third
quarter it was up by 2.4%, driven by a strong export
performance. Gross fixed capital formation declined by
4.8% in 2002, in response to a downswing in public
works, a contraction in the demand for housing, idle
capacity in manufacturing, high rates of interest and
uncertainty over the future of the economy. Private
consumption stood still. The large increase in the volume
of exports, however, served to offset these adverse trends.
Economic performance varied from one sector to
another. Mineral extraction was up by 12%, thanks to
excellent conditions in petroleum production, while the
agricultural sector expanded by 4.5% and services posted
a moderate growth rate of 1.6%. By contrast,
manufacturing and construction contracted heavily,
although the trend was less negative at the end of 2002.
The rate of unemployment reached 7.3% of the
economically active population, which was higher than
the rate of 6.2% posted in 2001. The economy’s sluggish
performance and the rise in inflation translated into a
real decline of 1.6% in the wage bill. This was despite
an increase of 1.6% in the rate of employment, which
reflected an expansion in labour-intensive activities, such
as agriculture. The number of formal contracts rose at a
faster rate than might be expected from their proportion
of overall employment, which represented the
continuation of a positive trend that began in 2000.
Labour productivity expanded again in 2002, widening
the gap with respect to the trend in real wages, which
have declined steadily in the last four years.
Despite the trying circumstances described, the
Brazilian economy enjoys enough manoeuvring room
to ensure fiscal and external solvency, which should help
the country recover a positive growth path in the next
few years. Its external competitiveness has improved,
given the high level of the real exchange rate and the
large gap between labour productivity and real wages.
Having already made the major adjustments that were
needed, Brazil is on a sound footing to deal with external
and public debt issues, although it faces a number of
large maturities in 2003. The public accounts have
yielded a significant primary surplus, which is enough
to service interest payments, providing these maintain a
reasonable real rate. Large trade surpluses such as those
Brazil has recorded in recent years help to meet external
commitments, but sovereign spreads of the magnitude
seen in the second semester of 2002 during the run-up
to the elections convey an extremely high implicit rate
of interest that makes Brazilian public and external debt
unsustainable, stymies domestic adjustment efforts and




In 2002 the Chilean economy continued to post a moderate rate of growth. GDP expanded by
1.8%, compared with 2.8% in 2001. Inflation exhibited seasonal fluctuations and proved
sensitive to exchange-rate variations and to the international prices of petroleum and petroleum
derivatives. Overall, the inflation rate was around 3%, in keeping with the monetary authority’s
target. The world economic slowdown, the regional crisis and the increase in global risk
premiums not only translated into a sharp downturn in external trade, but also a steady
worsening in the terms of trade –which were down 9% in the biennium 2001-2002– and a
contraction in capital inflows which, together, amounted to over 5 percentage points of GDP.
The external environment was one of the harshest experienced since the crisis of 1982-1983
and Chile did not escape the effects of external turbulence and of the drastic reduction in
capital flows to emerging economies.
As a result of the crisis in Argentina and the slowdown
in Brazil, exports to those countries decreased by 60.7%
and 23.2%, respectively, which represented a decline of
over US$ 500 million in the period from January to
October 2002 with respect to the same period of 2001.
Contagion spread mainly through  trade losses, which
were only partially offset by the redirection of exports
to other markets. Financial contagion was less
significant, judging from  the volume of financial and
investment flows. In 2002 net external transfers were
negative again, at -2% of GDP. The nominal exchange
rate reacted strongly, however, rising by more than 10%
between January and October, when it peaked. The
central bank announced that it was prepared to use up to
US$ 4 billion over a period of four months for foreign
exchange operations (until November, some US$ 600
million had been sold on the currency market). These
measures, together with the calm post-electoral
atmosphere in Brazil, counteracted expectations of a
sharply rising exchange rate, and nominal currency
depreciation was no more than 5% over the year.
With inflation under control, monetary policy was
geared towards at boosting domestic demand. The
Central Bank Board cut the Monetary Policy Rate, or
MPR (sometimes referred to by its Spanish acronym,
TPM), six times, by a total of 350 basis points between
January and August 2002, to reach a historically low
nominal annual rate of 3%. Nevertheless, the
transmission of TPM cuts to market interest rates was
slow and concentrated in large and long-term loans.
Fiscal policy, meanwhile, continued to be governed
by a rule requiring the maintenance of a structural
surplus of 1% of GDP. The central government’s
structural balance represents a recalculation of fiscal
revenues taking into account potential GDP growth  and
the long-term price of copper. As macroeconomic
conditions worsened, fiscal revenues were lower than
had been provided in the budget law, but this did not
entail adjustments to public spending plans. The
cyclical component of the public-sector balance was
therefore negative by almost two GDP percentage
points, which meant that the government had to deploy
a considerable countercyclical effort. Public finances
played an important stabilizing role by softening the
impact of the harsh external conditions on domestic
spending. A new feature in the preparation of the 2003
budget was the use of non-government experts to
estimate potential output and the price of copper for
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the coming year, showing that the authorities are taking
an increasingly non-discretionary approach to
complying with the fiscal rule.
The projected accounting deficit of 0.9% of GDP
for 2002 was financed with an issue of sovereign bonds
on the international market, in April, in the amount of
US$ 900 million. The remainder of that operation was
used to prepay older and more expensive external loans
and to refinance the Copper Stabilization Fund. In 2003
a deficit of 0.7% of GDP is projected. This should be
covered easily, given the central government’s low level
of indebtedness, which is equivalent to 17 GDP points
in gross terms.
In the first semester of 2002 the price effect brought
down the value of exports. Negative variations of 16.4%
and 8.9% were recorded in the first and second quarters,
respectively, by comparison with the same quarters of
2001. In the third quarter the price effect was positive,
however, with a rise of 2.7% in relation to the third
quarter of 2001. By volume, manufactured goods were
up 13.9%, mining by 3.7% and agricultural, forestry and
fisheries exports by 14%. The value of imports decreased
by 7.8% (comparing the periods January-September of
2001 and 2002), with declines of 3.3% in consumer
goods, 9.2% in intermediate goods and 8% in capital
goods. To September, foreign direct investment inflows
were US$ 1,574 billion, which was far less than the figure
of US$ 3.9 billion recorded to the same month of 2001.
International reserves were US$ 14.9 billion at October
2002.
At the end of the year, the heavy decline in imports
and the negative trend in supermarket sales were
evidence that domestic demand remained slack, with
consumption sluggish and rates of unemployment
relatively high. There were some signs of an upturn,
however, such as an increase in sales of houses and
apartments and in consumer credit, while the large firms
have taken advantage of the lower rates of interest to
conduct massive debt restructuring operations. In the
last three months the register of private investment
projects for the coming five years expanded by 11.2%,
as a number of initiatives that were at the planning stage
came on stream, mainly in the mining sector. In addition,
total bank credit increased by 3.6% in nine months and
consumer credit was up by 6.3% between January and
September. The non-performing loans portfolio stood
at 1.8% of total assets, a low figure according to
international standards.
In spite of expectations of an upswing in 2003,
unemployment continues to be the main unresolved item,
although for the first time in three years it stayed below
10% in the winter months. The labour situation was
mitigated in part by direct public employment
programmes and subsidies to private employment
(reintegration and training allowances). These
programmes financed 160,000 jobs during the three-
month winter period.
A number of structural reforms were carried out in
different areas in 2002. One of the most significant facts
or from the point of view of Chile’s position in the
international economy was the signing of a free trade
agreement with the United States, which will come into
effect at the end of 2003 subject to ratification by
congress in the two countries. This agreement will
improve trade with the United States by regulating
matters relating to dispute settlement, access to goods
and services markets –including financial markets–
labour and the environment. A controversial aspect of
the agreement was the elimination of Chile’s reserve
requirement on short-term capital inflows, which is
currently applicable under Chilean law (though now at
a rate of zero). The agreement will ultimately eliminate
restrictions on the free movement of capital between the
United States and Chile, but provides tools that allow
Chile to implement temporary capital controls in extreme
circumstances that may have serious effects on economic
conditions. These barriers would not enter into conflict
with the other clauses in the agreement.
Trade agreements were also reached with the
European Union and South Korea. The European Union





The free trade agreement with the Republic of
Korea, the first of its kind between an Asian and a
Western economy, is also the first for Korea and a
pioneering venture in cross-Pacific trade agreements.
The Republic of Korea is an important trading partner
for Chile, as it ranks between fourth and sixth as an
export destination, competing with Brazil and Mexico.
Tariff reductions will be applicable to goods from the
fisheries, mining, forestry, agricultural, industrial and
agribusiness sectors.
On the domestic front, a wide range of legal and
institutional modifications are covered by what is known
as the “Agenda for growth”, a private sector initiative
that was quickly embraced by the public authorities. The
initiatives are: regulatory measures to improve
competitiveness, policies on technology and on
expanding the use of new information technologies,
measures to simplify public-sector procedures, changes
to the tax structure to boost investment, deepening of
the capital market, measures to increase the efficiency
of public expenditures, labour projects and export
development. Before it can come into effect, this
agenda will require the enactment of a substantial
package of legislation, part of which is currently in
Congress.
The government obtained legislative approval for
tax measures aimed at stimulating growth and creating
conditions that will facilitate the use of Chile as a
platform for regional investment. The extension of the
accelerated depreciation mechanism will enable
investors to recoup investment costs more quickly. The
new law also exempts the refinancing of mortgage loans
of over one year that were granted for the purposes of
acquiring, building or extending a dwelling from the
stamp duty on credit operations. A special tax regime
was also created to exempt income generated in third
countries from taxation on passing through Chile to the
country where the investment originated.
Overall, growth is expected to pick up considerably
in 2003 in the context of a broadly balanced economic
performance.
CHILE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 4.4 2.8 1.8
Consumer prices 4.5 2.6 3.0 b
Real wages c 1.4 1.6 2.3 d
Money (M1) 9.3 6.6 16.4 e
Real efective exchange rate f 1.6 12.1 1.3 g
Terms of trade 0.0 -6.9 -2.1
Average annual percentages
Unemployment rate 9.2 9.1 9.0 d
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP 0.1 -0.3 -0.9
Real deposit rate 4.3 3.9 -0.5 h
Real lending rate 9.7 9.5 3.4 h
Millions of dollars
Exports of good
and services 22,971 22,315 21,870
Imports of good
and services 21,702 21,221 20,271
Current account -1,073 -1,241 -526
Capital and financial
account 1,410 645 1,326
Overall balance 337 -596 800
foreign investment and largest provider of international
cooperation. The accord was signed on 18 November
and is to come into effect in 2003. The most important
trade implication of the accord is that 85% of Chilean
exports to the European Union will enter tariff-free once
the agreement comes into force, while remaining
products will be subject to tariff-reduction programmes
of up to 10 years. According to official estimates,
agricultural exports could double within five years, with





 Variation between November 2001 and November 2002.
c
 General index of hourly wages.
d
 Estimate based on average January-October.
e
 Variation between October 2001 and October 2002.
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 Average January-September, annualized.
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Colombia
The slowdown that was evident in the Colombian economy in 2001 carried over into the first
quarter of 2002. From the second quarter on, indicators corresponding to the real sector  pointed
to a moderate upturn. As a whole, output expanded by 1.6%, as against 1.4% in 2001.
Unemployment remained high and underemployment continued to rise. The government
pursued an expansionary monetary policy, in order to bring down interest rates and thus aid
economic reactivation and stimulate an upturn in the financial system. No resumption of
credit to the private sector ensued, however. The current-account deficit widened to 2.3% of
GDP and, although the exchange rate returned to competitive levels, non-traditional exports
declined due to sluggish growth in the economies of the country’s main trading partners. A
downturn in the fiscal balance translated into a consolidated public-sector deficit of 4% of
GDP, which was attributable chiefly to lower public revenues.
In August Alvaro Uribe took office as President after a
sweeping election victory, which was interpreted as a
mandate to bring the internal conflict –perceived as the
country’s main problem– to a rapid solution. A few days
into his term, the new President declared a “state of
internal disturbance”, which gave the government the
power to enforce temporary public order measures. The
measures taken in this framework included, in particular,
the enactment of a tax of 1.2% on net worth to finance
higher spending on national security. In addition, the
new government submitted to Congress a proposal on
tax reforms to raise the revenues needed to put fiscal
affairs on a sounder footing, together with programmes
covering labour reform and the pension scheme. A
referendum was also proposed, encompassing fiscal
austerity measures.
Considerable liquidity in the market and the
satisfactory performance of inflation enabled the central
bank to continue to implement an expansionary
monetary policy, which translated into a decrease in
interest rates, particularly in the first semester. Money-
market intervention rates declined by 3.25 percentage
points and most were even lower than current inflation.
Market rates followed suit, trending down in the first
semester and stabilizing in the second. As a result, the
average borrowing rate in the financial system for 90-
day term deposits stood at 7.9% in mid-December, which
was three percentage points lower than the figure
recorded in January.
This downward trend was unaffected by the
temporary rise in the rates of interest payable on public
debt in the third quarter. Rates on treasury bills increased,
which reflected a combination of domestic factors, with
the new government’s acknowledgement of the existence
of serious public finance problems, and external factors,
as spreads on Colombian debt increased as a result of
contagion from speculative pressures on the Brazilian
economy. These pressures eased in the last quarter,
however, and the government was even able to issue
bonds on the international market, in the amount of
US$ 500 million.
The decline in the price of public debt in the third
quarter placed strong pressure on the exchange rate.
At the end of September, the price of the dollar rose
above 2,850 Colombian pesos, which represented an
annual devaluation of over 23%. These speculative
pressures receded later, but the currency continued to
be volatile into the final months of the year and in
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
  COLOMBIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 2.2 1.4 1.6
Consumer prices 8.8 7.6 7.1 b
Real wages  c 3.9 0.3 4.7 d
Money (M1) 30.5 12.1 15.8 b
Real effective exchange rate e 10.0 3.7 -0.5 f
Terms of trade 12.9 -5.7 -1.0
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate g 17.2 18.2 17.6 h
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -5.9 -5.8 -6.5
Real deposit rate 3.4 4.7 2.4 i
Real lending rate 9.5 12.4 9.2 i
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 15,668 14,971 14,568
Imports of goods
and services 14,399 15,844 15,540
Current account 424 -1 538 -1 897
Capital and financial account 445 2,756 2,197





 Variation between November 2001 and November 2002.
c
 Workers in manufacturing.
d
 Estimate based on average January-August.
e




 Includes hidden unemployment.
h
 Estimate based on average January-October.
i
 Average January-September, annualized.
The financial system’s portfolio showed some signs
of improvement in the third quarter, but this process was
not fully consolidated. The mortgage portfolio continued
to trend downwards, in terms of both quantity and
quality. Although the financial portfolio expanded at a
rate of over 12%, excluding purchases of public debt
securities this was only slightly higher than inflation.
In consequence, credit to the private sector, which is
the main channel of transmission for an expansionary
monetary policy, failed to carry out this function
properly as banks and debtors maintained a cautious
stance.
Fiscal affairs took a turn for the worse. The expected
adjustment did not materialize and the targets agreed
upon with IMF were not met. The central government
deficit increased to 6.5% of GDP and the non-financial
public sector deficit expanded to 4%, by comparison
with 5.8% and 3.6%, respectively, in 2001. This increase
was basically a reflection of a decline in revenues, owing
to the economic slowdown recorded in 2001 and early
2002.
The government covered its borrowing requirements
for 2003 with new loans from multilateral banks (worth
about US$ 2.7 billion, or 78% of the external borrowing
requirement), the World Bank, IDB and the Andean
Development Corporation, in addition to the bond issues
mentioned earlier. An IMF technical mission gave its
approval to the government’s economic programme and
agreed to extend a new stand-by loan that will provide
US$ 2 billion in funds to be disbursed over the next two
years.
Between January and September GDP grew by
1.5%, which was similar to the rate recorded in the
year-earlier period. By sector, growth has been led
by construction and agriculture, with an upturn also
apparent in industrial production. Mining, especially
petroleum extraction, contracted, however. In the
third quarter the annualized GDP growth rate was
1.9%, as against 0.8% in the same quarter of 2001,
which pointed to a slight acceleration of this
upswing.
Urban unemployment (13 metropolitan areas)
continued to be high, with an average rate of 17.6% in
the first 10 months of 2002, compared to 18.2% a year
earlier. The overall labour force participation rate of
64% remained unchanged from the year before, due to
increased participation by secondary household
workers in response to lower household income. The
employment rate rose slightly, but the deterioration in
the quality of employment was reflected in a marked
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Ecuador
in the first 10 months of 2001 to 33% in the same period
of 2002.
Driven by a gradual upswing in domestic demand,
consumer price inflation reached 7.1% in the 12-
month period to November, which meant that the
central bank missed its target rate of 6%. Cumulative
inflation was 6.7% in November as consumer prices
rose under pressure from supply shocks, especially
those affecting food (and particularly potatoes). The
sharpening of devaluation in the third quarter had no
particular effect on consumer prices, but did lead to a
significant rise in producer prices, which were up by
9% in November.
The external environment was defined in the first
nine months by a downswing in exports (-5.2%) which
was larger than the decline in imports (-3.9%).
Traditional exports were down by 10%, which was
chiefly attributable to a decrease in petroleum sales,
which declined by 10% between January and September
as production contracted. Non-traditional exports were
down 1.4%, which was a reflection of the slow economic
upswing in the United States and the decline of economic
activity in Latin America, particularly the crisis in
Venezuela. Exports to Ecuador expanded, but this was
not enough to fully offset the downward trend: in the
first nine months of the year the trade surplus narrowed
to US$ 128 million, which will translate into a current-
account deficit of around 2.3% of GDP for the year
overall.
Net capital inflows were considerably smaller than
the previous year, mainly because international issues
of public debt instruments were lower than in 2001, when
issues were stepped up in order to bolster the economy
against the potential destabilizing effects of the elections
in early 2002. At the close of the year, the capital and
financial accounts of the balance of payments will yield
a surplus of about US$ 2.2 billion, and international
reserves will stand at around US$ 10.8 billion.
The money in economic activity in 2001 (6.0%) could not be maintained in 2002, and the
Ecuadorian economy grew at a more moderate rate. GDP increased by only 3.4%, despite the
significant level of investment related to the construction of the heavy crude oil pipeline
(OCP), while the gap in the balance-of-payments current account continued to widen, rising
to the equivalent of 8.4% of GDP. In contrast, inflation and unemployment rates showed a
clear improvement.
In 2002, Ecuador was on the way to completing three
years of relative economic and political stability as the
dollarization of the economy proceeded. The high prices
for oil, the country’s main export, and the continuous
increase in tax revenue were crucial for this performance.
The price of Ecuadorian oil remained at around US$ 21
per barrel over the three-year period 2000-2002,
compared to the historical average of US$ 16. Also, the
improvements in tax collection resulted in a significant
increase in the tax ratio from 7% of GDP in 1998 to
13% in 2002. The relatively favourable conditions
existing during this period, however, were only partly
exploited, as the economy remained vulnerable to
external and domestic crises.
In this election year, privatizations of public energy
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  ECUADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 2.3 6.0 3.4
Consumer prices 91.0 22.4 9.7 b
Real minimum wage -3.5 11.5 …
Real effective exchange rate c 13.2 -29.7 -12.4 d
Terms of trade 16.5 -7.7 6.9
Average annual percentage
Urban unemployment rate e 14.1 10.4 8.7 f
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -1.1 0.9 1.0
Real deposit rate -39.0 -8.5 -2.8 g
Real lending rate -34.6 -0.9 6.1 g
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 5,987 5,774 5,940
Imports of goods
and services 5,012 6,754 7,943
Current account 916 -704 -1,703
Capital and financial account -6,623 474 1,578





 Variation from November 2001 to November 2002.
c
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
d
 Average from January to October.
e
 Includes hidden unemployment.
f
  Estimate based on average from January to October.
g
 Average from January to September, annualized.
previously planned price increases for public services
were cancelled. At the same time, private oil companies
began litigation against the State for the return of VAT
payments, thereby jeopardizing Ecuador’s participation
in the plan for extension of the United States tariff
preferences granted to the Andean countries. Lastly, and
despite the government’s efforts, no new agreement was
reached with IMF. All of these factors, together with the
financial turbulence that affected the region, were
reflected in the emerging market bond index (EMBI)
for Ecuador, which went from 1,000 basis points in April
to around 2,000 in the last quarter of the year.
The most important fiscal event of the year was the
adoption of the Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization and
Transparency Act, the central element of which is the
use of the additional fiscal resources to be received from
the commissioning of the OCP to set up stabilization
fund. These resources will mainly be used for payment
or purchase operations of external and domestic public
debt and, to a lesser degree, for dealing with fiscal
problems or natural disasters and for social development
projects. The same act also introduces a 3.5% ceiling
for annual growth in public spending in order to
strengthen the government’s fiscal position.
Fiscal revenue was boosted by high international
oil prices and by improved tax collection. In fact, the
Internal Revenue Service collected more than US$ 2.7
billion, which is an increase of around 20% over the
year before. On the expenditure side, there was an
increase of about 50% in wage payments. Public-sector
wages thus exceeded the level reached prior to the 1999
crisis. In the first six months, the non-financial public
sector showed a surplus; however, as the fiscal accounts
were under review, at the time of writing it was not yet
possible to give a fiscal result for the year as a whole.
The situation of the financial system continued to
improve, although its restructuring is not yet completed.
The increases in deposits and credit were significant,
both with nominal annual growth rates of close to 20%.
As there was a high level of liquidity in the financial
system, the slow decline in interest rates was maintained,
more in the case of deposits than loans. The ratio of
non-performing loans for private banks went down to
10%, whereas in the public-sector banks it remained at
90%. The Monetary Reserve of Free Availability (RILD)
maintained a relatively high level –between US$1.1 and
1.2 billion– mainly thanks to public-sector deposits in
the central bank. In view of the inflation rate differential
between Ecuador and the United States and the strong
depreciation of some currencies in the region, the real




Preliminary overview of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 65
Paraguay
a result, is now overvalued by around 10% compared to
the average for the 1990s.
The 3.4% rise in GDP was the result of an increase
of over  5% in aggregate demand, but a larger proportion
of the latter was oriented to external supply than in
previous years. Whereas imports grew by 15%, exports
grew by less than 2% in volume. With regard to domestic
demand, investment was significant, especially private
investment, which expanded by more than 20%, driven
by construction of the OCP. For the same reason, the
highest level of sectoral growth was in construction
(18%), followed by trade (7%). The only sector that
contracted was oil and mines, owing to the lower level
of extraction of crude oil.
Inflation continued to decline, and in November the
inter-annual inflation rate was at 9.7%, compared to
22.4% in the previous year. Real wages recovered a
significant part of their purchasing power owing to the
combined effect of nominal rises and reduced inflation.
The labour market also improved substantially, as the
unemployment rate went down from an average 10.4%
in the first ten months of 2001 to 8.7% for the same
period of 2002.
The Ecuadorian trade balance continued to
deteriorate in 2002. Imports, encouraged by the
overvalued real exchange rate, grew by 23%, whereas
exports increased their value by only 5%. Imports of
consumer and capital goods were the most dynamic,
bolstered by the recovery of salaries and the OCP
construction, respectively. Exports of primary products
were responsible for the overall increase in exports.
Remittances from emigrants, again close to US$ 1.5
billion, did not manage to compensate entirely for the
deficit in the services and income balances. The deficit
on the balance-of-payments current account doubled in
2002 over the previous year’s is level, reaching around
US$ 1.7 billion, equivalent to 8.4% of GDP. This gap
was financed with long-term capital inflows, especially
foreign direct investment and the increase of over 50%
in private-sector foreign debt. This expansion of private
foreign debt led to an increase in total external debt of
over US$ 1.5 billion.
Faced with the precarious situation in the subregion and greater disturbances than in 2001,
especially from June to September, the Paraguayan economy slipped into recession in 2002;
GDP declined by 3%, bringing to a halt the recovery of the previous year and completing five
years of lacklustre economic performance. All of this occurred amidst an intense debate on
domestic economic reforms. Unlike the situation in 2001, adverse weather conditions caused
a marked loss in dynamism in crop production. The depreciation of the guaraní pushed inflation
up to 14.6%, real wages fell while weak demand caused a decline in real tax revenues; thus
the fiscal deficit rose to the equivalent of 2.5% of GDP.
In the first quarter, a sharp debate arose over the
transparency of the COPACO telephone company
privatization process, provided for under the State
Reform Act and contemplated in the 2001 IMF
monitoring programme. A series of delays since the start
of the year ended in June, when Congress approved the
indefinite suspension of the sale of this company.
Negotiations with IMF were resumed and culminated
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 PARAGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product -0.6 2.4 -3.0
Consumer prices 8.6 8.4 14.6 b
Real wage 1.3 1.4 -4.9 c
Money (M1) 17.8 9.0 4.1 d
Real effective exchange rate e 3.3 3.4 8.5 f
Terms of trade -3.9 -0.1 -0.5
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 10.0 10.8 ...
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -4.3 -1.1 -2.5
Real deposit rate 6.3 7.9 7.1 g
Real lending rate 16.5 19.1 17.2 g
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 2,926 2,907 2,782
Imports of goods
and  services 3,335 3,278 2,938
Current account -192 -220 -96
Capital and financial account -145 164 -25









 Percentage change October 2001-October 2002.
e
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
f
 Average for January to October.
g Average January to September, on an annualized basis.
in August in the approval of an agreement for 200 million
United States dollars’ worth of special drawing rights.
The disbursement of funds under this agreement is
subject to approval by Congress of fiscal and banking
reforms.
At the beginning of 2002, it was projected that a
portion of privatization proceeds would be made
available as exceptional financing but when the
privatizations were suspended, legal amendments were
proposed in an effort to reduce the shortfall between
government revenue and expenditure. Since September,
the National Congress has been debating an economic
transition bill which provides for a series of measures
including a rise in VAT from 10% to 12%, an increase in
public utility rates, salary cuts in the public service and
regulations for improving tax collection. With
presidential elections in the offing, the study of this body
of laws has been delayed.
In September, fiscal revenue fell by more than 10%
in real terms with a sharp reduction in tax revenue
–almost 15%– attributable to the recessionary
environment. The smaller decrease in non-tax revenue
stemmed from the lower contractual income and
royalties from binational entities. For its part, total
expenditure stagnated in real terms with higher funds
earmarked for physical investments. Capital expenditure,
unlike current expenditure, expanded making good the
decline of 2001, but remaining below the 1997 level.
The trend in these variables points to a government
deficit of around 2.5% of GDP, financed mainly through
domestic borrowing.
Until April, the foreign exchange market enjoyed
stability: the exchange rate was in the range of 5,000
guaraníes to US$ 1. However, as a result of the intense
debates on privatizations and the spillover from
turbulence in the Brazilian market, the exchange rate
rose sharply to 6,300 guaraníes to the United States dollar
by the end of July. In accordance with its policy of
avoiding wide fluctuations in the value of its currency,
The Central Bank intervened in the middle of the year
and managed to stabilize the exchange rate at 6,100
guaraníes to the dollar in August. In the fourth quarter,
it again soared to almost 6,800 guaraníes per dollar. In
order to curb exchange-rate volatility, the central bank
ordered commercial banks to reduce their degree of
participation in the foreign exchange market. In the third
quarter, the authorities raised the rate of monetary
management instruments to an average of 30% for the
same purpose. Monetary policy continued to be
restrictive and, up to September, M1 scarcely varied in
nominal terms, while inflation continued to rise. Despite
the soaring exchange rate, there was only a moderate
real depreciation, given the domestic inflation and the
sharp devaluations sustained by two of Paraguay’s main
trading partners.
Contagion from the Argentine crisis showed up
through financial and commercial channels. In addition
to the effects of the exchange rate, the impact was visible
in the financial system, where the authorities adopted
emergency measures to bail out one of the largest
national banks following losses in Argentina and a
decline in depositor confidence. The banking reform
under review is aimed precisely at giving greater stability
to the financial system and guaranteeing savers’ deposits.
The economic downturn became more evident in
September. By contrast with the buoyancy of 2001, the
crop-farming sector was affected by the adverse weather
conditions. A drought in the early part of the year,
followed by heavy rainfall, caused extensive damage to
crops yielding heavy losses. Soya bean production
decreased by 6%, despite a 7% expansion in the area
under cultivation. Corn and cotton also registered poor
results; on the other hand, wheat and cassava were
buoyant. For its part, industrial production lost
momentum, while the recovery in other activities was
sluggish except for livestock production, although this
was affected by outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in
some areas of the country in October. Against this
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background, the jobless rate is expected to soar to its
highest level in the last five-year period, up from 11%
in 2001. The situation is all the more precarious bearing
in mind the expansion in informal activity.
Since June, inflationary pressures have grown with
the intensification in the devaluation of the guaraní. The
producer price index, owing to its high import
component reflected more rapidly these pressures and
rose in September to 24% per year. On the other hand,
owing to depressed demand, inflation measured by the
consumer price index (CPI) remained relatively
controlled until this month recording an annual variation
of 13.8%. Real wages fell by 5% in the first half-year.
Up to September, foreign trade was affected strongly
by the sharp devaluation sustained by neighbouring
countries. Imports were down drastically in value terms,
(-20%), whereas exports declined by 5%; this reduced
the merchandise trade deficit to half its former level.
The non-factor services balance showed a lower surplus,
owing to the reduction in income from tourism, while
lower remittances from Argentina resulted in a decline
in current transfers. The outcome of these movements
was a reduction in the current account deficit to US$ 96
million, which can be compared with US$ 220 million
in 2001.
This deficit was financed by drawing on reserves
as there was a small deficit on the capital and financial
account. The balance of payments deficit stood at US$ 120
million. Given the constraints on access to external
financing, as of September the government external debt
had increased only slightly in nominal terms to stand
at US$ 2.2 billion.
Peru
In a difficult regional and global context, Peru continued with the moderate recovery that had
begun in the second semester of the previous year and achieved a growth rate of 4.5% in
2002, the best result of the past five years. This expansion was helped by the increase in
mining exports and –especially in the second semester– a recovery of domestic demand,
stimulated by the moderately expansionary monetary policy in place since the end of 2001
and a moderate upturn in the labour market, while credit and public spending (apart from
incentives for construction) did not contribute significantly to growth.
The authorities that took over in July 2001 sought to
strengthen the stability inherited from the transitional
government and to stimulate economic growth. They
defined their goals in a new stand-by agreement with
IMF and implemented a programme of inflation
targeting, with the objective being a rate of 2.5% within
a range of one percentage point on either side. Given
the slight deflation observed at the beginning of the year
and the very low inflation recorded subsequently, this
range made it possible to apply an expansionary
monetary policy, although the greater instability of the
exchange rate in the third quarter led to a more cautious
policy. Even so, as of October the monetary base had
grown by an annual rate of around 14%. Broad money
in national currency expanded by 16%, while total broad
money (including quasi-money in dollars) grew by only
8%, owing to the slight de-dollarization of the financial
system. At the same time, during the first semester
interest rates continued the descent that had begun in
the previous year. In the third quarter, the greater
volatility of the external situation caused a slight
increase; both nominal and real rates, however, remained
low in historical terms.
Following the contraction in credit to the private
sector over the two previous years, the latter has still not
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recovery, it was slight, at 2.5% in October (7.8% in new
soles and a drop of 2.9% in dollars), which was less
than the nominal economic growth rate. In any case, the
financial system continued to grow stronger, and the ratio
of non-performing loans was reduced from almost 10%
of total credit at the end of 2001 to 8% in September,
while loan-loss provisions exceeded 125% of non-
performing loans.
The nominal exchange rate, which remained stable
during the first half of the year, was affected by regional
instability in the third quarter, and appreciated again
towards the end of the year. The average for the period
from January to October thus showed a real
depreciation of 1.2% with regard to the dollar, while,
in view of the strong devaluations of other currencies
in the region, the multilateral exchange rate declined
by 1.3%.
The drop in fiscal income during the first half of
the year, caused by the reduction in the special solidarity
tax, the lowering of tariffs and the settlement of tax debts,
precluded a more expansive fiscal policy, in view of the
deficit goal of 1.9% of GDP, which was subsequently
adjusted to 2.3%. In the second part of the year,
collection increased significantly, owing to the recovery
of internal demand and improvements in tax
administration. Accordingly, in terms of percentage of
GDP, central government income fell from 14.3% to
14.1% during the first three quarters. Over the same
period, current spending remained at 14.3%, while
capital spending fell from 2.1% to 1.9%, so that the
central government deficit was maintained at 2.1%. For
the end of the year the estimated non-financial public
sector deficit amounted to  2.3% of GDP. This shortfall
was financed mainly with foreign debt, but also with
bonds floated on the domestic market, while income
from privatizations was less than programmed.
Another factor that tended to favour internal demand
was the development of the labour market, as over the
year the level of employment rose. Although most new
jobs appeared in informal activities and the labour
demand from the formal sector was weak, the new jobs
generated purchasing power. In addition, the government
made efforts to deal with the difficult labour situation
through a new programme of temporary employment.
At the same time, the increase in employment was
accompanied by a larger supply, so that the inter-annual
variation in unemployment was modest.
Over the first months of the year there was
deflation, but subsequently the CPI rose slightly, and
in November inflation reached an inter-annual value
of 1.5%, at the floor of the range envisaged by the
authorities. These price changes contributed to an
increase in real salaries.
Owing to the development of the labour market,
household consumption, which had been weak at the
beginning of the year, recovered in the second quarter.
Public consumption, which had contracted in the
previous year, grew significantly, mainly as a result of
salary increases granted at the end of 2001, whereas
the fiscal restrictions mentioned led to a fall in private
investment. Fixed private investment continued the
decline of the four previous years during the first
months of 2002, but then recovered slightly in the
second quarter and grew by more than 4% in the third
quarter.
Exports were thus the main engine of growth. The
expansion of mining played a key role, as it grew by
15% during the first nine months of the year, in particular
owing to the opening of the Antamina mine in the
previous year.
Another dynamic sector was construction, which,
after contracting in previous years, expanded by 10%
during the first three quarters of the year, thanks in
part to public programmes to promote housing
construction. The agricultural sector also recovered
from the fall of the previous year, with growth of more
than 5% over the same period. Non-primary
manufacturing showed a similar level of recovery in
the second quarter, with an expansion of more than
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 PERU: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 3.0 0.2 4.5
Consumer prices 3.7 -0.1 1.5 b
Real wages c 0.8 -0.9 4.1 d
Money (M1) -1.7 6.6 20.0 e
Real effective exchange rate f -0.8 -2.4 -1.3 g
Terms of trade -2.9 -4.1 4.9
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 8.5 9.3 9.4 h
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -2.7 -2.8 -2.3
Real deposit rate 9.1 10.8 0.5 i
Real lending rate 23.2 21.4 11.0 i
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 8,614 8,597 9,267
Imports of goods
and services 9,723 9,487 9,809
Current account -1,568 -1,094 -1,211
Capital and financial account 1,437 1,511 2,256
Overall balance -131 417 1,045
Source: Statistical Appendix.
a Preliminary estimates.
b Percentage change: November 2001- November 2002.
c Private-sector works in the Lima metropolitan area.
d March.
e Percentage change: September 2001-  September 2002.
f A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
g Average for January - October.
h Estimate based on the average for January - October.
i Average: January - September on annualized basis.
Uruguay
Exports increased by 9%, partly because they
benefited from price increases for some main products.
Apart from mining products, however, there was only
an increase in sales of non-traditional agricultural
products. Imports showed a higher level of dynamism
as of mid-year and in a comparison of the first nine
months of 2002 and 2001, imports of consumer goods
increased by 10.5%, whereas capital goods and inputs
fell by 1.8%. An increase in imports of 3% is estimated
for the year as a whole. As a result, the balance of goods
was slightly positive, for the first time in twelve years.
Owing to a larger payment for factor services, the
balance-of-payments current account deficit remained
stable, at 2.2% of GDP.
The financial account showed a surplus of more than
3% of GDP (compared to 2% in 2001) owing to a higher
level of foreign direct investment and two placements
of public bonds, one for an  amount of US$1.43 billion
(US$500 million in global bonds and 930 million for a
Brady bond swap) at the beginning of the year and
another for US$500 million in November. External debt,
however, remained stable at 51% of GDP (in October),
as the increase in public debt was offset by a decrease in
private debt. The net international reserves of the Central
Bank had increased by US$1.1 billion by the beginning
of December.
In a situation of serious economic and financial crisis, the GDP of Uruguay collapsed
(-10.5%), inflation accelerated abruptly to an annual 25% and the unemployment rate rose to
19%. Despite cutbacks in spending, the loss of income due to the recession prevented the
public sector deficit from being reduced to less than 4% of the product, while the significant
rise in the price of the dollar and weak internal demand contributed to closing the external
gap.
The financial crisis in Argentina had serious
consequences for the financial system, as from the
beginning of the year there was a mass withdrawal of
non-resident deposits. In the first months of 2002,
Uruguay lost the investment grade rating that had made
it possible to obtain external financing at low interest
rates. As of that time, public bonds fell sharply. During
the same period, two large banks were in serious
difficulties owing to the continuous withdrawal of
deposits. At the end of June, the Central Bank adopted a
floating exchange rate regime after a number of years
of a sliding exchange-rate band, which encouraged
uncertainty in a highly volatile exchange market. As a
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URUGUAY: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
AND INFLATION
(Percentage variation)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
in pesos, a factor which together with its immediate
consequence for domestic prices, substantially raised the
value in national currency of the extensive public- and
private-sector debts in dollars.
The unavailability of deposits in Argentine banks
had a negative effect on expectations in Uruguay, where
the domestic economic situation was very weak after
three years of recession and in the context of a
disadvantageous real exchange rate with Brazil and the
European Union. The sudden devaluation of the
Argentine peso undermined the country’s external
competitiveness, although the authorities had already
begun to accelerate the devaluation of the Uruguayan
peso. All of the above had a strong impact on the
national financial system. Deposits by non-residents,
almost all Argentine, which at the end of 2000
amounted to US$4.6 billion and had increased by
US$1.6 billion in 2001, contracted by more than 3
billion in the first six months of 2002. Meanwhile,
resident deposits to a value of US$1.45 billion were
withdrawn over the same period.
The rapid loss of deposits exploded in mid-year
when the activity of another national private bank was
suspended because of fraudulent operations by the
owners. At this point, there was a marked acceleration
in the daily decline of the international reserves of the
Central Bank, which together with its function of lender
of last resort is the guarantor for timely service payments
for the huge external debt of the national government.
When international reserves reached the equivalent of
one fifth of the level recorded at the end of the previous
year, the authorities ordered -at the end of July- a one-
week bank holiday, in addition to temporarily
suspending the activities of four national private
banks,  and approving a bill  on the unilateral
restructuring of fixed-term deposits in State banks. A
substantial level of financial support from multilateral
credit organizations –amounting to close to US$4
billion (almost one third of the country’s current GDP
in dollars)– together with the contribution from the
United States Treasury (which assigned a bridge loan
of U$1.5 billion while the above loans were being
negotiated), allowed the rest of the financial system
to reopen (official and foreign-owned banks). The
problem of the suspended banks had to wait for a later
solution.
The financial assistance referred to was based on a
new agreement with the IMF, the third such agreement
signed during the year, which predicted a fall in GDP
of 11% in 2002 and of 4.5% in 2003, and estimated
inflation for the current year of the order of 40%, with
the possibility of rising to 50% in the following year.
With a new external situation, the current-account
surplus for 2002 is expected to be equivalent to 0.9%
of GDP (-2.5% in 2001).
The agreement signed with the IMF aimed to
achieve a primary consolidated public-sector surplus
equivalent to 1.6% of GDP in 2002 (-1% in 2001), which
would grow to 4.3% of GDP in 2003. The public deficit
would thus be reduced to 3.4% of the product in 2002
and to only 1.5% in 2003. In order to achieve these
ambitious goals, the letter of intent stated that there
would be no public-sector wage increases in 2002, and
that pension adjustments would be limited to the legal
requirement, which would involve slight variations in
2003, as pensions are adjusted with changes in average
wages.
The agreement made it possible to create the Fund
for the Stabilization of the Banking System, in order to
preserve the functioning of the payment chain. This
initiative, which used US$1.5 billion of multilateral
credit, finances the withdrawal of current-account
deposits denominated in pesos and in dollars from the
official banks and the suspended national banks. The
law that established the Fund also made provision for
postponing the maturity of fixed-term deposits with the
State banks. Deposits in all other foreign or domestic
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URUGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product -1.9 -3.4 -10.5
Consumer prices 5.1 3.6 24.7 b
Real wages -1.3 -0.2 -9.1 c
Money (M1) 15.6 -5.6 11.3 d
Real effective exchange rate e 1.9 1.6 17.0 f
Terms of trade -9.2 1.0 1.5
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 13.6 15.3 17.0 g
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -4.2 -4.7 -4.3
Real deposit rate 6.8 9.7 0.4 h
Real lending rate 41.9 45.6 53.9 I
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 3,659 3,276 2,859
Imports of goods
and services 4,193 3,718 2,672
Current account -567 -512 117
Capital and financial account 733 815 -4,135





 Variation from November 2001 to November 2002.
c
 Estimate based on the average from January to October.
d
 Variation from August 2001 to August 2002.
e
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
f
  Average from January to October.
g
 First  three quarters.
h Average from January to July, annualized.
i Average from January to August, annualized.
The figures available do not show divergences from
what was planned. On the one hand, the fall in GDP
(-10.5%) was almost at the expected level. The positive
development of the agricultural sector, which showed
significant growth (7%), partially offset the decline in
other activities. The significant decrease in demand, both
domestic and external, had a strong impact on the
manufacturing industry, construction and the commerce,
restaurants and hotels segment of services, which were
down more than 10%.
Inflation, limited by depressed domestic demand,
decelerated rapidly in the final quarter, to a level of
around an annual 25% (3.6% in 2001). This change took
place in the context of substantial deterioration in real
wages (more than 10%) and a sudden increase in the
unemployment rate, which with a considerable loss of
jobs, reached a historic maximum in the third quarter of
almost one fifth of the economically active population.
In other areas, the expected turnabout in the external
current account did occur, but this was due to the drop
in imports of goods and services, as exports continued
to fall. The increase in traditional exports was not
sufficient to counteract the substantial decline in sales
of non-traditional goods, so that exports of goods
contracted by 10%. The increase in traditional exports
was mainly due to the expansion of beef sales, after their
paralysis in the previous year following the outbreak of
foot-and-mouth disease.
Non-traditional products, on the other hand, in the
context of the stagnation of domestic credit and still with
a low level of international competitiveness despite the
considerable depreciation of the peso (the currencies of
neighbouring countries also depreciated substantially),
continued to fall steeply. In particular, demand from
Argentina collapsed 65%. The devaluation of the
Uruguayan currency, however, together with the sudden
fall in domestic demand, caused an even greater fall in
imports, which slumped by 30%.
Lastly, the decline in public income kept the fiscal
deficit above the expected level, as there was continued
resistance to going below the level of 4% recorded in
recent years. Nominal expenditure was maintained,
which brought a sizeable reduction in disbursements in
real terms. Nevertheless, the banking crisis affected the
private sector with immediate consequence on tax
collection, which fell dramatically. In a vicious circle,
the public sector postponed payment to private creditors,
which then aggravated the decline in the level of activity,
the delay in tax payments and the financial restriction.
The persistent public sector deficit and the external
account surplus showed that the private sector continued
to make significant adjustments.
The economic and financial situation in Uruguay
towards the end of the year showed a certain
improvement. In October there was an increase in bank
deposits for the first time during the year. The dollar
exchange rate slowed down significantly after its rapid
ascent in the third quarter, which was a pattern similar
to that observed for domestic prices. There was still
uncertainty, however, as to how the subregional situation
would develop, taking into account the forthcoming
changes of government in Argentina and Brazil, while
in the following year there would be an heavy schedule
for foreign debt service payments. At the end of
November the banks suspended at the time of the bank
closure in July had still not been able to reopen, which
meant a postponement of two loan instalments agreed




The Venezuelan economy became caught up in a serious political and economic crisis in
2002, as a result of which GDP declined by 7% and inflation rose. The rate of inflation
measured by the consumer price index was 30%, compared with 12.3% in 2001, while
wholesale prices increased by around 50%. GDP contracted in the first semester, then
experienced a slight upturn in the third quarter. Petroleum activity slipped further than the
non-petroleum sector and investment plunged. In the external sector, the current-account
surplus was twice the figure recorded in 2001, thanks to an upswing in the value of exports in
the second semester and a large decline in imports as economic activity contracted. The fiscal
deficit remained around 4% of GDP in 2002, which was still a considerable figure given the
relatively high oil prices. This was attributable to the government’s procyclical fiscal policy,
which entails taking advantage of favourable crude oil prices to increase spending, but which
forces adjustments on a large scale when the price of crude declines and the fiscal deficit
widens dangerously.
An increasingly complicated political situation was
largely to blame for the woes of the Venezuelan
economy, with a number of strikes during the year that
hurt productive activity and investment. In combination
with the strong appreciation of the bolívar seen in recent
years, the political crisis also helped to trigger a large
outflow of capital. In these straitened circumstances, the
Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) was forced to allow
the bolívar to float freely in February 2002. Until then
the nominal exchange rate had been kept within a
systems of bands set by BCV, but serious exchange-rate
and fiscal disequilibria –which had already been
mounting– sharpened in late 2001 and early 2002.
As part of the effort to halt currency depreciation,
the authorities drew on international reserves, which
declined form US$ 20 billion to US$ 15 billion in the
early months of 2002. BCV then raised interest rates
sharply, which helped to recoup reserves but also
dampened the incipient economic upturn.
With the new exchange-rate system, the price of the
dollar initially surged by 40% and went on to rise by a
total of 70% in the year overall, from 763 bolívares at
the end of December 2001 to about 1,300 bolívares a
year later. The highest dollar price was recorded in
September, when it peaked at 1,500 bolívares. Towards
the end of the year there was a slight decrease in the
nominal exchange rate, which was a reflection of an
increase in the value of exports as the petroleum price
rose. Currency depreciation helped to boost fiscal
revenues, which meant that the deficit, though still
sizeable, was narrower than had been envisaged early
in the year. The proceeds of debt issues were not enough
to cover the government’s spending commitments, and
the deficit was financed by means of a drawdown of
funds from the Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund
(MSF), among other measures.
The petroleum sector experienced the sharpest
contraction in economic activity in 2002, with a heavy
decline in the second quarter (down 12% from the
preceding quarter). Petroleum activity declined
throughout 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 because
of the quota reductions negotiated with OPEC. This was
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(Percentage variation)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
VENEZUELA: MAIN ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 3.8 2.9 -7.0
Consumer prices 13.4 12.3 30.7 b
Wages ... 4.0 -7.6 c
Money (M1) 31.5 13.2 8.0 b
Real effective exchange rate d -2.3 -4.8 29.5 e
Terms of trade 47.0 -16.2 4.0
Average annual percentages
Unemployment rate 14.0 13.4 15.8 f
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -1.6 -4.3 -4.5
Real deposit rate 3.2 2.9 -5.4 g
Real lending rate 11.2 9.0 0.5 g
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 34,394 28,296 28,760
Imports of goods
and services 19,868 21,775 16,628
Current account 13 112 4 365 8 672
Capital and financial account -7,294 -6,435 -10,672
Overall balance 5,818 -2,070 -2,000
Source: Statistical Appendix.
a
  Preliminary estimates.
b
 Variation between November 2001 and November 2002.
c
 Estimate based on average January-September.
d




 To the third quarter.
g
 Average January-September, annualized.exacerbated in the second and the fourth quarters by a
downturn in activity on the part of PDVSA, the state-
owned oil company, which reflected the serious events
that unfolded during the month of April and the strike in
December. By contrast, in the third quarter PDVSA
production posted an upturn and the output of private
firms and petroleum refineries expanded. Economic
activity in general picked up in the third quarter, on the
back of the upswing in the petroleum sector.
Nevertheless, Venezuela fell short of the OPEC targets
for the second semester, as production decreased because
of the depletion of a number of oil fields and a lack of
investment in new ones, in combination with labour
conflicts within PDVSA.
The increase in inflation in 2002 was chiefly the
result of the devaluation of the bolívar. Imported goods
account for a high proportion of total consumption and
of intermediate goods, which tends to translate into large
price rises.  In addition, unemployment rose sharply,
from an average rate of 13.4% in 2001 to 15.9% in 2002.
The increase in unemployment would have been sharper
but for the government’s decision to extend a firing freeze
applicable to public- and private-sector workers earning
up to 633,000 bolívares per month. As well, the
obligatory minimum wage for workers in urban areas
was increased by 20% and a bonus of three months’
wages was announced for public-sector employees.
Total exports declined in 2002, which was
attributable to a downturn in petroleum shipments. The
value of state petroleum exports trended sharply
downwards in the first semester. In the second semester,
however, a significant upturn was recorded in the value
of exports thanks to an increase of 16.6% in the
international price of hydrocarbons and to increased sales
of crude petroleum by private firms, as well as a steady
rise in the volumes exported by non-petroleum state
enterprises, particularly chemicals and base metals.
Although overall private-sector non-petroleum exports
posted a small decline of 3.5%, there were considerable
rises in iron and steel products and in the automotive
sector. Imports were down by 24% in 2002, with a
sharper fall in the second semester. This large contraction
was attributable to currency depreciation and to the
downswing in the real economy, which led to lower rates
of consumption and investment. The plunge in imports
translated into a considerable increase in the trade surplus.
The balance-of-payments current account yielded a
surplus of US$ 8.7 billion, which was US$ 4.3 billion
more than in 2001. The net outflow of capital on all items
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CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO
Costa Rica
Despite the adverse international situation, the GDP of the Costa Rican economy grew by
2.8%, which meant an improvement in per capita GDP. The main impetus came from the
increase in domestic demand and, to a lesser extent, from a moderate recovery in export
earnings. Due to the rapid growth of imports, the deficit on the balance-of-payments current
account continued to widen. Despite the higher rate of economic activity, the unemployment
rate reached 6.4% and was even higher in urban areas, while labour income lost purchasing
power.
A significant increase in public spending helped to boost
the economy, but caused the consolidated public sector
deficit to reach 4% of GDP, compared to 1.7% the
previous year. Monetary policy, in turn, was moderately
restrictive, which caused a slight increase in domestic
interest rates, while credit expanded for both the public
and private sectors. The inflation rate reached 10% in
2002 and the monthly exchange devaluation policy was
continued and, as a result, nominal parity depreciated
11%. The real exchange rate increased slightly,
counteracting in part the fall recorded in the two previous
years.
It is estimated that economic growth will slow down
to 2% in 2003. Domestic demand will weaken in view
of the need to moderate fiscal and external imbalances,
so the impetus for growth will come mainly from
external demand.
The balance-of-payments current-account deficit
increased by US$ 905 million, which amount to 5.4%
of GDP. Although foreign direct investment was of the
order of US$ 424 million, 5% less than in 2001, capital
income was US$ 990 million, 32% more than in the
previous year. This made it possible to finance the
external deficit and even to accumulate net international
reserves of around US$ 85 million.
As non-traditional agricultural products and sales
in the free trade zones performed well, merchandise
exports grew by 6%. This was a positive result in an
adverse international context, especially in view of the
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COSTA RICA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
AND INFLATION
(Percentage variation)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
the main market for such merchandise. In contrast, sales
of traditional agricultural products declined, despite the
increase in coffee exports, which benefited from the
international grain price increase that occurred in the
second half of the year. Exports to the Central American
Common Market were also down.
Exports of services also rose (2.2%), thanks to the
recovery of tourism and activities such as
telecommunications, data processing, software
production, medical services and electronic betting
centres.
Merchandise imports grew rapidly (14%), with the
purchase of machinery and equipment and consumer
goods, especially durables, showing the highest growth
rates.
As a result of the moderate growth in tax income
and a relatively lax public spending policy, public
finances deteriorated considerably. The central
government financial deficit reached 4.3% of GDP (2.9%
in 2001), owing to the expansion of total expenditure,
which grew by 12% in real terms. The latter represented
18% of GDP, while tax income maintained a coefficient
of 13.3%.
At the same time, the authorities proceeded with
the strategy of exchanging domestic debt for external
debt, in order to reduce its cost, although introducing an
exchange risk, placing bonds on the international market
for US$250 million. Domestic debt, however, still
accounted for two-thirds of total liabilities.
The greater external imbalance and the expansion
of the fiscal deficit meant that most of the adjustment
was the responsibility of the monetary authority. The
issue of monetary control instruments brought an
increase in the base lending rate during the first
semester, which then stabilized as of July at about
17.5%, 150 basic points above the level in December
2001. Even so, net domestic credit expanded by 17%
over the year; while credit to the private sector
increased by 23%. Total liquidity increased by 6.9%
in real terms in contrast with the reduction of 1.3% in
2001. The cost of  monetary intervention for the central
bank was high; losses are estimated at approximately
1.5% of GDP. The average daily rate of depreciation
was maintained and reached a cumulative annual
devaluation of 11%.
With regard to trade policy, free trade agreements
with Chile, the Dominican Republic and Canada came
into force in 2002. Meanwhile, the negotiations with
Panama and Trinidad and Tobago continued, and
preparations began for negotiating the agreement
between the United States and Central America.
During the year in question there were no new
initiatives with regard to the processes of economic and
structural reform. Nor is it clear that the current
administration would promote a political agenda in that
direction.
The expansion of domestic demand brought the
greatest stimulus to economic activity, as the recovery
in external demand was moderate (exports in 2001 had
decreased by 9.2%). Growth in gross fixed capital
formation was significant (7.9%), due to both public
spending on electricity generation and distribution and
telecommunications, and private spending in free trade
zones, tourism, commercial  construction and business
services. At the same time, total consumption increased
by 2.8%.
The goods-producing sectors recovered slightly
after two consecutive years of contraction. Growth in
the manufacturing sector was fundamental (2.2%)
owing to the higher level of growth in the free trade
zones, including the high-technology industry. In
contrast, the agricultural sector decreased by 1% owing
to the decline in coffee and banana production,
while other agricultural products related to exports
–pineapples, flowers, foliage, tubers, mangoes and
citrus fruits– have made up for the reduction in
traditional products.
Construction contracted (-1%) after a high level of
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El Salvador
slowed down. Commercial, industrial and services
construction, however, grew throughout the year.
Basic services were again among the most dynamic
activities, growing by 9.7%, in particular high-value-
added telecommunications services, such as cellular
telephone services, Internet access, international calls
and data transmission. Commerce maintained the rate
of growth of the previous year (2.2%). Tourist activities
increased slightly, thanks to enhanced domestic spending
on such services.
In 2002 the inflation rate (10%) remained in line
with the goal of the central bank. Underlying
inflation did not show any significant demand
pressures that would create a more significant
inflationary process.
Real average wages for the employed population
were reduced during the year. In July, real average wages
had fallen by 1.4%, although the income of wage earners
increased marginally (0.6%). The nominal minimum
wage increased by 7%, and purchasing power fell by
2.7%. The open unemployment rate went from 6.1% in
2001 to 6.4% in 2002. One significant feature is that
urban open unemployment increased, rising from 5.8%
to 6.8% of the labour force, while unemployment in rural
areas decreased.
The Salvadoran economy grew by 2.3% in 2002, which was a slight improvement in relation
to the 1.9% recorded the previous year. Per capita GDP, however, remained virtually stagnant
for the third consecutive year. The factors assisting this moderate recovery included the impetus,
although still weak, of United States demand, and the high  public investment required to
rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by two major earthquakes in early 2001. In contrast,
international coffee prices were low for most of the year and oil prices increased, which had
a negative impact on the terms of trade. Meanwhile, private investment stagnated, as it was
affected by the deterioration in domestic political and social stability.
COSTA RICA: MAIN ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual rate of variation
Gross domestic product 2.2 1.0 2.8
Consumer prices 10.2 11.0 10.0 b
Real wages c 0.8 2.0 0.6
Money (M1) 16.2 9.7 15.4 b
Real effective exchange rate d -1.4 -2.5 1.5 e
Terms of trade -6.8 -1.4 -1.0
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 5.3 5.8 6.8
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -3.0 -2.9 -4.3
Real deposit rate 3.3 1.0 2.4 f
Real lending rate 13.7 11.9 15.9 f
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 7,748 6,820 7,158
Imports of goods
and services 7,295 6,911 7,796
Current account -707 -737 -905
Capital and financial account 555 750 990





 Variation from November  2001 to November  2002.
c
 Average wages declared by workers covered by social security.  In
2002, all wage earners.
d
 A negative rate signifies an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Average from January to October.
f
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EL SALVADOR: DOMESTIC PRODUCT
AND INFLATION
(Percentage variation)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
The results for 2002 were strongly affected by the
process of dollarization of the economy and by the
continuing inflow of family remittances. In that context,
efforts were made to reduce the fiscal deficit by
controlling current spending, while application of a
domestic debt conversion policy diminished the short-
term financial pressures, but considerably increased the
level of public external debt. Affected by the lowering
of international interest rates, local interest rates
diminished significantly, a trend that did not however
result in a higher level of demand for credit for
investment. At the same time, real salaries deteriorated
owing to the freeze on minimum wages that has been in
place since 1998.
The elections of deputies and mayors scheduled for
March and the presidential elections in 2004 have an
impact on the economic prospects for 2003, as they will
affect investment and government management
decisions, as well as the announced fiscal adjustment.
The probable onset of negotiations for a free trade treaty
between Central America and the United States also has
an effect. The official estimates are a 3% increase in
GDP, inflation at 2.5% and a public-sector deficit of 1.6%
in relation to GDP.
The external sector improved with regard to the
previous year thanks to the positive performance of
exports, with growth of 2.4%. Non-traditional sales
increased by 6.1%. In particular, there were signs of a
revival of United States demand for maquila exports, as
shipments rose by 5%. In contrast, traditional exports
continued their negative trend, with a decline in  coffee,
sugar and shrimp export earnings. As total imports
stagnated, the country’s trade deficit diminished to 13.5%
of GDP. Although the current account deficit increased
slightly, it remained at manageable levels (1.6% of GDP)
thanks to income from family remittances of almost
US$2 billion, which represented 13.8% of GDP. These
resources also made it possible to maintain a level of
international reserves equivalent to 4 months of imports.
Progress was made in 2002 in controlling the fiscal
deficit, while investment expenditure for economic and
social infrastructure increased. The non-financial public
sector (NFPS) deficit reached 3% of GDP, which was
less than in the previous year. The central government
deficit went down to 2.7% of GDP. This progress in
controlling the fiscal deficit was the result of applying a
containment policy for current expenditure, as well as
the increase of 10% in tax revenue thanks to the auditing
and control plans implemented over the year, which
partly compensated for slow economic growth and
import stagnation. As a result, the tax burden reached
11.1% of GDP.
External public debt increased by 27.8% compared
to the previous year, owing to the aggressive policy of
substituting external for internal debt in which the
government placed US$1.25 billion in bonds abroad.
As a result, external public debt reached US$4.02 billion,
equivalent to 28.1% of GDP and internal public debt
diminished by 23.7%, making a total of about US$1.64
billion, equivalent to 11.5% of GDP. In net terms, the
total public debt increased by around 7%, representing
39.6% of GDP.
The main objective of monetary policy was to
manage the process of dollarization, which was
implemented for a second year without major obstacles,
helping to reduce the country risk and reinforce financial
stability. Thanks to dollarization and the significant
lowering of international interest rates, local rates
declined significantly. The average lending rate for one-
year loans was at 7.2%, while the average deposit rate
for 180-day deposits reached 3.4% (the rates reported
by the IMF are even less: 5.2% and 1.4%, respectively).
This reduction in interest rates did not, however, result
in a higher level of credit for the private sector or in a
higher level of investment.
With regard to trade policy, preparations were made
for negotiations for the free trade agreement between
Central America and the United States. El Salvador’s
international re-integration strategy is based on trade and
migration flows with the United States, and so the
government made the negotiations for the free trade
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  EL SALVADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 2.1 1.9 2.3
Consumer prices 4.3 1.4 1.4 b
Real effective exchange rate c -0.6 -0.3 0.4 d
Terms of trade -4.8 -3.1 -0.8
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 6.5 7.0 7.1 e
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -2.3 -3.6 -2.7
Real deposit rate 3.7 4.6 1.4 f
Real lending rate 8.1 8.7 5.2 f
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 3,662 3,977 3,870
Imports of goods
and services 5,636 5,892 5,814
Current account -431 -177 -238
Capital and financial account 385 -1 208





 Variation from November 2001 to November 2002.
c
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
d
 Average from January to October.
e
 First three quarters.
f
 Average from January to September, annualized.
Guatemala
The expansion of activity was moderate again,
which shows the difficulties facing the Salvadoran
economy in its effort to return to the high growth levels
recorded in the first five years of the 1990s. Domestic
demand showed a slight recovery of 1.4%, which was
driven by public investment spending, as overall
consumption was slack and external demand was down.
The most dynamic sectors were construction, which
increased by 6.2%, as well as basic services for electricity,
gas and water, which grew by 5.6%. Manufacturing
industry increased by 3.4%, while the agricultural sector
(1%) recovered from the fall of the previous year.
El Salvador continued to have one of the lowest
inflation rates in Latin America and the Caribbean. In
November the inter-annual rate of inflation was 1.4%.
This behaviour is associated with the process of
dollarization of the economy, as well as the availability
of a sufficient supply of dollars that made it possible to
overcome sectoral bottle-necks by means of imports,
together with the positive production of basic foods
recorded over the year.
As in previous years, official minimum wages for
the agricultural, industrial, trade and services sectors did
not change in nominal terms, which meant a reduction
in real terms for the fifth consecutive year.
Despite a recovery in the second semester, economic growth in Guatemala slowed down for
the fourth consecutive year. GDP expanded by 1.9%, somewhat less than in the previous year
(2.4%). This performance is associated with the sluggishness of the world economy, together
with the drop in internal investment and implementation of the stabilization programme. The
latter made it possible to reduce the central government deficit to 1.1% of GDP (2.0% in the
previous year) and reduce inflation to 6.6%, compared to 8.9% in 2001. The low level of
external demand and the real exchange rate appreciation brought a significant increase in the
trade deficit, but in view of the extraordinary growth in international remittances from
Guatemalan resident, the current-account deficit reduced slightly.
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 GUATEMALA: MAIN ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rate
Gross domestic product  3.4  2.4 1.9
Consumer prices  5.1  8.9 6.3 b
Money (M1)  20.4  7.8 6.3 c
Real effective exchange rate d  1.6 - 3.7 -6.7 e
Terms of trade - 2.9 - 2.1 - 1.4
Average annual percentages
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -1.9 -2.0 -1.1
Real deposit rate 3.9 -0.1 1.8 f
Real lending rate 14.0 9.3 11.2 f
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 3,860 3,896 3,809
Imports of goods
and services 5,568 6,040 6,441
Current account -1,049 -1,238 -1,202
Capital and financial account 1,703 1,712 1,128





 Variation from November 2001 to November 2002.
c
 Variation from September 2001 to September 2002.
d A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Average from January to October.
f
 Average from January to September, annualized.
The main causes of the reduction in inflation and
the fiscal deficit included the steady implementation of
the stabilization programme agreed with the IMF (signed
in March), as well as the implementation of the fiscal
reform approved in the previous year. If there is a an
improvement in the international economy and fiscal
discipline is maintained –in particular, if the pressures
to increase public spending that are typical of presidential
election periods can be contained– it is estimated that
growth could be of the order of 2.7% in 2003, with
annual inflation of 5% and a current-account deficit of
5% of GDP. One condition for achieving these goals
would be to avoid a real appreciation in the quetzal.
One significant development in 2002 was the
stagnation of the external market, especially in Central
America,  together with the real exchange rate
appreciation (6.7% in twelve months). The trade deficit
widened by more than 20%, in view of a fall in exports
(-4%) and an increase in imports (7%). Sales to Central
America were down (-13.7%) and sales to the rest of
the world showed a small increase (1.7%). Traditional
exports stagnated (0.8%), still affected by low
international prices; the fall in coffee (-12.7%) could
not be offset by the increases in cardamom (28.9%),
bananas (5.9%) and sugar (2.5%). Non-traditional
exports expanded gradually (2.8%). There were sales
increases only for oil (50%, owing mainly to price
increases), natural rubber (26%) and sesame (26%).
Maquila activities continued to slow down, with growth
of only 2%.
Imports expanded owing to the significant increase
in purchases from the rest of the world (11%), which
more than counteracted the strong contraction in those
from Central America (-17%). There was an increase in
purchases of capital goods for industry (23%), with a
significant component of equipment for construction and
for energy generation. In contrast, imports of consumer
goods slowed down (7%), as did those of intermediate
goods (3%), and fuel and lubricant purchases declined
(-13%).
The substantial increase in net income from current
transfers (70%) exceeded the increase in the trade and
income deficits, so that the current account deficit was
slightly reduced. The high level of capital income  –mostly
short term, as direct investment was down– limited the
reduction in international reserves to only US$75
million, leaving its estimated balance at the end of the
year at US$2.275 billion, which is within the limit
specified in the stabilization programme.
In April a drawing rights agreement with the IMF
entered into force, valid for twelve months, in order to
support a macroeconomic stabilization programme. The
initial goals for 2002 included: 2.3% economic growth,
4-6% annual inflation; reducing the fiscal deficit to 1.5%
of GDP –but maintaining social expenditure above 5%
of GDP– and limiting the fall in reserves to US$210
million. The agreements provided for potential access
to 84 million special drawing rights (US$105 million)
from the IMF, and to additional resources from the IDB
and the World Bank. Economic policy conformed to that
programme and it is estimated that the monetary/fiscal
goals will be achieved, but with slightly higher inflation
and lower growth.
A central element in the fiscal reorganization was
the increase in tax revenue (21%) –31% for direct taxes–
as a result of the greater effort against evasion and
application of the fiscal reform approved in 2001,
which increased the rate of VAT by two points (to 12%),
established a special tax on business assets, and
increased other levies. It is expected that the fiscal
burden will reach 10.7% of GDP (one point higher than
2001). Non-tax revenue fell by 24% following
settlement of the interest due on the final payment by
the telephone company. Nominal current expenditure
rose by 3%, that is, they fell in real terms (-3%). The
increase in capital expenditure (14%) was due in part
to the need to make payments in respect of previous
years. The central government deficit is estimated at
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Honduras
1.1% of GDP (compared to 2.0% in 2001). Quasi-fiscal
losses (0.5% of GDP) increased the consolidated deficit
to 1.6% of GDP, one point lower than in 2001).
External capital was very important for financing
the public sector. In fact, in net terms the internal debt
was covered using part of the resources obtained with a
sovereign bond placement for US$325 million in 2001.
The active intervention of the Central Bank in open
market operations limited the annual rate of monetary
expansion to 8% (15% in 2001) and broad money (M3)
to 11% (17% in 2001) while the rediscount rate fell
below 1%. In contrast, real lending rates rose by one
point (9.8%), which helped to maintain the restriction
on credit to the private sector.
At the end of the year, Congress approved a bond
flotation for US$700 million. The resources will,
provisionally, be used to assist with certain commitments
made in the Peace Accords (including demobilisation
of the army and industrial conversion of its lands) and
to restructure public debt and support the reorganization
of the financial sector.
Despite the fact that gross fixed capital formation in
the private sector rose by 6.8% –interrupting the fall
reported in the previous year–  economic growth was not
higher than in 2001 in view of the poor export
performance, the reduction in inventory accumulation
(-4.6%) and the slowdown in public spending. Consumption
grew by 3.6%, almost the same as the previous year.
Goods production scarcely expanded (1.2%), owing
to the slow growth of the agricultural sector (1.4%) and
of manufacturing (0.7%). In contrast, electricity, gas and
water services grew at a higher level (3.2%), owing to
the increased production for domestic consumption and
for exporting energy to El Salvador. The transport and
communications sector reported the highest growth
(4.3%), owing in part to the transformation of the
telephone industry, stimulated to some extent by
privatization.
The information available does not give exact
information on changes in employment. The limited
recovery in the economy however, the decline in rural
activity, and the slow performance of manufacturing and
the maquila industry suggest that formal job creation is
not responding adequately to employment needs.
Minimum wages show, on average, a nominal increase
of 9% (3% in real terms).
The increase in the consumer price index was close
to the inflation goal of the government programme,
and several points below the level recorded in 2001.
This reduction of inflationary pressures reflects the
greater level of fiscal and monetary discipline, the
gradual elimination of the one-time impact of the VAT
rate increase on price levels and also to some extent
the impact of the exchange-rate appreciation.
Low growth was once again the dominant feature of Honduras’s economic performance in
2002. GDP grew by 2% and per capita GDP declined by 0.6%, compared with flat growth in
per capita GDP in 2001.
Having recovered from the damage caused by
Hurricane Mitch, the export sector remained virtually
static. Slow growth in the world economy, the
prolongation of the crisis in the coffee sector and the
slump in the international prices of some of the country’s
primary exports depressed production, pushing up
unemployment and discouraging gross fixed
investment. As in the preceding year, the agricultural
sector accounted for much of the downward adjustment
in economic growth. The maquila industry recorded
one of its lowest annual growth rates, while some




2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 4.8 2.7 2.0
Consumer prices 10.1 8.8 7.7 b
Money (M1) 4.7 5.2 13.5 c
Real effective exchange rate d -4.3 -3.1 0.3 e
Terms of trade -5.8 -2.2 -2.8
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate ... 5.9 6.2
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -5.9 -7.3 -5.2
Real deposit rate 4.9 5.8 5.1 f
Real lending rate 14.7 14.4 13.3 f
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 2,464 2,447 2,371
Imports of goods
and services 3,318 3,498 3,315
Current account -258 -326 -262
Capital and financial account 191 342 386





 Percentage change November 2001-November 2002.
c
 Percentage change September 2001-September 2002.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Average for January to October.
f
 Average January to September, annualized.
Notwithstanding the low rate of growth, the
performance of the main financial variables fulfilled the
objectives for stability set out in the Central Bank’s
monetary programme. Remittances from nationals
resident abroad were once again the mainstay of the
economy as a whole.
The current-account deficit stood at US$ 262 million
or US$ 64 million less than in 2001. A 3.1% contraction
in exports was attributable to the weakness of external
demand (which affected, in particular, the maquila
industry) and to the low international prices for some
primary products. Imports declined by 4.1%, basically
as a result of the slowdown in the domestic economy
and the reduction in investments.
Transfers and foreign direct investment (FDI) were
used to finance the trade deficit. In the first case, the
substantial component turned out to be the amount
remitted by Honduran workers in the United States
totalling just over US$ 600 million. In the second case,
FDI flows, although down by 8%, continued to be an
important source of financing.
As in the preceding years, the Central Bank’s
international reserves closed the year in a sound position
having recorded an annual gain of approximately
US$ 260 million.
The 2002 fiscal deficit amounted to 5.2% of GDP,
which was slightly higher than projected by authorities,
but almost one third lower than in 2001. This was due
mainly to the low level of execution of scheduled public
investment spending. On taking up office in January,
the new Government restructured the budget, which
delayed the disbursements of funds to the public sector
for capital expenditure for almost the entire year,
thereby contributing to a sharper fall in aggregate
demand.
As has been the case for the past five years, the
central government deficit was financed almost totally
through external financing (loans and grants) Tax
revenue was lower than budgeted and annual growth
in this revenue (5.1%) did not keep pace with inflation.
The modest yield from both direct and indirect
taxation is attributable to the decline in economic
activity and the benefits granted to taxpayers who,
for different reasons, have not complied with their
tax obligations. Total central government revenue
represented 17.5% of GDP (seven decimal points less
than in 2001).
Total government spending was equivalent to 22.7%
of GDP (against 25.5% a year earlier). Recurrent items
in the budget continued to be the most dynamic
component of government spending, representing almost
75% of total spending in 2002, or six percentage points
more than in 2001. By contrast, and owing in large
measure to problems with efficiency in their
management (budget restructuring continued until May
and public bids take around seven months), investment
spending contracted sharply, diminishing by 20% with
respect to the previous year.
The exchange rate policy remained unchanged. The
reference price for the lempira against the dollar rose
by 5.8% in 2002, a rate which is somewhat higher than
in previous years. However, there is still a lag compared
with international inflation.
Further steps were taken towards the establishment
of a customs union in Central America, which is
expected to enter into force towards the end of 2003;
in addition, a mechanism for the exchange of
information with the United States was established with
a view to the negotiation of a free trade agreement with
that country.
The money supply grew as the expansion in net
international reserves was greater than the increase in
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public-sector deposits at the Central Bank. As in previous
years, registered securities were issued to absorb the
excess liquidity. In 2002, the preference for financial
placements in foreign currency was again very
pronounced, recording an inter-annual expansion of
more than 10%, compared with zero growth in local
currency deposits.
Bank credit to the private sector stagnated in the
first three quarters, reviving towards the end of the year.
In real terms, the amount of resources from this source
of financing contracted by almost 2.4%.
The costs of bank financing declined slightly.
Although weighted average interest rates decreased
slightly in the course of the year, financial intermediation
spreads remained at the high levels recorded in the
preceding years (around 11.7%).
The National Banking and Insurance Commission
intervened to bail out two banking institutions with
solvency problems, declaring shareholders’ shares to be
devoid of value and investing a total of 478 million
lempiras (equivalent to close to 7% of the “current
account” deposits in the financial system).
In 2002, the interim period of the Highly Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative came to an end,
leaving Honduras to await the final phase, which is
contingent on the agreement being negotiated with
IMF.
The total external debt balance stood at US$ 4.7
billion, slightly less (-1.8%) than in the previous year.
GDP growth was expected to amount to 3%, but
only reached 2% owing mainly to the slowdown in
agricultural and manufacturing activity.
The agricultural sector, which accounts for one fifth
of GDP and employs more than one third of the
economically active population, saw a deepening of the
recession started a year earlier and a decline in its real
growth rate of almost one percentage point. This situation
reflects the chronic crisis in the coffee sector as well as
the downtrend in the international price and demand for
other important agricultural items and the financial
problems being experienced by a significant percentage
of farmers. The production of basic grains, for their part,
showed an improvement over 2001.
Manufacturing output showed a marked downturn
(2.2% against an average of 5.4% in the previous
biennium). This result was due mainly to the reduction
in international demand and the stagnation in private
investment. Growth in the maquila industry, which plays
a leading role in industry trends, hit one of its lowest
levels ever (around 2%).
The 7.6% inflation rate posted for 2002 was within
the range established by the country’s monetary
authorities. This achievement was made possible by two
factors: the general decline in economic activity and the
expansion in the supply of basic grains.
The average minimum wage showed a nominal
increase of 13% (three points less than in 2001). After
adjustment for inflation, this was equivalent to an
increase of 5.3% in its purchasing power.
The open urban unemployment rate was 6.2%,
somewhat higher than that of the previous year, while
the rates of visible and invisible underemployment stood
at 3.9% and 36.2%, respectively, reflecting a
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MEXICO: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
AND  INFLATION
(Percentage variation)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
In 2002 the Mexican economy grew by just 1.2%, which was well below the government’s
target. This rate reflected the virtual stagnation of production for the second year in a row and
the negative effects that this had on per capita income. Contributing factors included slack
United States demand –which had been the main driver of the economy in recent years– combined
with a tight, procyclical economic policy and a lacklustre performance by the domestic market.
An increase in real wages –albeit at a lower rate than
in recent years– together with non-bank financing
schemes served to buoy private consumption, which
nevertheless performed only modestly, while
investment declined. The adverse international
conditions contributed to the volatility of the foreign-
exchange and money markets, which was partly to
blame for the nominal depreciation of the peso after
almost 18 months of steady appreciation. In
combination with the effects of poor weather
conditions on the prices of several foodstuffs, the
currency depreciation contributed to increase inflation
to a yearly rate of over 5%, which was one percentage
point in excess of the official target.
The balance-of-payments current account deficit
(2.4% of GDP) came in below target due to a lower goods
trade deficit and increased remittances from abroad,
among other factors. Disciplined management of public
finances kept the public-sector deficit in line with the
target set at the start of the year.
According to  the government’s targets for 2003
GDP growth should reach 3%, with projected inflation
of around 3% and a fiscal deficit of 0.5% of GDP.
The performance of external trade reflected the
weak expansion of external and domestic demand.
Exports and imports stagnated and generated a lower
current-account deficit than in 2001, which was financed
with long-term resources from the private sector.
Manufacturing activity accounted for over 90% of total





Petroleum exports benefited from the rise in
international prices, manufacturing exports stood still
as maquila activity picked up only sluggishly and
agricultural exports declined. The downturn in domestic
investment generated a steep decline in capital goods
imports. Intermediate goods imports remained
unchanged from the previous year, in line with economic
Preliminary overview of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 85
 MEXICO: MAIN ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 6.8 -0.4 1.2
Consumer prices 9.0 4.4 5.4 b
Real wages c 6.1 6.6 1.4 d
Money (M1) 15.4 20.5 12.6 e
Real effective exchange rate f -7.4 -6.0 -1.6 g
Terms of trade 5.0 -0.1 1.8
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 2.2 2.5 2.8 h
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -1.3 -0.7 -0.7
Real deposit rate -1.7 0.0 -1.7 i
Real lending rate 9.4 8.6 4.3 i
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 180,167 171,103 172,527
Imports of goods
and services 190,494 184,614 183,854
Current account -18,160 -18,002 -15,000
Capital and financial account 25,269 25,327 19,600









 Estimate based on average January-September.
e
 Variation between October 2001 and October 2002.
f
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
g
 Average January-October.
h  Estimate based on average January-October.
i
 Average January-September, annualized.
activity in general. Imports of consumer goods, however,
rose by 6%. Mexico’s trade continued to rely heavily on
the United States, which accounted for 89% of its exports
and 65% of imports. Remittances from Mexicans
residing abroad were about US$ 9 billion, which was
equivalent to 80% of petroleum exports.
Foreign direct investment was close to US$ 13.5
billion in 2002. This was a little more than half the figure
recorded in 2001, but much the same if the 2001 sale of
Banamex is excluded from the calculations. Over a third
of investment went to manufacturing and another third
went to the financial sector. The United States was the
main source of revenues, accounting for around 80% of
total foreign investment.
Despite the lower rate of GDP growth and episodes
of financial and exchange-rate volatility during the year,
public finances stayed within the fiscal target. The deficit
was 0.7% of GDP, and 2.9% including the cost of
financial rehabilitation operations, but this was still
smaller than the deficit of 3.2% allowed in the economic
programme for the year.
Non-petroleum tax receipts were less than 10% of
GDP, as the fiscal measures implemented failed to
generate the anticipated increase in resources. The lower
fiscal revenues were offset by a rise in electricity and
gasoline prices, together with additional resources
provided by higher international prices of petroleum,
even though the volume exported was lower than
expected. The constraints on federal government
revenues also translated into an estimated 9% decline in
federal contributions to states and municipalities. An iron
fiscal discipline was the hallmark of public spending in
2002, but the Executive’s structural reforms failed to
negotiate Congress successfully.
Total public debt represented 25% of GDP, 1.6
points more than in 2001, while external debt increased
by 0.7 GDP percentage points to reach 12.5%, which
was entirely attributable to the depreciation of the peso.
Domestic debt rose by 0.9 points, also to 12.5%. The
main source of external financing, which amounted to
US$ 9.4 billion, was the issuance of bonds on the
international market, in the amount of US$ 4.066 billion.
Debt payments amounted to US$ 16 billion, including
advance payments.
Although monetary policy in 2002 was geared
towards ensuring price stability, the inflation target was
overshot slightly. An inflation rate of 3% is projected
for 2003, in order to converge with the rates in the
United States and Canada. The economic downturn in
early 2002 led to a loosening of monetary policy in
April, but as exchange-rate volatility and interest rates
appeared to threaten its grip on inflation, the central
bank tightened monetary policy by expanding its
liquidity control mechanism (the “corto”) –the amount
of funds borrowed by banks from the central bank at
above-market rates– from the daily rate of 300 million
pesos set in April to 400 million in September and
475 million in December. Interest rates decreased
from an average of 11.3% in 2001 to around 8.5% in
2002. The Mexican stock exchange also experienced
a number of fluctuations with an overall downward
trend in line with the performance of the New York
stock exchange.
Commercial bank credit to the non-bank private
sector declined in real terms for the eighth year running
(to September it was down by 7.7% with respect to the
same month of 2001). Mortgage loans and credit to firms
and self-employed people were also down, but consumer
loans expanded at an annual rate of 36%.
In the framework of the floating currency scheme,
which has been in place since 1995, the peso depreciated
in real terms  for the first time since 1998. This was due
to several –albeit short-lived– speculative attacks during
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the year. The depreciation stimulated exports, but also
exerted pressure on domestic prices.
There was virtually no progress on structural
reforms in 2002, owing to dissent between the executive
and legislative bodies. After being discussed in Congress
in late 2001, the Executive’s proposal on integrated fiscal
reform translated into an assortment of measures which
were ultimately too limited to boost receipts and which,
moreover, came up against an tough economic
environment, while others –such as the implementation
of the luxury goods tax– were repealed. The state of
public finances therefore remained fragile and continued
to depend perilously on petroleum income. Other major
reforms that were still to be sent to or approved by
Congress referred to energy, telecommunications and
labour.
After stagnating in the first semester, economic
activity posted a modest gain in the second, averaging a
rate of 1.2% for the year overall. Consumption rose
slightly and investment slid by 1.7% between January
and September, with a standstill or decline in all the
sectors. Commerce, restaurants and hotels,
manufacturing and mining all shrank in real terms, while
agriculture and services recorded an upswing.
Private consumption of durable goods continued to
increase, chiefly on the back of schemes offered by banks
and non-bank institutions (such as department and self-
service stores and automobile distributors) which
enabled consumers to take advantage of the lower rates
of  interest. During the period January-October domestic
automobile sales expanded by 9%, while export
production declined by 2.8%.
The total number of employed persons covered by
the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) continued
to decrease, and the number of jobs created was barely
a fourth of the volume required to absorb the labour
supply, which is expanding by 1.2 million people per
year. Employment and hours worked in the maquila
industry declined, which was a reflection of slack
external demand, and the informal sector apparently
continued to absorb a large volume of labour, since the
rate of open unemployment barely increased, from 2.5%
in 2001 to 2.8% in 2002.
The upward trend in real wages continued, however.
In combination with the lower rate of economic activity,
this implies a fresh rise in unit labour costs. Contractual
wages, excluding productivity bonuses, posted an
average nominal increase of around 6.5%. This
represented real wage growth in most of the sectors of
production, which came in addition to the rise recorded
in 2001.
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Nicaragua
The Nicaraguan economy slowed down for the third consecutive year. Real GDP grew by
0.5% in 2002, two and a half percentage points less than the previous year. This translated
into a reduction in the per capita product (-2.1%) and an increase in the unemployment rate to
12.9%. The lower rate of growth is associated with a deterioration in the terms of trade, the
slow recovery of the economy and world trade, and the fiscal adjustment process, which
mainly affected investment expenditure.
One of the contributing factors in this unfavourable
economic performance was the political uncertainty
created by the lack of parliamentary support for the
Executive’s proposals. This caused a deterioration in the
investment climate and not only delayed the signature
of a new agreement with  IMF, but also access to external
assistance flows. Despite the fact that the internal and
external imbalances were still very high, inflation
remained low and the devaluation rate was maintained
(6%). In the external sector, the current account deficit
was reduced. The reduction in net capital income,
however, caused a larger deficit in the balance of
payments and losses of international reserves.
The slow pace of economic activity brought about
a reduction in the current-account deficit, from 38% of
GDP in 2001 to 33% in 2002. The lower level of external
imbalance was the result of the contraction of the trade
deficit, the reduction in payments for interest, profits
and dividends, and the increase in current transfers,
especially family remittances.
The goods trade deficit diminished by almost 5%
in 2002, yet remained very high. Imports were down by
3%, while exports declined 1%, including those of
companies operating in the export-processing zones. The
decline in exports was largely due to the reduction in
sales of traditional products (16%), caused by the fall in
coffee and shellfish exports. The value of imports went
down owing to the fall in external purchases of
intermediate and consumer goods, a result of the
slowdown in activity and the lower growth rate of
domestic demand. In contrast, imports of capital goods
showed an increase (3.3%), reflecting the improved
expectations of growth in the last two months of the year,
which meant that the coefficient of gross fixed capital
formation increased by one percentage point in relation
to GDP.
In view of the acute external and financial
vulnerability of the country, macroeconomic policy was
austere in tone. The main objectives of the measures
adopted were to reduce the fiscal deficit and to
accumulate international reserves in order to achieve a
gradual reduction in domestic public debt.
In the course of the year a tax reform law was
approved with the aim of expanding the tax base by
reducing exemptions and special regimes, reducing the
regressive nature of the tax structure and combating tax
evasion. At the same time, adjustments were made to
make budget expenditure compatible with resource
availability and with the poverty reduction strategy. At
the end of the year, it is estimated that the current savings
of the non-financial public sector (NFPS) increased from
0.6% to 2.9% of GDP, owing to the greater dynamism
of fiscal revenues and the moderate increase in current
expenditure, mainly due to wage increases. In this
context, the anticipated reduction in the overall NFPS
deficit from 16.1% to 9.4% of GDP is based on the
contraction in public investment.
Monetary policy remained restrictive, thus slightly
reinforcing the contraction in the fiscal area. The central
bank maintained the legal reserve requirement at
19.25%, continuing the interest-bearing increase of three
percentage points introduced in September 2001. The
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 NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 6.4 3.0 0.5
Consumer prices 9.9 4.7 4.2 b
Real wages 1.6 4.3 5.4 c
Money (M1) 6.4 17.6 3.5 d
Real effective exchange rate e -2.0 0.8 3.3
Terms of trade -4.7 -8.3 -0.5
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 9.8 10.7 12.9 f
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -7.8 -11.5 -9.0
Real deposit rate -0.2 4.8 2.8 g
Real lending rate 10.7 18.1 17.6
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 956 919 906
Imports of goods
and services 1,991 1,982 1,923
Current account -917 -976 -837
Capital and financial account 717 710 561





 Variation from October 2001 to October 2002.
c
 Average from January to July.
d
 Variation from October 2001 to October 2002.
e
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
f
  Official estimates.
g
 Average from January to September, annualized.
higher level of savings by the government and public
enterprises and the lower level of fiscal pressure,
however, facilitated the management of monetary policy.
The balance of credit provided to the NFPS by the
financial system, which had increased by 30% in 2001,
contracted by 1% in 2002, which made it possible to
increase credit to the private sector, maintain an adequate
level of total liquidity and to redeem more indexed debt
securities than were placed.
The dynamism of economic activity was affected
by the sluggish external market, the process of fiscal
adjustment and the delay in the signing of a new three-
year agreement with the IMF. The slowdown was also
due to the deterioration of the investment climate
associated with the political uncertainty resulting from
the disagreements between the Government and the
National Assembly.
GDP grew more slowly, which is due both to the
contraction in the agricultural sector and the fishing
industry and the significant deceleration in construction,
as well as to the modest growth in other productive areas.
On the demand side, in view of the reduction in exports
and public spending, the increase in GDP was due to
the expansion of consumption and investment spending
in the private sector.
Although basic grains production increased
significantly, agricultural production as a whole
diminished as a result of the reduction in export crops,
especially coffee. The livestock sector was affected by
the cut-back in exports of stock on the hoof to Mexico
due to marketing difficulties and by the lower level of
poultry production. Fishing declined sharply owing to
the fall in international shrimp prices and the
prohibition on lobster catching, which was announced
after excessive exploitation in recent years.
Construction slowed down rapidly owing to the severe
fiscal adjustment, which significantly reduced public
investment. In contrast, production in the
manufacturing sector increased at a higher rate than in
2001. Growth, stimulated by a higher level of foreign
direct investment and the increased activity in free
zones, was mainly concentrated in the areas of
foodstuffs, beverages and clothing. Service activities
continued to grow at a slower rate. The most significant
slowdown was in commerce.
Inflation stood at 4.2% in October 2002, a figure
slightly less than the 4.7% recorded at the end of 2001.
This slight price increase reflected the declining pressure
of demand as the economy lost buoyancy, the restrictive
nature of fiscal and monetary policy, the relative
abundance of agricultural products and the greater
stability of tariffs for basic services.
The 8.8% rise in minimum wages, the salary
adjustments in the public sector and the increase in
remuneration in certain sectors resulted in a considerable
improvement in real average remuneration. The modest
level of economic growth, however, led to an increase
in the unemployment rate from 10.7% to 12.9%, which
was higher than the decline in underemployment and
raised the global underemployment rate from 23% to
24.5%.
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The Panamanian economy remained stagnant for the second consecutive year. GDP grew by
scarcely 0.4%, and so per capita GDP again declined. The weakness of the Latin American
economies caused a contraction of merchandise re-exports, as well as a meagre performance
of international services. Domestic demand lost impetus as investment fell for the third
consecutive year, while growth in consumption was moderated. Inflation remained very low,
unemployment receded marginally and average real wages diminished slightly. The Assembly’s
failure to approve the budget caused a stir, but at mid-year the political impasse was resolved
in the framework of the National Dialogue, when significant measures for economic recovery
were agreed, which are expected to take effect in 2003.
As a result of the sluggishness of economic activity, the
balance-of-payments current account deficit was at a
level of around 0.9% of GDP. This was helped by the
fact that the substantial increase of the traditional surplus
in services neutralized the large negative balance of the
trade in goods. Minor international bank operations
reduced the non-factor services account. At the same
time, the flow of direct foreign investment diminished.
Exports of goods fell by 13%, as a result of the
adverse performance of re-exports from the Colón Free
Zone, and even more because of national exports. The
former were affected by the persisting economic
weakness of the main South American customers
(Venezuela and Colombia). In the case of the latter, both
banana and coffee exports reached their lowest level for
the past five years. Sales of marine products stagnated,
and those of clothing declined.
As for exports of services, the number and spending
of passengers in transit increased, port operations
continued to grow, although at a lower rate, and income
from the Panama Canal rose as a result of toll increases.
The value of imports went down by 2%, as a result
of the lesser supply of merchandise from the Colón Free
Zone and the reduction (-6%) in imports for the national
economy. As a result of the cut-back in aggregate
demand, capital goods purchases were reduced, while
the acquisition of inputs stagnated.
The fiscal year began with the budget of the previous
year, as the Executive’s proposal had not been approved
by the Assembly. That meant adopting measures to
restrain expenditure, which resulted in a slight reduction
of the deficit. The framework for managing economic
policy however went through important changes as a
significant agreement was reached in the context of the
National Dialogue. Thus, Law 20 issued in May defined
mechanisms for the use of State assets (the Trust Fund
and reverted areas of the Canal), for establishing ceilings
on debt and fiscal deficit and for anti-cyclical public
action, measures which are expected to have an impact
in 2003. The discussion on fiscal reform was also
revived.
The central government deficit went down from
2.7% to 2.0% of GDP. On the one hand total income
increased by a nominal 4.1%, based on the increase in
capital income, as current income contracted (1.5%) in
practically all areas owing to the economic cooling. At
the same time, the interest accrued by the Trust Fund
was not collected and the share of profits of state
enterprises decreased. Central government expenditure
stagnated owing to the brake on investment, as current
expenditure increased because of higher interest
payments.
The balance of external debt was reduced by
US$ 45 million to reach US$ 6.22 billion. In the first
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  PANAMA: MAIN ECONOMIC
INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 2.6 0.4 0.4
Consumer prices 0.7 0.0 1.6 b
Real effective exchange rate c -0.7 2.0 0.3 d
Terms of trade -5.7 0.5 -1.4
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate e 15.2 17.0 16.1
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -2.2 -2.7 -2.0
Real deposit rate 6.4 7.9 3.7 f
Real lending rate 9.8 12.1 8.1 f
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 7,820 8,010 7,800
Imports of goods
and services 8,099 7,817 7,722
Current account -716 -154 -90
Capital and financial account 388 -150 -40





 Variation from October 2001 to October 2002.
c
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
d
 Average from January to October.
e
 Includes hidden unemployment.
f 
 Average from January to September, annualized.
quarter the operation for re-financing of external debt
was completed, with the redemption of US$ 360 million
worth of Eurobonds issued in 1998. There was also a
local issue for the first time of National Treasury notes
with a three-year term to finance public expenditure.
With regard to the use of the assets of the Trust Fund
(US$1 billion, from earlier privatizations), authorization
was granted for their investment in Panamanian global
bonds in order to improve the financial yield.
Import tariffs were raised to the consolidated levels
of WTO, for coffee, its substitutes and derivatives, and
toned milk, except for milk for infants. There was also a
tariff reduction for certain packagings and intermediate
products. Together with other countries, Panama made
a request to WTO for an extension of the deadline (2002)
for lifting export subsidies.
Panama concluded its first trade agreement with El
Salvador, which allows for a period of up to 10 years to
achieve free trade. Also, at the beginning of the year,
the Central American presidents signed a common text
on the standards for trade in goods and services. After
the announcement by the United States concerning the
beginning of negotiations for a free trade treaty with
Central America, the negotiations with Costa Rica were
suspended; nor was progress made with Nicaragua, and
there is no specific renewal date for Mexico and Chile.
There was an announcement of interest in reaching a
free trade agreement with Taiwan.
The supply of goods and services contracted in view
of the slow growth in consumption, the cut-back in
investment and the continuing weakness of external
demand. In almost all areas the level of activity fell. The
exceptions were electrical energy production, which
grew by 14% owing to increased hydroelectric
generation, and government services.
Telecommunications and port operations, especially
in the handling of container cargo, continued to grow,
but at a lesser rate. Income from the Panama Canal
increased although the number of ships in transit
declined. In contrast, in the banking sector deposits and
credit operations were significantly reduced.
International operations contracted in view of the
difficulties in the region. Credit to the internal market
diminished as a result of the low level of demand, as
well as the application of stricter standards for portfolio
evaluation, especially in the area of consumption which
had shown strong growth in past years.
Agricultural production receded by almost 3%,
reflecting external marketing difficulties with bananas
and coffee, although there was success with other crops,
such as watermelon, melon and pineapple. The livestock
industry stagnated.
Manufacturing contracted for the fourth consecutive
year (-3.5%), owing to the loss of competitiveness on
the national and international market. The construction
industry contracted for the second consecutive year
(11%) as housing construction diminished, owing to
problems in implementing large public projects and
prudential measures in bank credit.
The inflation rate rose to 1.6% at the month of
October, but was very low compared internationally. This
was affected by the unification of urban transport tariffs
and the increase in petrol prices. However, there were
price reductions for foodstuffs, beverages, footwear,
clothing and medicines, and other products. The
adjustment to the minimum wage was postponed, while
average real wages diminished.
Despite the stagnation of the economy, the national
unemployment rate was at 13.2%, compared to 14% in
the previous year.
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Barbados
The Barbadian economy registered negative growth (-0.4%) for the second year in a row.
Authorities reacted to the slump by stepping up capital expenditures, which led to a widening
of the fiscal deficit. The build-up of liquidity in the banking system, created by sluggish
demand for credit, helped to finance that gap.
The external sector was also affected by the economic
contraction. Revenue from tourism and merchandise
exports declined and demand for imports waned. The
net result was a marginal widening of the current account
deficit. Inasmuch as the external deficit could not be
financed by a surplus on the capital and financial
account, international reserves fell.
The central government registered a fiscal deficit
equivalent to 4.1% of GDP, up slightly from the 3.6%
registered in 2001. This outturn was due to an increase
in government expenditure and, to a lesser extent, lower
inflows. Direct tax revenues slipped as a result of the
underperformance of corporate tax receipts; personal
income tax receipts were down as well. The
underperformance of direct taxes was offset by receipts
of indirect taxes, particularly the value added tax
and the international trade tax, which expanded 22%
–despite the decline in total import value– owing to
the adoption of a 60% bound tariff on selected
agricultural products.
Capital expenditure projects, mainly ongoing work
on infrastructure, ports and transportation facilities, were
the main source of the increase in spending. Current
expenditures showed only a marginal increase.
The deficit was financed mainly from domestic
sources. Net external financing was down in relation to
the previous year, as the government did not go to
international capital markets and its loan repayments
exceeded the project-fund portion of external financing.
Base money expanded by 36%, while the banking
system’s liabilities to the private sector recorded no
growth. The behaviour of monetary aggregates mirrored
the slowdown in economic growth and the fiscal stance
of the government. In a shrinking economy, overall
demand for loans increased only marginally, and the
marked absence of attractive alternatives to commercial
bank deposits had the effect of inflating these banks’
reserves (73%).
This monetary policy strategy had two main effects.
First, the accumulation of commercial bank reserves,
coupled with an ample stock of government deposits in
the central bank, enabled the latter to finance a larger
share of the government’s budget deficit (70% of the




2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 3.1 -2.2 -0.4
Consumer prices 3.8 -1.2 -1.4 b
Real effective exchange rate c -1.1 -1.0 3.0 d
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 9.2 9.9 10.5
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -1.5 -3.6 -4.1
Real deposit rate 1.9 … …
Real lending rate 7.0 … …
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 1,328 1,309 1,243
Imports of goods
and services 1,616 1,539 1,470
Current account -145 -94 -97
Capital and financial account 324 288 74
Overall balance 201 227 -23
Source: Statistical Appendix.
a
 Preliminary estimates to third quarter.
b
 Variation between July 2001 and July 2002.
c
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
d
 Average January-October.
excess bank liquidity and obviating the need for new
domestic debt issues, the policy stifled interest rate
movements that could have put pressure on the fixed
exchange rate regime. The weighted average lending
interest rate declined marginally, from 10.97% to
10.79%. In December 2002, the monetary authorities
decided to lower loan and deposit rates in an effort to
reduce the operating costs of businesses and banking
institutions.
The shares of GDP contributed by sugar production
and manufacturing continued to shrink or remain
stagnant in 2002, thus highlighting the growing
importance of the services sector (79% of the total),
especially those related to tourism. The sugar sector
experienced a contraction (-10%) owing to adverse
weather conditions and the late start of the harvest
season. All other subsectors stagnated.
Tourism shrank by 3% as a result of the sector’s
underperformance in the first half of the year (-10%).
However, the third quarter witnessed a marked recovery
in tourist and cruise ship arrivals.
As in the past, inflation shadowed the trend of
international prices and stood at 2.8% for the year. The
main components of the retail price index posted declines
or only marginal expansion. Unemployment rose from
9.9% to 10.5%, reflecting the prevailing economic
conditions.
The balance of payments posted a negative overall
outturn (-US$ 23 million) as the result of a marginal
increase in the current account deficit and a substantial
decline in the capital and financial account surplus (from
US$ 288 million in 2001 to US$ 74 million in 2002).
The current account deficit reflected a slight increase in
the trade deficit that can be traced to a combination of
factors: falling exports (-12%) due to decreased output
of sugar and electronic components; stagnation of the
chemicals, food and beverages subsectors; and the
downturn in imports (-5%) linked to the slowdown of
the economy.
The outturn of the capital and financial account was
partly a result of the decision to tap domestic rather than
external funding sources. In 2001 the government had
borrowed US$ 150 million on the international capital
markets as a precautionary measure to cope with the
economic fallout from the events of 11 September.
Private-sector foreign direct investment (US$ 133
million in 2001 and US$ 55 million in 2002) focused
on the tourism sector and infrastructure projects.
Preliminary overview of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 93
Belice
Belize's economy grew by 3.7% in 2002, almost one percentage point less than the previous
year. Although agriculture and agro-processing failed to recover fully from adverse weather
conditions, other sectors (such as sugar production) posted favourable performances that,
coupled with the increase in cruise ship arrivals, made satisfactory GDP growth possible.
The central government's fiscal deficit rose to 10.9%
in fiscal year 2001/2002, due to an increase in
spending that was not offset by tax receipts. Total
revenues were equivalent to 25% of GDP, reflecting
the performance of international trade and
transactions taxes,  specifically the revenue
replacement levy on petroleum. Spending trends
mirrored increases in both current and capital
spending. The rise in current expenditures was
attributable to interest payments and wages, while the
higher capital outlays were owed to domestically
financed projects. The budget deficit was financed
from government deposits at the Central Bank as well
as external sources.
The fiscal accounts are expected to show
improvement in 2002-2003. Revenues from international
trade and transactions, which accounted for the bulk of
the increase in current revenue, were up, while current
expenditures declined, as the result of lower payroll
outlays and interest payments. Capital spending also
contracted, by 15%. A deficit target of 5% of GDP was
set for the year.
The government's financing strategy helped to
expand the net domestic assets of the Central Bank. At
the same time, the economy experienced increased
demand for foreign exchange, which translated into a
weakening in the net international reserve position of
the monetary authorities (-23%). As a result, the growth
rate of the monetary base slowed from 8% in 2001 to
6% in 2002.
Credit demand witnessed an increase of 9%, fuelled
by personal loans, manufacturing activity, real estate and
tourism. Commercial banks responded to this heightened
demand with measures to expand the supply of credit
and attract deposits by offering more favourable
conditions. Also in response to the increased demand
for liquidity, banks reduced their excess reserve ratios
and cut lending rates.
The authorities sought to ease pressure on the
foreign exchange market by partially legalizing the
parallel currency market, tightening monetary and fiscal
policies and widening the scope of liquidity-absorbing
measures. As part of this strategy, from the beginning of
the second quarter of 2002 the Government allowed
currency exchange establishments to trade at non-official
exchange rates. Later, in the third quarter, the cash-
reserve requirement for all deposits was increased by 2
percentage points.
Sugar cane delivery increased by 7% thanks to the
introduction of more efficient production methods. Sugar
production posted a more modest increase of 3%, owing
to a decline in cane purity that translated into a lower
cane-sugar ratio.
The citrus sector recorded a downturn of 24%,
because of damage caused by Hurricane Iris.
Specifically, the orange and grapefruit harvests were
down (by 26% and 16%, respectively) and, as a result,
so was juice production (by 26% and 36%, respectively).
Banana production showed some signs of recovery
from the hurricane damage. The upturn in the banana
sector has been aided by ready availability of financing
for rehabilitation purposes.
The tourism sector yielded mixed results. In the first
semester, tourist stay-over arrivals fell by 1.5%, but
cruise ship arrivals jumped from 20,000 to 105,000,
subsequent to the signing of agreements with cruise lines
for year-round port calls to Belize.
Inflation remained unchanged from the
previous year, reflecting higher fuel costs for consumers
and a hike in the rates for basic telephone services in
January. Transport and communications saw the highest
rise in prices.
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BELICE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 10.5 4.7 3.7
Consumer prices 0.6 1.1 1.5
Money (M1) 21.6 20.8 …
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 11.1 9.3 ...
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -8.2 -10.0 -10.9
Real deposit rate 5.0 4.3 4.3 b
Real lending rate 15.8 15.4 14.6 b
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 288 269 297
Imports of goods
and services  462  461 424
Balance of goods
and services -131 -153 -71.6
Current account -127 -170 -102
Capital and financial account 206 145 …





 Rate in June.
Tighter monetary and fiscal policies and the
resulting decline in the level of absorption will probably
push the rate of unemployment above the figure of 9.3%
posted in 2001.
The overall balance of payments is expected to
turn in a negative result because the expected surplus
on the financial account will not be enough to offset the
current account deficit. Even so, that deficit should
narrow from 21% of GDP in 2001 to 12% in 2002, thanks
to improved export performance and weaker demand
for imports as a result of tighter monetary and fiscal
policies.
In the first semester, merchandise exports expanded
by 8%, led by the export-processing zones. The
improved performance in services stemmed from a 10%
upturn in the tourism sector, spearheaded by higher
inflows of foreign exchange from cruise ship arrivals.
The surplus on the capital and financial account is
expected to drop significantly, owing chiefly to the public
sector's commitment to repay part of the external debt.
Lastly, foreign direct investment is likely to decline from
the sizeable levels recorded in 2001 with the privatization
of the water and sewerage company.
External setbacks and adverse weather conditions caused the Cuban economy to lose
momentum for the third consecutive year in 2002 (GDP growth slowed to 1.4% compared
with 2.5% in 2001). The external context remained unfavourable given the decline in
international tourism following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States.
Foreign direct investment stagnated for the second year in a row as a result of the weak world
economic situation. Overall, capital formation was flat.
Cuba
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CUBA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001a 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 5.3 2.5 1.4
Consumer prices b -3.0 -0.5 5.0
Money (M1) … 16.4 18.8
Terms of trade -5.7 4.9 -9.2
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 5.5 4.1 3.5
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -2.4 -2.5 -2.9
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services c 4,791 4,615 4,320
Imports of goods
and services c 5,671 5,561 5,170
Current account c -776 -553 -630
Capital and financial account c d 805 595 650





 Refers to local currency markets.
c
 Based on the official exchange rate: 1 peso = US$ 1.
d
 Includes Errors and omissions.
Hurricane Michelle struck the island late in 2001, and
then in 2002, two other hurricanes –Isidore and Lili–
caused substantial material damage to export crops,
including sugar and citrus fruits. Hurricane Michelle
caused direct and indirect damage totalling US$ 1.9
billion (6.3% of GDP) and its effects were fully felt in
2002. The other two hurricanes followed similar paths
and struck the western region of the country, leaving in
their wake over US$ 800 million in damage (2.7% of
GDP).
These adversities exacerbated existing macro-
economic disequilibria. In the realm of public finances,
the fiscal deficit widened to 2.9% of GDP, up from 2.5%
the previous year, although this was still within the range
provided for by economic policy (3% of GDP). The
narrow money supply (M1A) expanded substantially,
rising to 45% of GDP (38.6% in 2001), and the consumer
price index showed increases both in national currency
(5%) and in foreign currency, after having declined
during the previous three years. With foreign exchange
becoming gradually scarcer, the exchange rate on the
parallel market rose by 8%. The country’s balance-of-
payments current account position also deteriorated,
going further into the red.
The current account deficit climbed to US$ 630
million as a result of higher net factor service payments
(US$ 600 million), while trade in goods and services
showed a deficit of US$ 850 million and net current
transfers increased slightly (US$ 820 million). The
capital account surplus (US$ 650 million) was sufficient
to offset that deficit and to permit a slight increase in
the country’s low level of international reserves.
Tourism activity remained virtually at the same level
as in 2001. Tourist arrivals totalled 1.8 million and
generated gross earnings of US$ 1.84 billion. Hotel
capacity stood at 40,000 rooms, while the occupancy
level was 50%.
The increasingly tight foreign-exchange situation
and the need to repair the hurricane damage forced
authorities to concentrate on short-term economic
management. As a result, longer-term reforms came to
a virtual standstill. Some advances were made, however,
in upgrading State-owned companies by providing
greater autonomy in the area of production management.
Measures of this type were extended to include some
300 firms as compared with 205 the year before.
As spending outstripped revenues, the fiscal deficit
widened to 2.9% of GDP. The increase in current outlays
was notable since capital outlays actually declined. In
highly adverse conditions and with a declining growth
rate for the economy, tax income rose by almost
1 percentage point of GDP over the previous year’s
figure to represent 52% of GDP. This brought total
expenditures to 55% of GDP. Current income grew as a
net result of the increase in tax collections, principally
of direct taxes, since non-tax receipts declined. The new
tax system was applied to all businesses in the country
and generated an increase in direct tax collections,
mainly from taxes on profits and on labour force use.
Social security contributions and personal income tax
receipts also increased but less significantly.
Receipts from the country’s main taxes –the
circulation and sales taxes– grew, while taxes on services
diminished, mainly because the increases in wholesale
fuel prices were not passed on to consumers.
The external public debt balance was higher than
in the previous year, amounting to US$ 12 billion. It
was composed mainly of government-guaranteed export
credits (32.5%), bank deposits and loans (26%) and inter-
government loans (16.9%).
Progress continued with decentralization and
modernization of the financial, banking and non-banking
system, affording companies greater access to
temporarily immobilized financial resources,
consolidating domestic convertibility for the public, and
making loans available in national and foreign currency
96 ECLAC
Haiti
through risk analysis. Insurance continued to be extended
to all productive activities.
In the area of exchange rate policy, the official
exchange rate was maintained at Cuban peso 1 = US$ 1,
although the scarcity of foreign exchange led to an 8.3%
devaluation in the parallel rate, which stood at 26 Cuban
pesos per dollar.
One of the most notable economic reforms was
the restructuring of the sugar industry. Almost one
half of the 156 sugar mills were shut down and 50%
of the area used for sugar was replanted to import-
substitution food crops; 25% of the labour force was
relocated to other productive jobs. Sugar production
reached 3.6 million metric tons in the 2001/2002
harvest, compared with 3.5 million in the previous
period.
The dip in goods and services imports (-11.2%) led
overall supply to display virtually flat growth (-0.4%),
in a context of 1.4% growth in GDP. External demand
contracted for the second year (-11.5%). Domestic
demand, on the other hand, expanded (1.6%), with total
consumption up (2%) as a result of higher government
consumption (4.9%) and, to a lesser extent, higher private
consumption (1%). By contrast, investment declined
slightly in the wake of adjustments implemented as of
mid-2001 to address the country’s acute shortage of
foreign exchange.
At the sectoral level, energy production expanded
thanks to the significant increase (20%) in national oil
and associated gas production. Accordingly, imports
under this heading diminished and the electricity supply
improved. Government services (5.2%) and trade
(2.5%) also showed increases. On the other hand,
agricultural output declined (-3.8%), manufacturing
was down (-1%), and the construction sector was flat
(0.3%).
After three years of deflation, the consumer price
index increased by 5%, basically because of the lower
supply of agricultural products on the open market. In
the managed market, supply was maintained at the same
level as in 2001. Unemployment declined to 3.5%,
compared with 4.1% in 2001.
The economic climate in Haiti has been openly recessionary since the year 2000. The main
signs of this deterioration in 2002 were a 1.5% contraction in GDP, a downturn in foreign
trade (with a marked drop in exports), sharp devaluation of the gourde and an extremely
fragile fiscal situation, all due mainly to the persistent political and institutional instability.
The political crisis led to the almost total suspension of external financing by international
agencies, which forced the country to declare a moratorium on its foreign-debt interest
payments. Stronger remittance flows helped to mitigate the damage to the balance-of-payments
current account. By the end of the fiscal year, net international reserves were equivalent to
less than two months’ imports.
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HAITI: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 1.9 -0.7 -1.5
Consumer prices 19.0 8.1 10.1 b
Money (M1) 19.7 7.8 18.5
Terms of trade c -7.5 1.2 -1.5
Average annual percentages
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP -2.6 -2.7 -2.9
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 503 442 427
Imports of goods
and services 1,336 1,300 1,230
Current account -71 -97 -45
Capital and financial account 26 99 -25





 Percentage change September 2001-September 2002.
c
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
A 13% increase in real government revenue was
generated by higher receipts from customs (7.4%) and
indirect taxation (8.4%), although these were insufficient
to reduce the fiscal gap. Those increases, which fell short
of the Government’s targets, were undermined by losses
associated with oil-related taxation. Despite the
depreciation of the currency, domestic fuel prices have
not changed since September 2000, implying higher
subsidies and losses to the public treasury. The central
government deficit grew by 8%, financed with resources
from the Central Bank (Banque de la République d’Haïti
- BRH) and the accumulation of external arrears.
The climate of deep distrust was exacerbated by the
credit union crisis, during which payments where
suspended, and by the failure of authorities to repay, as
promised, funds that had been withheld. Persistent
rumours of a possible conversion of dollar deposits into
local currency triggered a rapid devaluation of the gourde
in October and November, and led to a significant
outflow of foreign exchange.
A new agreement with the IMF remains on hold
pending fulfilment of the respective requirements, which
include raising domestic oil and gas prices and restoring
external payments to a sound footing. These two factors
are the main prerequisites for renewing the staff-
monitored programme for the 2002/2003 fiscal year.
Execution and compliance with the programme for a
six-month period will lay the foundations for possible
agreement on a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
with the IMF.
Exports fell by 11.5% despite a strong surge in
mango sales (63%). Sluggish demand in the United
States affected the maquila industry, which recorded an
8% decline. Imports, too, were off (by 7%), because of
the slow economic growth and sharp devaluation of the
currency. The merchandise trade balance with the United
States –Haiti’s main international market– remained
practically flat compared with 2001. Net current transfers
(inflows) were again high, thanks to substantial
remittances from Haitians living abroad. Consequently,
the current account deficit stood at only US$ 45 million
(1.3% of GDP). However, this deficit was difficult to
cover in view of the suspension of multilateral financial
assistance. This situation led to a build-up of arrears
(US$ 49 million) in interest owed on foreign debt, in
particular to the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) and the World Bank, which, together, accounted
for 76% of this heading.
As the result of negotiations between the Government
and the IDB, the latter agreed –subject to the full
settlement of arrears– to extend close to US$ 50 million
in new credits under accelerated policy-based lending
arrangements. This should ease the severe financial
restrictions on the Government, since total disbursements
amounted to scarcely US$ 13 million in 2002.
The measures taken by the authorities in 2002 were
insufficient to achieve higher growth or macroeconomic
stability. Given the sharp contraction in the economy,
monetary policy was relaxed; the interest rate on Central
Bank bonds (91-day BRH bonds) was reduced by 11
percentage points (from 21.1% to 10.2%) over the course
of the fiscal year, and the M1 money supply expanded
by 11%. While the bond policy enabled the Government
to reduce its financing costs, there were no wider
repercussions in terms of recovery, and the real lending
rate (16.5%) continued its upward trend. Credit to the
private sector grew by 5%, while public-sector
borrowing increased by 16%.
Upward pressure on the exchange rate, coupled with
the associated inflationary effects, prompted the
monetary authorities to announce, on 11 November, a
hike in the BRH bond interest rate to 15%.
Although dollarization had been proceeding steadily
(dollar deposits account for 37% of M3), there was an
apparent reversal triggered by rumours that foreign
currency accounts would be converted into gourdes. In
October, close to US$ 90 million in foreign exchange
flowed out of the country (20% of total deposits in the
banking system). The exchange rate rose by 36% in
2002, hitting the mark of 36 gourdes to the dollar in
early December.
To compensate for the lack of external financing,
the Government imposed stiffer taxation measures on
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the main contributors (10% of whom account for two
thirds of total tax revenues). There was an increase in
real terms both in direct taxation (17%) and in the value
added tax (8%); more than one quarter of inflows
continued to originate in taxes on foreign trade. Some
specific taxes were also increased (e.g., long-distance
telephone services). Central-government investment
expenditure increased by 11% (for public works in
general and maintenance work on the Péligre
hydroelectric dam, in particular) to compensate for the
drastic reduction (-26%) in the preceding fiscal year.
The fiscal deficit (2.9% of GDP) was financed almost
exclusively through BRH, with a higher contribution
(21%) than in the previous year.
Industrial production expanded by 2.8% but its
modest contribution to GDP (7%) and the considerable
decline in maquila exports do not augur well for the
sector. If the initiative presented in October 2002 by the
Haitian Chamber of Commerce to the United States
Congress (Haiti Recovery Opportunity Act - HARO) is
successful in obtaining preferential treatment for textiles,
this could herald a more promising future.
The downturn in the construction sector (-1.2%) also
reflects the recessionary trend in the economy as a whole.
Public works undertaken or completed in the course of
the year mitigated this decline, attracting more than one
third of government investment.
The marginal expansion in power generation
(1.2%), following the sharp fall in the previous fiscal
year (-31%), is far from sufficient to meet demand.
The authorities had to contract with private suppliers
in order to meet part of the emergency pent-up
demand, especially after the temporary closure of the
country’s largest hydroelectric plant in the middle of
the year.
Year-on-year inflation stood at 10.1% in September,
which meant an increase with respect to the rate recorded
in December 2001. Consequently, purchasing power
continued to deteriorate and the real minimum wage
showed an 8% decline compared with the previous year.
The sharp devaluation in the gourde in the closing
months of 2002 could result in higher inflation,
especially if oil and gas prices, which are currently
frozen, increase.
In 2002 the Jamaican economy returned to modest growth (2%) against a backdrop of supply
shocks, adverse external conditions and uncertainty in the foreign exchange market. Economic
activity was also affected by the political climate during the run-up to the general elections of
October 2002.
The fiscal accounts registered a higher-than-expected
imbalance due to the increase in current expenditures
and the decrease in tax revenues. The deficit thus
amounted to 6% of GDP. Capital expenditures were used
as adjustment leverage.
The slide in the value of the Jamaican dollar, supply
shocks and higher wages fuelled inflationary
expectations, forcing monetary authorities to intervene.
The Central Bank had to draw on international reserves
and tightened its monetary stance.
Export performance was undermined by flood rains
and the poor competitiveness of non-traditional exports.
The services account suffered adverse effects from the
dip in tourist spending. However, the negative current
account balance and the significant flight of private
capital were offset by foreign direct investment, which
led to a positive change in international reserves.
The decline in tax revenues is explained by the
performance of the income and profits taxes and, more
importantly, taxes on interest (-16%). The poor showing
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JAMAICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
 Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 1.0 1.8 2.0
Consumer prices 6.1 8.7 5.8 b
Money (M1) -2.5 18.9 7.2 c
Real effective exchange rate d 7.3 -3.5 0.0 e
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate 15.5 15.0 ...
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP 1.4 -6.3 -6.0
Real deposit rate 6.0 0.2 2.1 f





 Variation between October 2001 and October 2002.
c
 Variation between September 2001 and September 2002.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e  Average January to October.
f
  Average January to September, annualized.
by international trade taxes reflected developments in
the tourism sector, which had not yet fully recovered
from the downturn of the previous year.
Total government expenditure rose by 18%, owing
to increases in current expenditure since capital
expenditures contracted significantly (-25%). The higher
current expenditures stemmed from wages and salaries
(12%) and interest on the external debt (60%).
The government deficit was financed from both
domestic and external sources. The former included
long-term bond issues designed to lengthen the maturity
period of the debt and government surpluses deposited
with the Central Bank. External financing included
US$ 300 million raised through the placement of a 15-
year Eurobond.
Monetary policy sought chiefly to maintain
exchange-rate stability in order to achieve the Central
Bank’s inflation target. The exchange rate moved from
J$ 47.40 at the end of December 2001 to around J$ 50.00
at the end of 2002. This movement can be traced to
lower-than-expected net inflows of foreign exchange,
an increase in private capital outflows and foreign debt
service.
The monetary authorities responded to these
market pressures by selling foreign exchange, thus
reducing  the  country’s  net  international  reserves
(-10%). Authorities also raised interest rates with effect
from September.
In July, the Bank of Jamaica lowered its repurchase
–or repo– rates (interest rate charged for overnight
borrowings). Commercial banks followed suit and
lowered the weighted loan rate from 19.7% to 17.85%
between August 2001 and August 2002. Credit demand
during this period increased by 42%, while narrow
money expanded 7% and broad money 5%.
The country’s modest GDP growth is the result of
climatic vagaries that affected the agricultural sector
and poor performance by the mining sector, specifically
the drop in bauxite production owing to technical
problems at one of the refineries. Lower-than-projected
growth in the food processing industry, petroleum
refining, the tobacco industry, and the textile and
garment industries was ref lected in a stagnant
manufacturing sector. The construction sector, on the
other hand, grew during the year, thanks to liquidity in
the economy and the recovery activities launched once
the heavy rains stopped.
The tourism sector had still not recovered from the
weather events of July, the slowdown in the United States
economy and the events of 11 September 2001. Total
visitor arrivals were down 6% in comparison with the
previous year.
Inflation abated in 2002 to 5.8%, nearly 3
percentage points lower than in 2001. The main price
increases were triggered by supply shocks, mainly in
the foods subsector, although increases were also
recorded in beverages, housing and other home-related
expenditures. Unemployment is expected to exceed 15%,
as fallout from the meagre performance by most
economic sectors.
The current account balance registered a deficit,
which was more than offset by a surplus on the
financial and capital account that led to an increase
in international reserves. This outturn was the result
of a widening of the trade deficit, an increase in the
income account and a narrower surplus in the services
balance.
Total merchandise exports were adversely affected
by supply shocks and temporary production disruptions
in the mining sector. Non-traditional exports also showed
a decrease, owing to stiff competition in the apparel
sector and the interruption in the production of
limestone.
Imports were down as well, mirroring essentially
the dip in raw material imports, since all other categories
recorded increases over the previous year.
The smaller surplus in the services account reflected
the sluggish recovery in the tourism sector, while the
deficit in the income account stemmed from the
repatriation of profits and dividends, and debt service
payments.
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Although external demand continued to shrink, economic activity in the Dominican Republic
expanded by almost 4% in 2002, a higher rate than in the previous year but considerably
lower than the average of 7.7% recorded in the period 1996-2000. Growth was driven mainly
by domestic demand owing to the strong increase both in consumer spending and in capital
formation.
Dominican Republic
Public expenditure expanded substantially –financed in
part by unused resources from sovereign bonds issued
in 2001– and helped to offset the slump in activity in
export-processing zones and international tourism.
Employment grew and real wages improved slightly.
However, domestic and external macroeconomic
imbalances led to an adjustment of the compensatory
policy in the second half of the year. For the year as a
whole, the fiscal deficit and the balance-of-payments
current-account deficit widened somewhat. The
monetary authorities intervened in the foreign exchange
market, allowing a gradual slide in the peso-dollar ratio;
the rate adjustment was significant enough, however, to
lead to a loss in international reserves. The inflation rate
doubled, and interest rates crept upwards as a result of
monetary restrictions.
Given the possibility of continued weak external
demand in 2003, GDP growth is estimated at between
3.0% and 3.5%. Fiscal and monetary restrictions will be
maintained for much of the year in an effort to attenuate
macroeconomic disequilibria. In December, the Senate
approved the issue of US$ 600 million in sovereign
bonds on the international market, which will help to
achieve this purpose.
Family remittances climbed to nearly US$ 2
billion. However, the wider trade deficit and higher
interest and dividend payments pushed the balance-of-
payments current-account deficit up to US$ 915 million
(equivalent to 4.2% of GDP, compared with 3.5% in
2001). Capital inflows declined, partly as a result of
the lower level of foreign direct investment, which –in
conjunction with Central Bank interventions to stabilize
the exchange rate– produced a dip in reserves on the
order of US$ 560 million.
Weak performance of the export-processing zones,
which account for 85% of total merchandise exports,
resulted in a decline in this heading for the second
consecutive year (-2%). In particular, garment sales to
the United States, the sector’s main client, were down.
Declines were also noted in ferro-nickel, tobacco and
coffee, because of lower demand and weak
international prices. Sugar and cocoa were the only
categories to post improvements, thanks to stronger
prices.
Although imports into the export-processing zones
declined, their total value did not fall off sharply (-0.3%)
inasmuch as the expansion in domestic demand helped
to spur purchases.
Although tourist arrivals fell by 9.3% in the first
ten months of the year, the services balance continued
to run a surplus. Even so, the improvement observed at
the end of the year was not sufficient to offset the meagre
results. Outlays for dividends and earnings increased as
bonds issued in 2001 started to fall due.
Economic policy at the beginning of 2002 was
conducted with the expectation that external demand
would pick up in the course of the year. Accordingly,
public expenditure expanded strongly, in parallel with
efforts by the monetary authorities to maintain domestic
and external stability. This expansionary policy was
discontinued, however, when external demand failed to
rally and signs came in that the macroeconomic
imbalances were unsustainable. Two measures merit
special mention: the broad-based adjustment in
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN
ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
 Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 7.3 2.7 4.0
Consumer prices 9.0 4.4 8.8 b
Real urban minimum wage -0.1 5.5 ...
Money (M1) -10.1 24.7 0.6 c
Real effective exchange rate d -2.7 -3.0 1.6 e
Terms of trade -1.9 1.5 -0.2
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate f 13.9 15.4 16.1 g
Central government fiscal
balance/GDP 1.1 0.4 -2.1
Real deposit rate 6.7 12.9 5.1 h
Real lending rate 15.0 21.3 13.7 h
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 8,964 8,366 8,091
Imports of goods
and services 10,852 10,056 9,978
Current account -1,026 -751 -915
Capital and financial account 979 1,264 353





 Percentage change November 2001-November 2002.
c
 Percentage change August 2001-August 2002.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Average from January to October.
f








electricity rates and the adoption of the Monetary and
Financial Act.
Even taking into account the restraint in spending
in the second half of the year, central government
expenditure grew by 15% in real terms, financed in part
by funds remaining from sovereign bonds issued in 2001.
On the one hand, a number of jobs were created, wages
were raised and debt interest payments increased. On
the other hand, capital outlays for various infrastructure
works rose considerably.
Tax revenue was up as a result of stronger domestic
demand and the reforms and adjustments launched in
2001. However, the increase was insufficient, and the
central government deficit rose to 2.1% of GDP.
Domestic credit expanded significantly (20% in real
terms in October compared with December), especially
credit made available to the central government. The
higher placement of treasury certificates and the cutback
in money creation were aimed at curbing liquidity and
avoiding excessive pressure on the external sector, the
foreign exchange market and prices. Consequently,
deposit and lending rates rose (by 7 percentage points
with respect to December), the money supply
contracted and term deposits expanded. As credit
demand shrank in the final months of the year,
monetary policy was relaxed, with the authorities
reducing the legal reserve requirement from 20% to
17% and opening up the Reserve Bank’s loan portfolio
to the private sector.
The limited supply of foreign exchange generated
pressure on the foreign exchange market throughout the
year. In order to stabilize the exchange rate, the Central
Bank intervened during much of the first half of the year,
but in April the focus shifted towards allowing
adjustments consistent with the foreign exchange
balance. As a temporary measure, the monetary
authorities, banks and foreign exchange agents agreed
in October to adopt a fixed exchange rate as a means
of stabilizing the market. At the beginning of
December, however, the exchange rate against the
dollar had depreciated by 15% compared with the same
month of the previous year, and authorities therefore
decided to implement monetary and foreign exchange
restrictions.
Negotiations with the United States to include the
Dominican Republic in that country’s free trade
agreement with Central America were not successful,
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and the Government is now seeking to establish bilateral
arrangements with the United States. Progress was made
with negotiations on a trade agreement with Panama,
and initial contacts have been made to negotiate with
Colombia and Chile.
Consumption and investment grew at high rates in
the period from January to September, notwithstanding
a slowdown in GDP growth in the third quarter.
Activities linked to the domestic market were the most
buoyant.  These  included  manufacturing, construction,
communications,  commerce   and   energy.   By
contrast,   the  export  sector  contracted  sharply,
especially  the  export-processing zones and  the hotel
industry.
Agriculture suffered a setback, as a result of the
dip in tobacco and tomato production and adjustments
in the production of items for domestic consumption
following the abundant supply in 2001. Although power
generation expanded significantly, there continued to
be a shortfall and, consequently, consumers and
producers continued to face power outages. In order to
regularize the service, the Government approved a
sharp hike in electricity rates and modified the
generalized subsidies to target the low-income sectors
of the population.
Inflation climbed to 8.8% –a rate double that
observed a year earlier– and generated an important
impact on the adjustment in electricity rates. Fuel prices
also increased. The public sector implemented a 6%
wage increase at the beginning of the year, and the
private sector (except in the export-processing zones)
followed suit in October, with an 8% salary increase.
In both cases, the adjustments were positive in real
terms.
The GDP of Trinidad and Tobago grew 2.7% in 2002, compared with 3.3% in the previous
year. The oil sector experienced faster expansion than in 2001, and the agricultural sector saw
a return to growth. Manufacturing output also expanded. Political uncertainty reigned
throughout most of the period, inasmuch as the December 2001 election results were so heatedly
contested that it was not possible to elect a prime minister and new general elections had to be
called.
Trinidad and Tobago
The external sector yielded a balanced result thanks to a
current account surplus (generated by higher insurance
flows) that was able to offset the deficit on the capital
and financial account (the result of external debt payment
obligations). This favourable balance-of-payments
situation enabled the authorities to maintain a solid
reserve position and to keep the exchange rate and
inflation within the Government’s target ranges.
Fiscal year 2001/2002 ended with a balanced
budget, since the shortfall in projected revenue was
matched by lower levels of fiscal expenditure. The
Government was thus able to honour its debt service
obligations and pursue a monetary policy built around
interest rate targets. The main challenge was to establish
rules for trading on the money market in an environment
of excess liquidity. The Central Bank engaged in
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TRINIDAD  AND TOBAGO: MAIN
ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 6.1 3.3 2.7
Consumer prices 5.6 3.2 4.7 b
Money (M1) 14.1 36.9 7.0 c
Real effective exchange rate d -2.3 -4.8 -4.3
Average annual percentages
Urban unemployment rate e 12.2 10.7 11.0
Real deposit rate 3.3 2.3 3.4 f
Real lending rate 11.2 10.0 10.7 f
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods
and services 4,290 4,124 …
Imports of goods
and services 3,322 3,694 …
Current account 544 127 …
Balance of goods and services 1,135 730 …
Capital and financial account -103 344 …
Overall balance 441 471 …
Source: Statistical Appendix.
a
 Preliminary estimates to third quarter.
b
 Variation from October 2001 to October 2002.
c
 Variation from August 2001 to August 2002.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Includes hidden unemployment.
f
 Average from January to July, annualized.
sterilization operations and at the same time eased its
monetary stance so as to stimulate the demand for
credit.
Tax revenues reflected a drop in receipts from the
income and profits tax (-17%), as tax payments by oil
firms plummeted (-38%) because of lower crude prices
in 2001 and higher allowances and deductions for capital
goods. The tax intake on goods and services increased
as VAT revenues expanded (13%). The lower level of
expenditure was the result of a contraction in capital
outlays (-24%). Current expenditure rose marginally,
mirroring increases in wage payments and emoluments.
The fiscal outcome allowed the Government to pare back
its borrowing requirements and make substantial debt
repayments.
The budget for fiscal year 2002/2003 will likely
yield a deficit of 1% of GDP due to payments to settle
salary arrears. Allowance has been made for the
reduction in the marginal rate for the top brackets of the
income and corporation taxes (from 35% to 30%) and
the elimination of export subsidies to comply with WTO-
related agreements.
The Central Bank introduced the repo rate (the
interest rate charged to commercial banks for overnight
borrowing) as the key indicator for guiding monetary
policy. Private-sector demand for loans slid steadily
throughout the year, and commercial bank deposits rose
15%.
Within this context, the Central Bank opted to lower
the repo rate from 5.75% to 5.25%, while sterilizing the
excess liquidity through Treasury bill issues. The net
result was an across-the-board drop in interest rates (the
basic prime rate fell from 14.5% to 12% between January
and September). Money supply aggregates were
responsive to interest rate objectives. Narrow and broad
money rose by 7% and 14%, respectively, between
August 2001 and August 2002. Implementation of
monetary policy was made easier by the build-up in net
international reserves, which kept the exchange rate
stable.
The petroleum sector grew 4.5% in 2002, despite
uneven performance by the petrochemicals subsector.
Nitrogenous fertilizer production rose 1%, and methanol
production expanded thanks to upgrades in plant
capacity and production methods. Iron and steel output
increased as well.
The revival of growth in the agricultural sector
(11%) came from the strong performance by sugar
production (21%). Slow manufacturing growth (1.1%)
was due to low levels of technology, high costs, an
unsuited marketing strategy and supply constraints in
the provision of raw materials. The drop in construction
activity reflected the contraction in public capital
expenditures. Lastly, the tourism sector remained
depressed (-1.3%), following the sharp drop the previous
year.
Inflation jumped from 3.2% to 4.7%, with foodstuffs
accounting for the bulk of the increase. The participation
and unemployment rates remained unchanged from the
previous year (61% and 11% in 2001 and 2002,
respectively).
The external sector registered a balanced overall
result thanks to a current account surplus which, for
the most part, offset the shortfall on the capital and
financial account. The current account performance
reflected surpluses on the merchandise and services
accounts that outweighed the deficit on the income
account.
Export growth was down with respect to the
previous year, showing a decline in trade in fuels that
was offset in part by a rise in petrochemicals. Trade in
fuels was affected by unfavourable price and demand
conditions for part of the year and by the expiration of a
fuel trade agreement with Venezuela. Manufacturing
exports increased, while agricultural exports contracted.
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The expansion in merchandise imports was spurred by
production requirements in the energy sector.
The surplus on the services account swelled from
US$ 34 million in 2001 to US$ 52 million in 2002,
reflecting mainly the rise in insurance flows, since the
transportation and travel headings declined in response
to stalled activity in the tourism sector. The deficit on
the income account was attributable to foreign exchange
outflows in the form of repatriation of profits.
The poor financial account outturn stemmed from
repayment of the public external debt, although foreign
direct investment increased with respect to the previous
year, drawn by investment opportunities in the energy
sector.
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Table A -1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(Percentages, based on values at 1995 prices)
Annual growth rates
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 a
Latin America and the
Caribbean  3.3  5.2  1.1  3.7  5.1  2.2  0.5  3.8  0.3 -0.5
Subtotal (20 countries)  3.4  5.2  1.1  3.8  5.2  2.2  0.5  3.8  0.3 -0.5
Argentina  5.9  5.8 -2.9  5.5  8.0  3.8 -3.4 -0.8 -4.4 -11.0
Bolivia  4.3  4.8  4.7  4.5  4.9  5.0  0.3  2.3  1.3 2.0
Brazil  4.5  6.2  4.2  2.5  3.1  0.1  1.0  4.0  1.5 1.5
Chile  6.9  5.0  9.0  6.9  6.8  3.3 -0.7  4.4  2.8 1.8
Colombia  4.4  5.9  4.9  1.9  3.3  0.8 -3.8  2.2  1.4 1.6
Costa Rica  7.1  4.6  3.9  0.8  5.4  8.3  8.0  2.2  1.0 2.8
Cuba -16.0  2.0  3.4  8.7  3.3  1.3  6.8  5.3  2.5 1.4
Ecuador  2.2  4.4  3.0  2.3  3.9  1.0 -7.9  2.3  6.0 3.4
El Salvador  6.4  6.0  6.2  1.8  4.2  3.8  3.4  2.1  1.9 2.3
Guatemala  4.0  4.1  5.0  3.0  4.4  5.1  3.9  3.4  2.4 1.9
Haiti -8.0 -17.6  9.5  5.6  3.2  2.9  2.9  1.9 -0.7 -1.5
Honduras  7.1 -1.9  3.7  3.7  4.9  3.3 -1.5  4.8  2.7 2.0
Mexico  1.8  4.5 -6.2  5.4  6.8  5.0  3.7  6.8 -0.4 1.2
Nicaragua -0.4  4.0  4.4  5.1  5.4  4.1  7.4  6.4  3.0 0.5
Panama  5.3  3.1  1.9  2.7  4.7  4.6  3.5  2.6  0.4 0.4
Paraguay  4.0  3.0  4.5  1.1  2.4 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6  2.4 -3.0
Peru  4.8  12.7  8.6  2.5  6.8 -0.5  0.9  3.0  0.2 4.5
Dominican Republic  3.0  4.7  4.3  7.2  8.2  7.4  7.8  7.3  2.7 4.0
Uruguay  3.5  7.0 -2.3  5.0  5.4  4.4 -3.4 -1.9 -3.4 -10.5
Venezuela -0.4 -3.7  5.9 -0.4  7.4  0.7 -5.8  3.8  2.9 -7.0
Subtotal Caribbean  0.9  3.1  2.7  2.6  2.0  3.6  2.8  3.5  1.8 1.9
Antigua and Barbuda  5.0  6.2 -4.8  6.0  5.5  5.0  4.9  2.6  4.3 0.0
Barbados  1.1  4.4  1.9  2.5  2.6  4.0  3.0  3.1 -2.2 -0.4
Belice  4.3  1.5  3.7  1.3  4.4  2.0  6.0  10.5  4.7 3.7
Dominica  1.9  1.9  1.2  2.9  2.2  3.1  1.3  0.7 -5.2 -6.0
Grenada -1.1  3.4  3.1  3.0  4.3  7.6  7.5  6.5 -3.3 3.4
Guyana  11.4  9.4  3.8  7.4  6.8 -2.2  5.0 -2.3  2.3 2.0
Jamaica  2.2  1.6  2.2 -0.1 -1.8 -0.8  0.6  1.0  1.8 2.0
Saint Kitts and Nevis  5.2  5.5  3.2  5.8  7.2  1.1  3.5  5.0  2.0 -2.5
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2.0 -2.3 7.8 1.2 3.5 5.8 3.6 1.8 0.3 4.0
Saint Lucia -1.3  4.6  2.1  0.8 -0.3  3.0  2.8  0.3 -5.0 1.0
Suriname -4.1 -0.1  0.0  5.3  3.3  2.9 -3.5 -1.2 … …
Trinidad and Tobago -1.2  4.2  4.2  4.4  4.0  7.8  4.4  6.1  3.3 2.7
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1995 prices.





LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(Percentages based on values at 1995 prices)
Annual growth rates
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 a
Latin America and the
Caribbean  1.6  3.4 -0.5  2.1  3.5  0.6 -1.0  2.2 -1.2 -1.9
Subtotal (20 countries)  1.6  3.4 -0.6  2.1  3.5  0.6 -1.1  2.2 -1.2 -2.0
Argentina  4.5  4.4 -4.1  4.1  6.6  2.5 -4.6 -2.0 -5.6 -12.1
Bolivia  1.7  2.3  2.2  2.0  2.4  2.6 -2.0  0.1 -0.9 -0.2
Brazil  3.0  4.7  2.7  1.1  1.7 -1.2 -0.3  2.6  0.2 0.2
Chile  5.1  3.3  7.3  5.4  5.3  1.9 -2.0  3.1  1.6 0.6
Colombia  2.4  3.8  2.9  0.0  1.4 -1.1 -5.6  0.4 -0.4 -0.1
Costa Rica  3.8  1.5  1.0 -1.9  2.7  5.6  5.4 -0.1 -1.2 0.7
Cuba -16.5  1.4  2.8  8.1  2.9  0.8  6.4  4.9  2.1 1.1
Ecuador -0.1  2.1  0.8  0.2  1.8 -0.9 -9.7  0.4  4.1 1.6
El Salvador  4.2  3.7  4.0 -0.3  2.1  1.6  1.3  0.1  0.0 0.4
Guatemala  1.3  1.4  2.2  0.3  1.7  2.4  1.1  0.7 -0.3 -0.7
Haiti -9.6 -19.0  7.5  3.7  1.3  1.0  1.1  0.1 -2.5 -3.3
Honduras  4.0 -4.7  0.7  0.8  2.1  0.5 -4.1  2.1  0.1 -0.6
Mexico -0.1  2.6 -7.8  3.7  5.1  3.3  2.1  5.2 -1.9 -0.3
Nicaragua -3.3  0.9  1.5  2.2  2.6  1.4  4.6  3.6  0.3 -2.1
Panama  3.4  1.3  0.1  0.9  2.9  2.9  1.9  1.0 -1.1 -1.1
Paraguay  1.3  0.4  1.7 -1.6 -0.2 -3.2 -2.6 -3.1 -0.1 -5.4
Peru  2.9  10.8  6.7  0.7  4.9 -2.2 -0.8  1.4 -1.4 2.9
Dominican Republic  1.2  2.9  2.5  5.3  6.3  5.6  6.0  5.5  1.0 2.3
Uruguay  2.8  6.2 -3.0  4.2  4.6  3.6 -4.1 -2.6 -4.1 -11.1
Venezuela -2.7 -5.8  3.7 -2.5  5.2 -1.3 -7.7  1.8  1.0 -8.7
Subtotal Caribbean  0.2  2.4  2.0  1.9  1.3  2.9  2.1  2.8  1.1 1.2
Antigua and Barbuda  4.6  5.8 -5.1  5.6  5.2  4.6  4.5  2.2  4.0 -0.3
Barbados  0.6  4.0  1.5  2.1  2.2  3.7  2.6  2.8 -2.6 -0.7
Belice  2.5 -0.2  1.8 -0.7  2.2 -0.2  3.6  8.1  2.6 1.7
Dominica  2.0  2.0  1.3  3.0  2.3  3.2  1.4  0.8 -5.2 -5.9
Grenada -1.4  3.0  2.8  2.7  4.0  7.2  7.2  6.2 -3.6 2.7
Guyana  11.0  8.9  3.3  6.9  6.2 -2.7  4.5 -2.7  1.9 1.7
Jamaica  1.3  0.7  1.3 -0.9 -2.6 -1.6 -0.2  0.1  0.9 1.1
Saint Kitts and Nevis  6.2  6.4  4.1  6.7  8.1  1.9  4.3  5.8  2.7 -1.8
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  1.3 -3.0  7.1  0.5  2.8  5.1  2.9  1.2 -0.3 3.4
Saint Lucia -2.5  3.5  0.9 -0.3 -1.5  1.9  1.7 -0.8 -6.1 -0.1
Suriname -4.4 -0.4 -0.3  4.9  3.0  2.5 -3.9 -1.7 … …
Trinidad and Tobago -2.0  3.3  3.4  3.8  3.4  7.3  3.9  5.6  2.8 2.2
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1995 prices.
Note: Totals and subtotals do not include those countries for which no information is given.
a
 Preliminary estimates.
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Table A - 3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
(Annual growth rates based on constant 1995 dollars)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 a
Latin America and the
Caribbean 4.8 10.4 -4.3 5.1 13.3 3.2 -6.4 3.9 -2.3 -6.3
Argentina 15.1 13.5 -13.0 8.8 17.5 6.7 -12.6 -6.8 -15.7 -35.0
Bolivia 2.5 -8.4 14.1 11.8 27.6 28.2 -15.3 -8.1 -21.0 2.5
Brazil 4.1 14.2 7.3 1.2 9.3 -0.3 -7.2 4.5 1.1 -5.0
Chile 17.9 6.3 23.7 8.9 10.7 1.8 -18.6 8.8 1.9 -0.2
Colombia 35.8 21.8 0.9 -1.4 -2.0 -6.3 -34.6 -0.8 22.3 4.0
Costa Rica 12.0 2.4 3.0 -8.3 14.7 25.0 -3.9 -2.4 3.7 7.9
Cuba -28.9 -29.3 7.3 36.5 3.0 4.1 6.3 1.9 1.1 -0.1
Ecuador 0.7 3.6 3.3 1.7 3.8 6.4 -34.5 9.6 37.3 22.5
El Salvador 15.4 12.4 13.3 -11.1 7.9 9.4 -0.9 4.1 0.2 3.0
Guatemala 8.3 -2.4 8.3 -2.9 23.9 19.6 5.5 -6.7 1.7 6.0
Haiti b -26.0 -34.8 123.4 11.8 7.6 -3.2 24.0 18.3 -6.8 -1.5
Honduras 35.8 -0.2 -14.3 6.2 15.8 10.3 7.0 -7.7 -3.5 -3.7
Mexico -3.2 8.5 -29.8 17.0 22.3 8.5 7.7 11.4 -5.9 -1.1
Nicaragua -6.4 15.5 13.1 8.6 19.4 12.0 39.3 -10.7 -3.2 3.5
Panama 41.5 5.5 7.8 -3.0 5.1 15.5 22.4 -6.5 -14.0 -9.5
Paraguay 3.7 4.5 7.5 0.1 -1.4 -4.7 -3.9 -0.6 -19.6 -10.0
Peru 11.5 33.6 21.5 -2.9 15.3 -1.3 -11.0 -5.0 -8.1 1.7
Dominican Republic 6.7 -2.9 -5.8 6.7 19.4 30.8 11.2 7.5 1.8 5.5
Uruguay 14.9 6.4 -5.6 8.7 9.2 8.0 -6.2 -11.1 -12.4 -30.0
Venezuela -6.1 -18.7 2.3 -7.6 26.6 -3.3 -16.4 1.1 13.6 -23.0




 Refers to gross domestic investment.
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Table A - 4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONSUMER PRICES
(December-December variations)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 a
Latin America and the
Caribbean 872.4 328.7 26.0 18.6 10.7 10.0 9.7 9.0 6.1 11.4
Argentina 7.4 3.9 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.7 -1.8 -0.7 -1.5 40.6
Barbados -1.0 2.1 2.8 1.8 3.6 1.7 2.9 3.8 -1.2 -1.4 b
Bolivia 9.3 8.5 12.6 7.9 6.7 4.4 3.1 3.4 0.9 2.3
Brazil 2 477.2 916.5 22.4 9.6 5.2 1.7 8.9 6.0 7.7 10.9
Chile 12.2 8.9 8.2 6.6 6.0 4.7 2.3 4.5 2.6 3.0
Colombia 22.6 22.6 19.5 21.6 17.7 16.7 9.2 8.8 7.6 7.1
Costa Rica 9.0 19.9 22.6 13.9 11.2 12.4 10.1 10.2 11.0 10.0
Cuba 0.0 0.0 -11.5 -4.9 1.9 2.9 -2.9 -3.0 -0.5 5.0
Ecuador 31.0 25.3 22.8 25.5 30.7 43.4 60.7 91.0 22.4 9.7
El Salvador 12.1 8.9 11.4 7.4 1.9 4.2 -1.0 4.3 1.4 1.4
Guatemala 11.6 11.6 8.6 10.9 7.1 7.5 4.9 5.1 8.9 6.3
Haiti 44.4 32.2 24.8 14.5 15.7 7.4 9.7 19.0 8.1 10.1 c
Honduras 13.0 28.9 26.8 25.3 12.8 15.7 10.9 10.1 8.8 7.7
Jamaica 30.1 26.8 25.6 15.8 9.2 7.9 6.8 6.1 8.7 5.8 d
Mexico 8.0 7.1 52.0 27.7 15.7 18.6 12.3 9.0 4.4 5.4
Nicaragua 19.5 12.4 11.1 12.1 7.2 18.5 7.2 9.9 4.7 4.2 d
Panama 0.9 1.4 0.8 2.3 -0.5 1.4 1.5 0.7 0.0 1.6 d
Paraguay 20.4 18.3 10.5 8.2 6.2 14.6 5.4 8.6 8.4 14.6
Peru 39.5 15.4 10.2 11.8 6.5 6.0 3.7 3.7 -0.1 1.5
Dominican Republic 2.8 14.3 9.2 4.0 8.4 7.8 5.1 9.0 4.4 8.8
Trinidad and Tobago 13.4 5.5 3.8 4.3 3.5 5.6 3.4 5.6 3.2 4.7 d
Uruguay 52.9 44.1 35.4 24.3 15.2 8.6 4.2 5.1 3.6 24.7
Venezuela 45.9 70.8 56.6 103.2 37.6 29.9 20.0 13.4 12.3 30.7
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by official sources in the countries.
a
 Figures correspond to the variation from November 2001 to November 2002.
b
 July 2001-July 2002.
c
 September 2001-September 2002.
d October 2001-October 2002.
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Table A - 5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT
(Average annual rates)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 a
Latin America and the Caribbean b 6.6  6.3  7.5  8.0  7.8  8.1  8.9  8.4  8.4  9.1
Argentina Urban areas c  9.6  11.5  17.5  17.2  14.9  12.9  14.3  15.1  17.4  21.0 d
Barbados e Total national  24.3  21.9  19.7  15.6  14.5  12.3  10.4  9.2  9.9  10.5
Bolivia Departmental capitals  5.8  3.1  3.6  3.8  4.4  6.1  8.0  7.5  8.5 …
Brazil Six metropolitan areas  5.4  5.1  4.6  5.4  5.7  7.6  7.6  7.1  6.2  7.3 f
Chile Total national  6.5  7.8  7.4  6.4  6.1  6.4  9.8  9.2  9.1  9.0 f
Colombia e Seven metropolitan areas  8.6  8.9  8.8  11.2  12.4  15.3  19.4  17.2  18.2  17.6 f
Costa Rica Total urban  4.0  4.3  5.7  6.6  5.9  5.4  6.2  5.3  5.8  6.8
Cuba Total national  6.2  6.7  7.9  7.6  7.0  6.6  6.0  5.5  4.1  3.5
Ecuador e Total urban g  8.9  7.8  7.7  10.4  9.3  11.5  14.4  14.1  10.4  8.7 f
El Salvador Total urban  8.1  7.0  7.0  7.5  7.5  7.6  6.9  6.5  7.0  7.1 h
Guatemala i Total national  2.6  3.5  3.9  5.2  5.1  3.8 ... ... … ...
Honduras Total urban  7.0  4.0  5.6  6.5  5.8  5.2  5.3 ...  5.9  6.2
Jamaica e Total national  16.3  15.4  16.2  16.0  16.5  15.5  15.7  15.5  15.0 ...
Mexico Urban areas c  3.4  3.7  6.2  5.5  3.7  3.2  2.5  2.2  2.5  2.8 f
Nicaragua i Total national  17.8  17.1  16.9  16.0  14.3  13.2  10.7  9.8  10.7  12.9
Panama e Total urban j  15.6  16.0  16.6  16.9  15.5  15.2  14.0  15.2  17.0  16.1
Paraguay Total urban k  5.1  4.4  5.3  8.2  7.1  6.6  9.4  10.0  10.8 …
Peru Metropolitan Lima  9.9  8.8  8.2  8.0  9.2  8.5  9.2  8.5  9.3  9.4 f
Dominican Republic e Total national  19.9  16.0  15.8  16.5  15.9  14.3  13.8  13.9  15.4  16.1 l
Trinidad and Tobago e Total national  19.8  18.4  17.2  16.2  15.0  14.2  13.2  12.2  10.7  11.0
Uruguay Total urban  8.3  9.2  10.3  11.9  11.5  10.1  11.3  13.6  15.3  17.0 h
Venezuela Total national  6.6  8.7  10.3  11.8  11.4  11.3  14.9  14.0  13.4  15.8 h
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
b In 1992 does not include the Caribbean countries.
c Covers a large and increasing number of urban areas.
d Estimate.
e Includes hidden unemployment.
f Estimate based on average January-October.
g As of 1999: Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca.
h First three quarters.
 i Official estimates.
 j Up to 1999 figures correspond to the metropolitan region.
k Up to 1993, figures correspond to the metropolitan area of Asunción.
 l April.
m Estimate based on average January-September.
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Table A - 6
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AVERAGE REAL WAGES
(Average annual indices: 1995 = 100)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 a
Argentina b 101.7 100.4 101.1 100.0 99.9 99.3 99.0 100.1 101.6 100.4 84.9 c
Bolivia d 85.5 91.2 98.5 100.0 98.5 104.5 108.0 113.7 114.8 119.4 122.0 e
Brazil f 87.0 95.6 96.3 100.0 107.9 110.8 110.8 105.9 104.8 99.6 97.3 c
Chile g 88.7 91.8 96.1 100.0 104.1 106.6 109.5 112.1 113.7 115.5 118.1 h
Colombia i 93.8 98.1 99.0 100.0 101.7 104.4 103.1 109.0 113.3 113.6 118.8 j
Costa Rica k 89.2 98.3 102.0 100.0 97.9 98.7 104.3 109.2 110.1 112.3 113.0
Mexico b 100.7 109.7 114.9 100.0 90.1 89.1 91.5 92.4 98.0 104.5 106.0 c
Nicaragua 100.5 93.3 98.2 100.0 97.9 97.7 104.9 109.6 111.3 116.1 122.4 l
Paraguay 90.9 91.7 93.0 100.0 103.1 102.6 100.7 98.6 99.9 101.3 96.3 e
Peru m 95.2 94.4 109.2 100.0 95.2 94.5 92.7 90.7 91.4 90.6 94.3 n
Uruguay 97.3 102.0 102.9 100.0 100.6 100.8 102.7 104.3 102.9 102.7 93.4 h
Venezuela o 136.5 124.4 104.8 100.0 76.7 96.3 101.5 96.8 98.3 100.7 93.0 c
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
b Manufacturing.
c Estimate based on average January-September.
d Private sector in La Paz.
e First semester.
f Workers covered by social and labour legislation.
g Until April 1993, non-agricultural workers; from May 1993 on, general index of hourly wages.
h Estimate based on average January-October.
i Manual workers in manufacturing.
j Estimate based on average January-August.
k Average wages declared by workers covered by social security. In 2002, all workers.
l Average January-July.
m Private-sector manual workers in the Lima metropolitan area.
n March.
o Private sector.
Preliminary overview of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 113
Table A -7
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PUBLIC-SECTOR DEFICIT (-) OR SURPLUS
(Percentages of GDP)
Coverage 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 a
Latin America and
the Caribbean -1.4 -1.8 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 -2.4 -2.8 -2.5 -3.2 -3.3
Argentina NNFPS 1.5 -0.3 -0.6 -2.1 -1.6 -1.5 -1.7 -2.5 -3.1 -1.4
Bolivia NFPS -6.1 -3.0 -1.8 -1.9 -3.5 -4.7 -3.5 -3.8 -6.5 -6.9
Brazil b NFPS -0.8 1.1 -4.9 -3.4 -4.3 -7.4 -3.4 -1.2 -1.4 -2.1
Chile CG 2.0 1.7 2.6 2.3 2.0 0.4 -1.5 0.1 -0.3 -0.9
Colombia NFPS 0.1 1.0 -0.6 -2.0 -3.1 -3.4 -5.1 -3.7 -3.6 -4.0
Costa Rica CG -1.5 -5.5 -3.5 -4.0 -3.0 -2.5 -2.3 -3.0 -2.9 -4.3
Ecuador NFPS -0.1 0.6 -1.1 -3.0 -2.6 -5.7 -4.7 1.7 0.7 …
El Salvador CG -1.5 -0.8 -0.5 -2.0 -1.1 -2.0 -2.1 -2.3 -3.6 -2.7
Guatemala CG -1.5 -1.4 -0.5 0.0 -0.8 -2.2 -2.8 -1.9 -2.0 -1.1
Haiti CG -3.2 -3.3 -4.8 -1.6 -2.0 -2.4 -2.4 -2.6 -2.7 -2.9
Honduras CG -9.9 -7.0 -4.2 -3.8 -2.9 -1.1 -4.0 -5.9 -7.3 -5.2
Mexico NFPS 0.7 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -0.7 -0.7
Nicaragua CG  0.0 -5.2 -0.5 -1.5 -1.3 -1.9 -4.9 -7.8 -11.5 -9.0
Panama CG  0.5 -0.8  0.9 -1.3 -0.9 -3.2 -0.7 -2.2 -2.7 -2.0
Paraguay CG -0.5  1.7 -0.2 -0.8 -1.3 -1.0 -3.6 -4.3 -1.1 -2.5
Peru CG -3.6 -3.1 -3.4 -1.5 -0.9 -1.1 -3.1 -2.7 -2.8 -2.3
Dominican Republic CG  0.3 -0.6  1.1  0.0  0.9  0.6 -0.5  1.1  0.4 -2.1
Uruguay CG -1.0 -1.9 -1.9 -1.8 -1.6 -1.2 -3.8 -4.2 -4.7 -4.3
Venezuela CG -2.9 -7.2 -4.3  0.6  1.9 -4.1 -2.6 -1.6 -4.3 -4.5
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
Note:   Abbreviations used: CG = central government. NFPS = non-financial public sector. NNFPS = national non-financial public sector (does not
include provinces or municipalities). Totals and subtotals do not include those countries for which no information is given.
a
 Preliminary estimate.
b Operational financial balance.
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Table A -8
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INDICES OF THE REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE FOR IMPORTS a
(Indices: 2000=100, CPI used in the calculations)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 b
Latin America and the
Caribbeanc 106.5 105.6 103.8 101.2 96.5 96.0 99.5 100.0 98.3 105.9
Argentina 105.2 104.4 110.4 112.5 109.2 106.8 99.4 100.0 95.6 227.3
Barbados 99.2 100.9 103.6 102.5 97.0 99.5 100.4 100.0 98.7 101.6
Bolivia 103.1 108.7 111.1 104.3 102.4 98.3 97.2 100.0 101.3 96.8
Brazil 82.4 82.5 73.4 69.0 68.1 71.4 107.6 100.0 119.1 125.4
Chile 111.1 107.3 100.2 97.1 91.2 93.9 98.7 100.0 111.8 106.5
Colombia 107.3 87.2 85.6 79.2 74.6 80.2 91.1 100.0 102.4 102.4
Costa Rica 95.4 95.7 92.9 91.4 93.9 95.6 99.9 100.0 97.2 97.7
Ecuador 68.4 65.8 67.2 68.2 66.1 65.1 89.3 100.0 69.7 61.3
El Salvador 122.9 115.2 108.0 100.3 99.4 98.5 99.4 100.0 99.6 99.6
Guatemala 104.3 99.0 92.8 89.4 84.7 85.2 97.4 100.0 95.3 88.5
Honduras 124.0 136.5 121.2 123.9 116.8 106.8 103.3 100.0 96.9 96.7
Jamaica 134.0 135.4 126.5 105.5 94.4 92.0 96.2 100.0 97.1 96.4
Mexico 100.3 103.0 152.1 135.5 117.7 117.9 108.2 100.0 92.9 92.1
Nicaragua 78.1 90.5 94.9 96.5 100.5 100.0 101.3 100.0 101.0 102.8
Paraguay 100.1 94.1 92.9 89.6 88.3 98.2 96.3 100.0 103.4 105.7
Peru 97.5 92.4 92.2 91.0 91.6 92.9 101.1 100.0 97.8 94.6
Dominican Republic 101.2 98.0 95.0 89.6 90.8 97.5 101.8 100.0 96.8 97.2
Trinidad and Tobago 90.0 93.7 98.1 93.7 99.9 100.2 101.4 100.0 92.9 88.0
Uruguay 123.4 112.9 107.8 107.1 105.1 104.6 98.0 100.0 102.1 115.1
Venezuela 181.7 189.0 149.5 178.5 139.1 114.5 102.4 100.0 94.0 121.6
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and figures provided by the International Monetary Fund.
a
 The average of the indices for the real (main official) exchange rate for the currency of each country against the currencies of its main trading partners,
weighted according to the relative magnitude of imports from the countries. The weightings reflect the average for 1995-1998. As of 2000, the weightings
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Table A - 9
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS OF GOODS FOB
(Indices: 1995 = 100)
Value Unit value Volume
2000 2001 2002a 2000 2001 2002a 2000 2001 2002a
Latin America and the
Caribbean 156.1 150.0 150.3 97.1 91.3 90.1 160.7 164.2 166.8
Argentina 124.8 126.0 119.7 91.6 88.4 88.0 136.2 142.5 136.0
Bolivia 119.7 123.4 118.4 99.1 94.5 89.8 120.7 130.6 131.9
Brazil 118.4 125.2 129.7 85.6 83.0 78.4 138.4 150.8 165.3
Chile 120.1 115.5 112.4 71.0 63.5 60.3 169.2 181.9 186.3
Colombia 128.6 120.6 117.0 109.0 99.7 96.7 118.0 121.0 121.0
Costa Rica 167.0 141.4 149.9 87.9 83.4 80.9 189.9 169.5 185.3
Ecuador 115.0 108.8 110.1 115.1 102.8 107.9 99.9 105.9 102.0
El Salvador 179.4 175.6 179.9 92.0 86.5 84.6 195.0 203.0 212.7
Guatemala 142.9 132.8 127.5 79.7 74.9 73.0 179.2 177.3 174.8
Haiti 216.6 199.6 176.7 97.0 94.2 92.3 223.3 211.9 191.4
Honduras 137.0 136.5 132.3 95.1 89.6 85.1 144.1 152.4 155.4
Mexico 209.3 199.2 200.1 101.7 98.1 98.6 205.8 203.1 203.0
Nicaragua 147.5 139.2 137.8 86.3 76.7 75.5 171.0 181.5 182.3
Panama 95.9 98.4 85.8 103.8 100.7 98.9 92.3 97.8 86.7
Paraguay 55.4 55.8 54.1 90.8 87.7 85.9 61.0 63.6 62.9
Peru 125.9 127.2 138.6 75.6 69.6 71.9 166.5 182.7 192.8
Dominican Republic 151.8 139.6 136.8 94.6 92.7 90.8 160.4 150.6 150.6
Uruguay 111.0 99.8 89.8 82.1 79.6 78.8 135.2 125.4 114.0
Venezuela 173.1 141.8 144.6 141.0 114.8 118.2 122.8 123.5 122.3
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the International Monetary Fund and national agencies.
a
 Preliminary figures.
Table A - 10
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: IMPORTS OF GOODS, FOB
(Indices: 1995 = 100)
Value Unit value Volume
2000 2001 2002a 2000 2001 2002a 2000 2001 2002a
Latin America and the
Caribbean 156.4 152.6 141.5 94.0 91.0 90.0 166.3 167.8 157.3
Argentina 126.8 101.8 42.8 84.2 81.7 80.1 150.6 124.6 53.4
Bolivia 129.5 122.1 125.7 88.5 85.5 83.8 146.4 142.8 150.1
Brazil 112.4 111.9 96.2 94.2 91.5 90.1 119.3 122.3 106.8
Chile 116.7 112.1 105.4 96.5 92.7 89.9 121.0 120.9 117.2
Colombia 84.4 93.4 91.0 94.1 91.3 89.5 89.7 102.3 101.7
Costa Rica 158.4 151.0 172.6 91.8 88.3 86.5 172.5 171.0 199.5
Ecuador 82.5 117.4 141.9 93.0 90.0 88.4 88.7 130.5 160.6
El Salvador 151.0 154.5 153.5 111.2 107.9 106.4 135.8 143.2 144.3
Guatemala 156.4 169.6 181.9 94.1 90.3 89.2 166.2 187.8 203.9
Haiti 164.9 162.0 150.2 110.1 105.7 105.2 149.8 153.3 142.8
Honduras 169.9 179.1 171.8 91.6 88.2 86.2 185.5 203.1 199.3
Mexico 240.8 232.4 230.8 94.7 91.4 90.2 254.3 254.3 255.8
Nicaragua 186.9 184.8 178.9 111.6 108.2 107.1 167.5 170.8 167.0
Panama 104.5 99.9 97.6 104.0 100.4 100.0 100.5 99.5 97.6
Paraguay 64.7 64.2 56.5 107.8 104.2 102.6 60.0 61.7 55.1
Peru 94.8 92.8 95.8 93.5 89.8 88.5 101.4 103.4 108.3
Dominican Republic 183.3 169.4 168.9 92.7 89.5 87.9 197.8 189.3 192.2
Uruguay 122.2 107.5 75.3 95.2 91.4 89.1 128.3 117.6 84.5
Venezuela 128.4 143.2 104.5 89.6 87.1 86.2 143.3 164.4 121.2




Table A - 11
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF TRADE (GOODS), FOB/FOB
(Indices: 1995 = 100)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 a
Latin America and the
Caribbean 94.2 98.8 100.0 100.8 102.8 97.2 97.5 103.3 100.4 100.1
Argentina 104.8 105.6 100.0 108.5 108.9 103.9 98.5 108.8 108.2 109.9
Bolivia 88.3 102.5 100.0 111.7 115.6 109.9 109.8 112.0 110.5 107.1
Brazil 79.9 91.5 100.0 98.0 103.8 103.8 93.6 90.9 90.7 87.0
Chile 74.2 84.1 100.0 80.7 83.0 73.3 73.5 73.6 68.5 67.1
Colombia 91.0 104.9 100.0 103.7 104.4 95.8 102.6 115.8 109.2 108.1
Costa Rica 84.5 93.9 100.0 94.9 100.6 103.9 102.8 95.8 94.5 93.5
Ecuador 106.4 108.9 100.0 109.6 111.9 99.6 106.2 123.8 114.2 122.1
El Salvador 63.7 81.0 100.0 93.6 94.1 91.8 86.9 82.7 80.2 79.5
Guatemala 84.3 89.9 100.0 87.7 94.8 94.3 87.2 84.7 82.9 81.8
Haiti 94.1 96.8 100.0 90.6 94.8 96.6 95.3 88.1 89.1 87.8
Honduras 90.3 92.1 100.0 92.8 115.4 118.0 110.2 103.8 101.6 98.8
Mexico 104.9 103.3 100.0 102.8 104.0 100.4 102.3 107.4 107.3 109.3
Nicaragua 81.3 95.5 100.0 88.1 83.9 87.4 81.1 77.3 70.9 70.5
Panama 106.8 110.1 100.0 101.3 103.4 103.3 105.9 99.8 100.3 98.9
Paraguay 87.2 105.1 100.0 100.0 99.9 92.4 87.7 84.2 84.2 83.7
Peru 89.1 95.7 100.0 96.5 103.2 89.7 83.3 80.9 77.5 81.3
Dominican Republic 90.7 95.6 100.0 97.7 102.0 103.1 104.0 102.0 103.6 103.4
Uruguay 94.6 94.7 100.0 96.7 96.4 103.1 94.9 86.2 87.1 88.4





LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(Millions of dollars)
Exports of goods Imports of goods
Balance on goods Balance on services(f.o.b.) and services (f.o.b.) and services
2000 2001 2002 a 2000 2001 2002 a 2000 2001 2002 a 2000 2001 2002 a
Latin America and
the Caribbean 407,395 392,026 392,530 420,493 412,197 381,450 4,469 -1,175 24,749 -17,568 -18,995 -13,669
Argentina 31,092 30,846 29,322 32,822 27,360 13,742 2,558 7,507 17,280 -4,288 -4,021 -1,700
Bolivia 1,470 1,521 1,463 2,078 1,996 2,051  339 -209 -305 -269 -266 -282
Brazil 64,469 67,545 69,567 72,774 72,652 62,138 -730 2,642 12,500 -7,574 -7,749 -5,071
Chile 22,971 22,315 21,870 21,702 21,221 20,271 2,154 2,094 2,576 -886 -999 -978
Colombia 15,668 14,971 14,568 14,399 15,844 15,540 2,531  510  431 -1,261 -1,383 -1,404
Costa Rica 7,748 6,820 7,158 7,295 6,911 7,796 -211 -821 -1,347  665  729  709
Ecuador 5,987 5,774 5,940 5,012 6,754 7,943 1,395 -462 -1,516 -420 -518 -487
El Salvador 3,662 3,977 3,870 5,636 5,892 5,814 -1,740 -1,913 -1,809 -235 -2 -136
Guatemala 3,860 3,896 3,809 5,568 6,040 6,441 -1,660 -2,278 -2,765 -48  133  133
Haiti  503  442  427 1,336 1,300 1,230 -743 -750 -708 -90 -108 -95
Honduras 2,464 2,447 2,371 3,318 3,498 3,315 -668 -820 -767 -185 -231 -177
Mexico 180,167 171,103 171,700 190,494 184,614 183,500 -8,003 -9,954 -8,000 -2,323 -3,558 -3,800
Nicaragua  956  919  906 1,991 1,982 1,923 -920 -942 -898 -115 -121 -119
Panama 7,820 8,010 7,800 8,099 7,817 7,722 -1,143 -675 -1,295  864  868 1,374
Paraguay 2,926 2,907 2,782 3,335 3,278 2,938 -568 -532 -256  160  160  100
Peru 8,614 8,597 9,267 9,723 9,487 9,809 -317 -90  319 -793 -800 -861
Dominican
Republic 8,964 8,366 8,091 10,852 10,056 9,978 -3,741.8 -3,484.5 -3,563.7 1,854.3 1,794.9 1,677
Uruguay 3,659 3,276 2,859 4,193 3,718 2,672 -927 -771 -111  394  329  298
Venezuela 34,394 28,296 28,760 19,868 21,775 16,628 17,544 9,774 14,981 -3,018 -3,253 -2,849
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Table A -12 (continued)
Trade balance Current transfers Balance  on the Balance on theincome accounts current account
2000 2001 2002 a 2000 2001 2002 a 2000 2001 2002 a 2000 2001 2002 a
Latin America and
the Caribbean -13,098 -20,170 11,080 20,272 23,547 25,562 -53,435 -54,718 -52,513 -46,262 -51,341 -15,871
Argentina -1,730 3,486 15,580  235  180  200 -7,370 -8,095 -6,499 -8,864 -4,429 9,282
Bolivia -608 -475 -588  387  393  373 -226 -210 -200 -447 -292 -415
Brazil -8,305 -5,107 7,429 1,521 1,638 2,350 -17,886 -19,747 -18,380 -24,669 -23,217 -8,601
Chile 1,269 1,094 1,598  454  422  521 -2,795 -2,757 -2,645 -1,073 -1,241 -526
Colombia 1,269 -873 -973 1,668 2,085 1,962 -2,514 -2,750 -2,887  424 -1,538 -1,897
Costa Rica  453 -92 -638  92  148  155 -1,252 -793 -422 -707 -737 -905
Ecuador  975 -981 -2,003 1,352 1,545 1,500 -1,411 -1,268 -1,200  916 -704 -1,703
El Salvador -1,975 -1,915 -1,945 1,797 2,004 2,049 -253 -266 -342 -431 -177 -238
Guatemala -1,708 -2,145 -2,631  868  997 1,680 -209 -90 -251 -1,049 -1,238 -1,202
Haiti -833 -858 -803  771  769  775 -9 -8 -17 -71 -97 -45
Honduras -853 -1,051 -944  747  871  760 -151 -146 -77 -258 -326 -262
Mexico -10,326 -13,511 -11,800 6,994 9,338 10,100 -14,827 -13,829 -13,300 -18,160 -18,002 -15,000
Nicaragua -1,035 -1,063 -1,017  320  336  375 -202 -249 -195 -917 -976 -837
Panama -279  193  78  177  198  209 -614 -545 -377 -716 -154 -90
Paraguay -408 -371 -156  177  167  120  40 -16 -60 -192 -220 -96
Peru -1,109 -890 -542  993  999  904 -1,452 -1,203 -1,573 -1,568 -1,094 -1,211
Dominican
Republic -1,888 -1,690 -1,887 1,902 2,028 2,149 -1,041 -1,089 -1,177 -1,026 -751 -915
Uruguay -533 -442  187  28  43  40 -61 -114 -110 -567 -512  117
Venezuela 14,526 6,521 12,132 -211 -610 -660 -1,203 -1,546 -2,800 13,112 4,365 8,672
Table A - 12 (concluded)
Balance on the capital Overall balance Reserve assets 
c IMF loans and credit and
and financial accounts b (variation) exceptional financing
2000 2001 2002a 2000 2001 2002a 2000 2001 2002a 2000 2001 2002a
Latin America and
the Caribbean 60,962 32,974 -1,377 14,700 -18,367 -17,248 -7,309 1,196 2,463 -7,696 17,172 14,785
Argentina 7,647 -17,030 -17,282 -1,218 -21,459 -8,000 439 12,083 4,000 778 9,376 4,000
Bolivia 408 255 296 -39 -37 -118 39 34 117 0 4 1
Brazil 32,731 19,766 -76 8,061 -3,450 -8,677 2,262 -3,307 177 -10,323 6,757 8,500
Chile 1,410 645 1,326 337 -596 800 -337 596 -800 0 0 0
Colombia 445 2,756 2,197 869 1,218 300 -869 -1,218 -300 0 0 0
Costa Rica 555 750 990 -152 13 85 -152 -13 -85 0 0 0
Ecuador -6,623 474 1,578 -5,707 -230 -125 -307 106 -65 6,014 124 190
El Salvador 385 -1 208 -46 -178 -30 46 178 30 0 0 0
Guatemala 1,703 1,712 1,128 654 474 -75 -654 -474 75 0 0 0
Haiti 26 99 -25 -45 2 -70 57 -5 40 -12 4 31
Honduras 191 342 386 -66 16 124 -119 -147 -258 185 132 134
Mexico 25,269 25,327 19,600 7,110 7,325 4,600 -2,824 -7,325 -4,600 -4,286 0 0
Nicaragua 717 710 561 -199 -266 -275 16 114 19 183 152 256
Panama 388 -150 -40 -328 -304 -130 109 -479 130 219 783 0
Paraguay -145 164 -25 -336 -56 -121 207 58 121 129 -1 0
Peru 1,437 1,511 2,256 -131 417 1,045 190 -448 -1,100 -58 31 55
Dominican
Republic 979 1,264 353 -48 513 -562 70 -519 562 -22 5 0
Uruguay 733 815 -4,135 167 302 -4,018 -167 -297 2,400 0 -5 1,618
Venezuela -7,294 -6,435 -10,672 5,818 -2,070 -2,000 -5,314 2,259 2,000 -504 -189 0
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the International Monetary Fund and national agencies.
a
  Preliminary estimates.
b
  Includes errors and omissions.
c
  A minus sign (-) indicates an increase in reserve assets.
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Table A - 13
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTa b
(Millions of dollars)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 c
Latin America and
the Caribbean 10,383 24,231 25,299 40,032 55,876 60,876 79,741 67,711 68,081 38,974
Argentina d 2,089 2,622 4,111 5,349 5,508 4,968 22,633 10,654 3,304 1,500
Bolivia 125 147 391 472 728 952 983 693 647 721
Brazil 801 2,035 3,475 11,666 17,877 26,002 26,888 30,498 24,894 13,402
Chile 600 1,672 2,205 3,681 3,809 3,144 6,203 -348 3,045 858
Colombia 719 1,298 712 2,784 4,753 2,032 1,336 1,905 2,386 1,864
Costa Rica 243 292 331 421 402 607 614 400 445 424
Ecuador 474 576 452 500 724 870 648 720 1,330 1,335
El Salvador e 16 0 0 0 59 1,103 162 178 277 317
Guatemala 143 65 75 77 85 673 155 230 456 110
Haiti -2 -3 -2 4 4 11 30 13 4 8
Honduras 52 42 69 90 128 99 237 262 195 179
Mexico f 4,389 10,973 9,526 9,185 12,830 11,602 12,476 15,318 25,221 13,500
Nicaragua 40 40 75 97 173 184 300 265 132 171
Panama 156 411 267 410 1,300 1,296 652 603 513 350
Paraguay 75 138 98 144 230 336 89 74 152 74
Peru 687 3,108 2,048 3,242 1,697 1,880 1,969 662 1,063 1,943
Dominican Republic 189 207 414 97 421 700 1,338 953 1,015 850
Uruguay 102 155 157 137 113 155 238 274 319 168
Venezuela -514 455 894 1,676 5,036 4,262 2,789 4,357 2,684 1,200
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the International Monetary Fund and national agencies.
a  Refers to direct investment in the reporting economy minus direct investment abroad by residents. For some countries this information is not available.
Includes reinvested earnings.
b  In accordance with the fifth edition of the IMF Balance of Payments Manual, all transactions between non-financial direct investment enterprises and
their parent companies and affiliates are included in direct investment.
c  Preliminary figures.
d  In 1999, includes the value of the investment by REPSOL in Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales. Part of this amount corresponds to the purchase of
shares in the company held by non-residents. In the balance of payments, the value of those shares is reflected in a debt under the portfolio investment
item.
e   The Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador has kept systematic records of foreign direct investment since 1998.
f  Includes the value of the investment by City Group in BANAMEX.
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Table A - 14
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES a
(Millions of dollars)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 b
Latin America and
the Caribbean 12,577 28,794 17,931 23,071 46,915 52,003 39,511 38,707 35,615 33,579 16,237
Argentina 1,570 6,308 5,319 6,354 14,070 14,662 15,615 14,183 13,025 1,501 -
Brazil 3,655 6,465 3,998 7,041 11,545 14,940 9,190 8,586 11,382 12,239 6,475
Chile 120 322 155 300 2,020 1,800 1,063 1,764 680 1,536 964
Colombia - 567 955 1,083 1,867 1,000 1,389 1,676 1,547 4,263 1,000
Costa Rica - - 50 - - - 200 300 250 250 250
Ecuador - - - 10 - 625 - - - - -
El Salvador - - - - - - - 150 50 354 1,252
Grenada - - - - - - - - - - 100
Guatemala - 60 - - - 150 - - - 325 -
Jamaica - - 55 - - 225 250 - 421 691 300
Mexico 6,100 11,339 6,949 7,646 16,353 15,657 8,444 9,854 7,078 9,232 4,066
Paraguay c - - - - - - - 400 - - -
Peru - 30 100 - - 250 150 - - - 1,430
Dominican
Republic - - - - - 200 - - - 500 -
Trinidad and Tobago 100 125 150 71 150 - - 230 250 - -
Uruguay 100 140 200 211 145 479 550 350 443 1,106 400
Venezuela 932 3 438 - 356 765 2,015 2,660 1,215 489 1,583 -
Source: International Monetary Fund, Research Department, Emerging Markets Studies Division.
a Gross issues. Includes medium-term euronotes.
b Preliminary estimates.
c Official information.
Table A - 15
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INDICES OF STOCK EXCHANGE PRICES IN DOLLARS a
(Indices: June 1997 = 100)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 b
Latin America  77.4  76.2  62.5  72.5  90.6 56.0  88.0 74.6 63.5 52.8
Argentina  84.9  63.6  69.1  82.1  96.3 68.9  91.9 68.9 33.4 21.8
Brazil  38.2  64.0  49.8  64.9  78.3 44.9  75.0 68.7 46.9 32.6
Chile  67.8  95.8  93.0  77.0  79.6 55.7  75.4 64.8 59.6 50.4
Colombia  81.6  103.5  77.1  80.5  99.9 56.4  45.1 24.8 29.5 32.2
Mexico  156.0  91.1  66.5  77.3  114.1 69.5  125.4 99.8 102.9 97.0
Peru  43.9  66.8  73.1  73.6  83.8 50.5  61.1 44.1 48.3 61.5
Venezuela  65.6  47.8  32.7  75.7  93.3 44.9  39.3 49.7 42.9 27.1
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the International Finance Corporation.
a Figures at end of month, general index.
b At the end of November.
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Table A - 16
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL DISBURSED EXTERNAL DEBTa
(Millions of dollars)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 b
Latin America and
the Caribbean 528,037 564,399 619,233 641,306 666,505 747,630 763,684 740,472 727,833 725,074
Argentina 72,209 85,656 98,547 110,613 125,052 141,929 145,289 146,338 139,783 132,900 c
Bolivia d 3,784 3,777 4,216 4,523 4,366 4,234 4,390 4,461 4,412 4,228 e
Brazil 145,726 148,295 159,256 179,935 199,998 241,644 241,468 236,157 226,067 228,723 f
Chile 19,665 21,768 21,736 22,979 26,701 31,691 34,167 36,477 38,032 39,204 g
Colombia 18,908 21,855 26,341 31,116 34,412 36,606 36,662 36,398 39,781 37,800 h
Costa Rica 4,011 4,133 4,209 3,289 3,086 3,402 3,641 3,742 3,951 4,175 h
Cuba 8,785 9,083 10,504 10,465 10,146 11,209 11,078 10,961 11,100 12,210 h
Ecuador 13,631 14,589 13,934 14,586 15,099 16,400 16,282 13,564 14,411 15,898 g
El Salvador  d 1,976 2,056 2,168 2,517 2,689 2,632 2,789 2,832 3,148 4,022 h
Guatemala 2,347 2,895 2,947 3,026 3,197 3,618 3,831 3,929 4,100 4,200 h
Guyana 2,062 2,004 2,058 1,537 1,514 1,500 1,196 1,250 1,250 1,200 h
Haiti  d 866 875 898 914 1,025 1,100 1,166 1,180 1,189 1,212
Honduras 3,850 4,040 4,243 4,121 4,073 4,404 4,729 4,721 4,802 4,715 h
Jamaica 3,687 3,652 3,452 3,232 3,278 3,306 3,024 3,375 4,146 4,231 g
Mexico  i 130,500 139,800 165,600 157,200 149,028 160,258 166,381 148,652 144,534 141,000 h
Nicaragua d 10,987 11,695 10,248 6,094 6,001 6,287 6,549 6,660 6,374 6,242 h
Panama  d 5,264 5,505 5,891 5,070 5,051 5,349 5,568 5,604 6,263 6,218 h
Paraguay 1,254 1,271 1,741 1,801 1,927 2,133 2,697 2,701 2,586 2,586 h
Peru 27,447 30,191 33,378 33,805 28,642 29,477 28,704 28,150 27,508 28,555 h
Dominican Republic 4,562 3,946 3,999 3,807 3,572 3,537 3,636 3,685 4,180 4,300 c
Trinidad and Tobago 2,102 2,064 1,905 1,877 1,565 1,471 1,585 1,680 1,638 1,614 f
Uruguay  d 3,578 4,251 4,426 4,682 4,754 5,195 5,618 6,116 5,855 6,981 c
Venezuela 40,836 40,998 37,537 34,117 31,328 30,248 33,235 31,840 32,724 32,859 c
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Includes debt owed to the International Monetary Fund.
b Preliminary figures.
c Balance in August 2002.
d External public debt.
e Balance in June 2002.
f Balance in September 2002.
g Balance in July 2002.
h Balance in October 2002.
i Public debt does not include investment by non-residents in government securities.
Preliminary overview of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 121
Table A - 17
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET EXTERNAL RESOURCE TRANSFERSa
(Millions of dollars)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 b
Latin America and
the Caribbean 31,470 10,356 19,784 22,441 35,398 28,055 -3,163 -169 -4,572 -39,104
Argentina 9,416 8,145 447 5,259 9,392 10,653 5,768 1,055 -15,749 -19,780
Bolivia 200 46 250 459 433 638 324 182 49 98
Brazil -1,714 -896 19,599 19,743 7,664 7,291 -1,250 4,522 6,776 -9,956
Chile 1,070 2,004 -626 1,748 4,374 -39 -2,575 -1,386 -2,112 -1,319
Colombia 784 2,414 2,994 4,414 3,805 2,070 -2,343 -2,069 6 -689
Costa Rica 464 273 311 2 448 -97 -660 -698 -43 568
Ecuador 428 543 -108 -740 -318 468 -2,717 -2,019 -670 568
El Salvador 123 36 338 243 297 231 165 132 -267 -134
Guatemala 704 586 210 356 717 1,100 709 1,494 1,622 876
Haiti 54 22 158 -13 99 7 81 5 95 -12
Honduras -4 151 51 110 254 150 551 225 328 443
Mexico 17,911 -1,741 -1,464 -9,659 5,387 4,945 1,661 6,157 11,498 6,300
Nicaragua 360 524 402 610 836 604 1,051 699 613 622
Panama -97 -133 32 181 1,119 402 640 -7 88 -418
Paraguay 84 734 262 423 478 189 287 25 147 -85
Peru 1,331 3,729 3,045 3,722 3,320 1,140 -502 -73 340 738
Dominican Republic -9 -785 -455 -527 -593 -453 -352 -84 181 -824
Uruguay 230 294 203 185 485 798 482 673 695 -2,627
Venezuela 134 -5,590 -5,864 -4,076 -2,797 -2,042 -4,484 -9,001 -8,170 -13,472
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the International Monetary Fund and national agencies.
a The net transfer of resources is equal to net capital inflows (including non-autonomous flows and errors and omissions) minus the balance on the
income account (net payments of profits and interest). Negative figures indicate net outward resource transfers.
b Preliminary figures.
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Table A - 18
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET CAPITAL INFLOWS AND
NET EXTERNAL RESOURCE TRANSFERS
(Billions of dollars and percentages)
Resource
Net capital Net payments
Resource
Exports transfers as a
inflows of profits of goods percentage of
and interest transfers and services  exports of goods
and services
(percentages)Autonomous a Non-autonomous b Total
5 = (3) - (4) (7) = (5) / (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7)
1980 29.2 1.7 30.9 18.9 12.0 106.9 11.2
1981 38.4 1.8 40.2 29.1 11.1 115.6 9.6
1982 3.3 17.2 20.5 38.9 -18.4 105.2 -17.5
1983 -22.1 30.1 8.0 34.5 -26.5 105.4 -25.1
1984 -10.6 23.9 13.3 37.5 -24.2 117.5 -20.6
1985 -16.0 20.3 4.3 35.5 -31.2 112.8 -27.7
1986 -12.1 21.8 9.7 32.7 -23.0 99.2 -23.1
1987 -13.7 26.5 12.8 30.9 -18.1 113.3 -16.0
1988 -19.4 22.8 3.4 34.6 -31.2 130.6 -23.9
1989 -19.7 29.3 9.6 39.1 -29.5 145.8 -20.2
1990 -7.3 24.3 17.0 34.4 -17.4 161.4 -10.8
1991 23.0 12.8 35.8 31.6 4.2 164.0 2.6
1992 49.1 7.8 56.9 30.4 26.5 177.6 14.9
1993 61.3 4.9 66.2 34.7 31.5 194.1 16.2
1994 42.3 4.4 46.7 36.6 10.1 223.3 4.5
1995 30.2 30.0 60.2 40.9 19.4 266.0 7.3
1996 66.8 -1.4 65.4 42.8 22.7 294.3 7.7
1997 84.6 -4.0 80.6 48.2 32.3 326.7 9.9
1998 69.5 8.9 78.4 51.2 27.2 326.1 8.3
1999 43.3 5.8 49.1 52.2 -3.1 341.0 -0.9
2000 61.0 -7.7 53.3 53.4 -0.2 407.4 0.0
2001 33.0 17.2 50.1 54.7 -4.6 392.0 -1.2
2002 c -1.4 14.8 13.4 52.5 -39.1 392.5 -10.0
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the International Monetary Fund and national agencies.
a Includes errors and omissions.
b Includes IMF loans and credit and exceptional financing (includes transactions such as debt forgiveness and accumulation of arrears).
c Preliminary figures.
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Table A - 19
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF TOTAL ACCRUED INTEREST
TO EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES a
(Percentages)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 b
Latin America and
the Caribbean 18.3 17.2 17.2 16.2 15.4 16.6 16.5 14.5 14.5 12.9
Argentina 23.2 26.5 27.8 27.8 29.0 34.6 40.8 39.7 39.2 34.1
Bolivia 21.2 14.3 16.6 12.1 14.8 15.1 15.7 14.3 10.3 10.1
Brazil 21.8 17.9 21.9 25.3 24.0 28.1 31.6 26.5 26.4 22.2
Chile 10.3 8.2 7.2 7.2 7.3 8.3 8.0 8.3 7.9 8.0
Colombia 12.3 15.7 15.6 16.2 18.7 19.8 18.2 17.1 17.4 17.7
Costa Rica 6.8 5.5 5.7 4.8 4.6 3.6 3.2 4.1 5.1 4.9
Ecuador 21.1 18.5 16.8 16.1 15.8 21.1 21.1 20.0 16.9 15.3
El Salvador 8.5 6.3 5.9 6.1 8.2 8.0 8.7 8.6 8.4 10.2
Guatemala 6.2 5.8 4.8 6.1 5.4 4.0 4.3 4.7 3.4 6.2
Haiti 7.9 6.1 10.4 3.1 3.2 1.9 … … 1.9 1.9
Honduras 15.6 15.6 13.2 11.4 8.8 7.9 8.6 7.5 6.6 5.9
Mexico 18.8 17.7 15.2 13.1 10.9 10.1 9.4 8.3 8.0 7.6
Nicaragua 116.7 99.7 57.3 45.0 28.3 18.4 19.7 17.1 20.3 14.7
Panama 15.6 15.4 22.5 17.0 15.7 19.1 20.5 20.2 15.6 …
Paraguay 3.0 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.0 3.1 4.2 4.1 5.8
Peru 38.9 34.6 33.2 25.2 19.6 24.1 23.1 18.8 16.3 14.9
Dominican Republic 5.8 4.0 4.0 3.3 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.6 …
Uruguay 14.4 14.9 16.5 15.9 16.9 18.1 20.9 20.6 23.7 27.2
Venezuela 17.0 17.0 16.1 11.2 13.8 15.4 12.8 8.6 10.3 11.3
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Includes interest paid and interest due and not paid.
b Preliminary figures.
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Table A - 20
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF PROFIT PAYMENTS
 TO EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES a
(Percentages)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 b
Latin America and
the Caribbean 4.4 4.5 5.4 5.6 4.7 5.3 5.7 6.1 5.3 5.2
Argentina 11.0 10.4 8.6 7.4 8.9 8.9 8.0 8.1 5.4 2.8
Bolivia 1.9 2.2 3.1 5.4 5.7 6.0 10.9 10.1 11.2 11.0
Brazil 4.5 4.7 5.3 7.6 9.1 10.2 9.3 6.6 7.4 8.2
Chile 8.1 12.9 11.2 10.2 10.1 7.8 8.2 10.7 10.1 8.9
Colombia 10.4 4.6 2.9 4.9 4.0 -0.2 -1.8 4.3 6.0 6.2
Costa Rica 2.9 1.7 2.4 1.8 3.3 5.5 21.0 14.7 8.7 2.6
Ecuador 2.5 3.1 2.8 3.4 3.2 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.8 5.6
El Salvador 1.8 1.6 … … … 1.0 3.5 1.6 1.8 1.6
Guatemala 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.6 4.4 3.1 3.9 5.8 6.8 5.5
Haiti … … 1.5 0.1 0.4 0.3 … … … …
Honduras 4.5 1.7 3.6 3.7 2.7 2.9 1.9 2.8 3.7 2.0
Mexico 4.4 5.3 3.2 3.9 3.4 4.1 2.4 3.3 3.1 2.6
Nicaragua 3.5 3.6 4.7 7.0 6.7 7.0 7.4 7.3 8.4 7.7
Panama 4.6 3.7 3.9 6.4 6.0 8.4 11.1 7.9 8.7 …
Paraguay 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.8 3.8 4.3 3.6 2.9 4.2 3.6
Peru 3.0 3.3 5.3 5.7 6.8 6.4 6.2 4.4 2.9 5.6
Dominican Republic 6.5 10.6 10.8 10.7 10.9 9.8 10.1 11.1 12.1 11.9
Uruguay 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.3 1.5 0.9 0.6 1.4 2.0 2.4
Venezuela 1.4 3.3 3.6 2.9 2.1 1.7 4.1 6.7 3.6 2.8
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the International Monetary Fund and national agencies.
a Includes reinvested profits.
b Preliminary figures.
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF TOTAL DISBURSED EXTERNAL DEBT
TO EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
(Percentages)
1993    1994    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 a
Latin America and
the  Caribbean 271.9 252.8 232.8 217.5 203.4 228.8 223.2 181.8 185.7 184.7
Argentina 441.9 442.3 395.8 390.8 405.6 457.2 523.5 470.7 453.2 453.2
Bolivia 421.9 310.7 340.2 343.4 308.9 312.4 335.0 303.4 290.1 288.9
Brazil 334.3 302.6 302.5 342.7 334.1 409.3 437.4 366.3 334.7 328.8
Chile 167.9 150.7 112.3 113.8 122.8 157.2 164.3 158.8 170.4 179.3
Colombia 190.1 205.6 214.3 236.5 242.1 272.5 262.4 232.3 265.7 259.5
Costa Rica b 115.2 108.3 94.6 68.1 57.7 49.4 44.3 48.3 57.9 58.3
Ecuador 361.4 316.3 268.2 259.9 249.7 327.7 304.6 226.6 249.6 267.7
El Salvador 144.5 125.4 106.1 114.3 92.3 86.4 87.8 77.3 79.2 103.9
Guatemala 116.0 126.6 105.2 109.4 100.5 104.4 111.5 101.8 105.2 110.3
Haiti 530.8 628.8 349.2 277.6 270.3 227.3 220.8 234.5 269.0 283.8
Honduras 318.0 295.0 244.6 215.1 186.6 179.8 211.2 191.6 196.3 198.9
Mexico 212.9 196.4 185.4 147.5 122.7 124.2 112.4 82.5 84.5 82.1
Nicaragua 3,019.3 2,522.1 1,674.3 945.9 752.7 757.1 781.0 696.7 693.3 688.9
Panama 78.4 73.9 77.4 68.4 60.2 64.7 77.9 71.7 78.2 79.7
Paraguay 38.0 33.6 36.3 41.0 48.4 51.1 93.4 92.3 89.0 93.0
Peru 630.4 533.2 496.7 462.3 342.2 392.8 376.0 326.8 320.0 308.1
Dominican Republic b 96.1 75.3 69.8 61.5 50.6 47.3 45.5 41.1 50.0 53.1
Uruguay 129.6 130.9 126.2 121.7 112.7 125.6 161.5 167.1 178.7 244.2
Venezuela 253.3 231.9 180.9 135.0 124.4 158.9 150.2 92.6 115.6 114.3
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